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[109 Senate Hearings]
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                                                        S. Hrg. 109-312
 
                        POLICY OPTIONS FOR IRAQ

=======================================================================

                                HEARINGS



                               BEFORE THE



                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE



                       ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS



                             FIRST SESSION



                               __________

                       JULY 18, 19, AND 20, 2005

                               __________



       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations


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                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                  RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska                JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island         PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia               CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota              JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio            RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee           BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire        BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska               BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
                 Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
              Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director

                                  (ii)

  
?

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

               IMPROVING SECURITY IN IRAQ--JULY 18, 2005

                                                                   Page

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware...........     3
    Prepared statement...........................................     5
Cordesman, Dr. Anthony H., Arleigh A. Burke Fellow in Strategy, 
  Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC.    27
    Prepared statement...........................................    30
Hagel, Hon. Chuck Hagel, U.S. Senator from Nebraska..............    65
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana................     1
McCaffrey, GEN Barry R., USA (Ret.), president, BR McCaffrey 
  Associates, LLC, Arlington, VA.................................    21
    Prepared statement...........................................    23
Pollack, Dr. Kenneth M., director of research and senior fellow, 
  Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution, 
  Washington, DC.................................................     7
    Prepared statement...........................................    10
                                 ------                                

          ADVANCING IRAQI POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT--JULY 19, 2005

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware...........   105
    Prepared statement...........................................   105
Feldman, Dr. Noah, professor of law, New York University, New 
  York, NY.......................................................    99
    Prepared statement...........................................   102
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana................    81
Marr, Dr. Phebe, senior fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace, 
  Washington, DC.................................................    83
    Prepared statement...........................................    85
Van Rest, Judy, executive vice president, International 
  Republican Institute, Washington, DC...........................    92
    Prepared statement...........................................    94
                                 ------                                

         ACCELERATING ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN IRAQ--JULY 20, 2005

Barton, Frederick D., senior advisor, International Security 
  Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
  Washington, DC.................................................   159
    Prepared statement...........................................   161
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware...........   172
    Prepared statement...........................................   172
Crane, Dr. Keith, senior economist, RAND Corporation, Arlington, 
  VA.............................................................   151
    Prepared statement...........................................   152
Dodd, Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut..............   149
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana................   147
Mohamedi, Fareed, senior director, Country Strategies Group, PFC 
  Energy, Washington, DC.........................................   164
    Prepared statement...........................................   165
Murkowski, Lisa, U.S. Senator from Alaska........................   150

                                 (iii)

  


                       IMPROVING SECURITY IN IRAQ

                              ----------                              


                         MONDAY, JULY 18, 2005

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in 
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar 
(chairman) presiding.
    Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Alexander, and Biden.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                            INDIANA

    The Chairman. The Foreign Relations Committee is called to 
order. Today the committee launches a series of four hearings 
on Iraq. Each of these hearings will focus on one aspect of 
Iraq policy. As the American people and policymakers debate our 
course in Iraq, I believe the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee can contribute greatly by being a bipartisan forum 
for advancing ideas to improve the situation. Our intent in 
these hearings will be to go beyond describing conditions in 
Iraq or assessing what is working and what is not. Our goal 
will be to examine options for making things better.
    With the help of our experts, we will consider whether 
changes in military tactics, alliance strategy, resource 
allocations, or other factors should be adopted. I am hopeful 
that this process will inform our own policymaking role, as 
well as help stimulate constructive public debate on forward-
looking alternatives.
    Traditionally, Congress has looked to the executive branch 
for foreign policy guidance and expertise. We should always 
carefully consider the recommendations of the President of the 
United States and his team, who are charged with implementing 
foreign policy. But I believe that our oversight role involves 
more than critiquing the President. Congress should also 
examine ideas and express its own views on critical issues.
    At the end of this four-hearing series, the Foreign 
Relations Committee will have held 30 full committee hearings 
on Iraq in the last 30 months of time. In addition, we have 
held numerous other hearings that have partially touched on the 
subject of Iraq. We have maintained this focus because success 
in Iraq is critical to the United States national security. 
Permanent instability in Iraq could set back American interests 
in the Middle East for a generation, increasing anti-
Americanism, multiplying the threats from tyrants and 
terrorists, and reducing our credibility.
    We know that the planning for postwar Iraq was inadequate. 
We should not pretend, however, that a few adjustments to our 
reconstruction strategy or an extra month of planning could 
have prevented all the challenges we now face in Iraq. Even in 
the best circumstances, political and economic reconstruction 
of Iraq after the overthrow of an entrenched and brutal regime 
was going to stretch our capabilities, our resources, and our 
patience to the limit. We are engaged in a difficult mission in 
Iraq, and the President and the Congress must be clear with the 
American people about the stakes involved and the difficulties 
yet to come.
    Almost 1,800 heroic Americans have died in Iraq during the 
past 2 years. During the insurgency thousands of Iraqi Muslims 
have been killed by other Muslims, including, most recently, a 
group of small children deliberately targeted by a suicide 
bomber. Like the recent terrorist attacks in London, the 
continuing insurgent attacks in Iraq are tragic, senseless, and 
often indiscriminate. Each day the Iraqi people are living with 
the fear caused by similar irrational, barbaric acts, but they 
continue to show their resilience. The Iraqi people get back on 
the buses, and open their shops for business. They return to 
their jobs as police officers, teachers, and doctors. They 
continue to hope that life will become normal and that the 
violence will end.
    Today we take on the responsibility of examining options 
for improving security in Iraq. Tomorrow we will address 
options for advancing Iraqi political development. On Wednesday 
we will turn our attention to the Iraqi economy. Finally, on a 
date to be determined, we will assess the regional dynamics 
related to the situation in Iraq as we ask questions about the 
impact on Iraq of Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.
    We have determined that these hearings will follow a unique 
format. Discussion in each hearing will be organized around 
four policy options for improving the situation in Iraq. 
Accordingly, after Senator Biden and I have offered our opening 
comments, instead of hearing comprehensive statements from the 
witnesses, we will put the first policy option and associated 
questions before our expert panel.
    Just as a matter of housekeeping, I will read the question 
and recognize one of the witnesses to commence his or her 
answer to that question. Each witness in turn will provide his 
or her views on the option being presented. Then we will put 
the second option before them, then the third, then the fourth 
and so on.
    Recognizing that options exist beyond our published hearing 
plan, we will ask our witnesses if they would like to offer any 
additional ideas for improving security that have not been 
discussed previously.
    After this sequence, committee members will be recognized 
in turn to address questions on any of the policy options to 
any member of the panel. My hope is that through the expertise 
of the witnesses, and the questions of the members, we can 
achieve a systematic evaluation of the options presented for 
improving Iraqi security. After the hearings, the committee 
will publish a record of all the policy options we have 
discussed.
    This morning we will ask our experts whether the basic 
counterinsurgency strategy that we are pursuing is the right 
one. We will ask whether it is possible to prevent infiltration 
of Iraq by foreign insurgents and whether it is feasible for 
other nations to assume a greater share of our border security 
burdens. We will ask how we can improve the critical process of 
training Iraqi forces, so that greater numbers of Iraqis will 
be capable of assuming the full range of security duties. We 
will examine whether changes should be made to the current 
United States force structure in Iraq.
    In this endeavor, we are joined by three distinguished 
experts. First, we welcome Dr. Kenneth Pollack, Senior Fellow 
and Director of Research at the Saban Center for Middle East 
Policy at The Brookings Institution. Dr. Pollack has provided 
exceptional security analysis to this committee in the past, 
and we are pleased that he has returned today.
    We also welcome GEN Barry McCaffrey, President of BR 
McCaffrey Associates. General McCaffrey, who has recently 
returned from a trip to Iraq and Kuwait, served as a professor 
at West Point after his distinguished military career, which 
included experience across the Middle East.
    Finally, we are pleased to welcome back Dr. Anthony 
Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair for Strategy at the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies. Dr. Cordesman 
also has recently returned from a research visit to Iraq.
    We thank our witnesses for joining us and we look forward 
to their insights.
    I would like to recognize now the distinguished ranking 
chairman of our committee, Senator Biden.

   STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                            DELAWARE

    Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 
you for holding these hearings. We have indeed had a number of 
hearings examining ideas and new ideas and alternative ideas, 
and we have jointly and separately drawn from those ideas and 
made our own recommendations to the administration.
    Quite frankly, not many have been listened to. One of my 
frustrations I expressed to you--and I am sure you must feel 
it, although I speak only for myself--as we began this hearing 
is that there are no administration witnesses on the schedule 
for this series of four hearings. I think that is important for 
one significant reason. We all know no foreign policy can be 
sustained, especially General McCaffrey, being in the field and 
being wounded in Vietnam and leading troops in Vietnam, no 
foreign policy can be sustained, no matter how well informed, 
without the informed consent of the American people.
    The American people--it is not a judgment on my part about 
the policy. It is a judgment by the American people. The 
American people clearly have begun to lose faith that we have a 
sense of how to proceed in Iraq, that we have a strategy for 
winning. I do not believe that it is the body counts, as tragic 
as it is, that is causing the diminution of support for our 
effort, but I think it is a failure to understand or believe we 
have a winning strategy.
    I compliment the President for having made his speech a 
couple weeks ago now. But I think it is important the President 
and the administration witnesses come before us in our 
oversight capacity, not just to seek new ideas, but to 
literally oversee the administration's policy and let us know 
what their benchmarks are, what their objectives are, and how 
they are proceeding, because I otherwise think we are going to 
continue to lose the support of the American people unless 
something dramatically changes on the ground, which could be, I 
am hoping. I am always hopeful. Because I think we not only 
want the President to succeed in Iraq; his success is America's 
success and his failure means America has a problem.
    I still--I am one who still believes, as I think we all do 
up here, that we can succeed in Iraq. By ``success,'' I want to 
redefine it here, or define it again, I should say. I am not 
looking for Jeffersonian democracy. I never have been. I am 
looking for a country that is secure within its own borders, 
that is not a breeding ground or a haven for terror, that is 
not a threat to its neighbors, where everybody thinks they have 
a piece of the action. We will begin the process, which will be 
long and arduous.
    It has now been 6 weeks since I have returned from Iraq. 
There are some good things that are happening. But the security 
situation is still very, very much in doubt. With General 
Petraeus' efforts, some very positive things are happening, but 
I believe General Abizaid, in his recent assessment, is correct 
that the insurgency's strength is about the same as it was 6 
months ago, not in its last throes.
    Iraqi forces are gradually improving. I wish we would stop 
talking about 172,000 trained Iraqi forces. They are in 
uniform, but all of the folks I spoke to on the ground were a 
long, long way. What it does in my view is undermine the 
administration's credibility with the American people. If we 
have 172,000 trained Iraqi troops and 130,000 American, 140,000 
American troops, they ask me in my district why, with over 
300,000 troops, are we not doing better? You know, it is a 
problem. They know we ain't telling the truth.
    Since a month ago, we have been in contact with General 
Petraeus. Things are even improving beyond what it was 5 weeks 
ago.
    There has been some progress with the Sunnis. It seems to 
me that we have turned a political corner of sorts and that 
they have realized they have to get in the game. But that is a 
long way from being able to actually have a political strategy 
that is likely to work.
    The thing that I have found--and I am anxious to hear our 
witnesses--I found when I spoke to our military folks for the 
first time they were talking about, not the probability, but 
the possibility of a civil war. They were talking about things 
breaking down, not getting better. Now again, I do not want to 
exaggerate it. It is just that it is my fifth trip--I went a 
couple times with my colleagues on my left--and this is the 
first time I started hearing about that.
    I came back--and I will end with this, Mr. Chairman--and 
spent a lot of time with a lot of people, including one of the 
witnesses. I have tried to, like you do, we all do on this 
committee--one of the great, great benefits and privileges of 
this committee is the best minds in the country will come and 
talk to you and sit down with you and visit with you. I went 
visiting on a regular basis with half a dozen--it's a rotating 
group, but essentially the same half a dozen of three- and 
four-stars who have in the past, like General McCaffrey, had 
significant responsibilities, including CENTCOM as well as 
NATO.
    Everybody I spoke to in the field, and spoke to back here, 
talks about something that is different than I think we are 
going to hear today, that is encouraging--we may hear something 
different--about what constitutes a counterinsurgency, that, 
really, it is hard to figure out what our counterinsurgency 
plan is. Again, these guys--they happen to be all men in this 
case. I told General McCaffrey this. Folks are talking about 
you cannot deal with a counterinsurgency unless you can occupy, 
at least for a while, the territory and you can not do a whole 
lot if the border is totally porous, and I understand we are 
going to hear today that maybe there is not a reasonable 
prospect of being able to do anything about the border.
    At any rate, I am anxious to hear what the witnesses have 
to say. I have an inordinately high regard for all three of the 
witnesses and I think the way you are proceeding is a really 
very good format for us to use, targeting what, at least, is on 
our mind. It may be that the witnesses will conclude not all of 
it is relevant, what we are asking. But at least they will tell 
us.
    I would ask unanimous consent that my statement be placed, 
the remainder of my statement be placed in the record as if 
read, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

  Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator From 
                                Delaware

    Mr. Chairman, thank you. I, too, welcome our witnesses. This is a 
superb panel. And I applaud the other hearings you've held to explore 
policy options in Iraq.
    I am frustrated, though, that none of the witnesses before us 
today, or scheduled in the days ahead, work for the administration.
    I have said from the outset and repeat today: No foreign policy can 
be sustained without the informed consent of the American people.
    The American people have not been informed about the reality on the 
ground and the very difficult challenges that lie ahead. They do not 
believe we have a coherent, realistic plan for success. And the gap 
between the administration's rhetoric and the reality on the ground has 
created a credibility chasm that is endangering public support for our 
efforts in Iraq.
    I give the President credit for starting to level with the American 
people in his recent speech. But to fully regain their trust and 
support, I believe it is very important for the administration to set 
clear benchmarks for progress and to report on them to us, in public, 
on a regular basis.
    I want the President to succeed in Iraq. His success is America's 
success; his failure means America has a problem.
    I believe we can still succeed in Iraq. I define success as leaving 
Iraq better than we found it. Not a Jeffersonian democracy, but a 
country with a representative government in which all the major 
communities have a stake; a country that is not a breeding ground or a 
haven for terrorists; and a country that is not a threat to us or its 
neighbors. Full stop.
    Based on my recent trip to Iraq--my fifth trip there--I believe we 
need to change course, not simply stay the course, if we are to 
succeed.
    There are some positive developments. But the security environment 
in Iraq remains precarious. I found considerable evidence to support 
General Abizaid's recent assessment that the insurgency's strength is 
about the same as it was 6 months ago.
    The Iraqi security forces are very gradually improving thanks to 
the leadership of General Petreaus.
    But let's not kid ourselves when we hear reports of 172,000 
``trained and equipped'' Iraqis. When my constituents in Delaware hear 
numbers like that, they ask why we still have 139,000 American troops 
in Iraq. The answer is because very few of those forces are trained to 
the only standard that counts--the ability to operate independently, 
without our support.
    A month ago, just a handful of the more than 100 Army battalions 
met that standard, while many more could operate alongside the 
coalition or with strong backup.
    The January elections were a remarkable achievement, but the 
goverment in Baghdad has very limited capacity and reach beyond the 
green zone. This has created a power vacuum that is being filled by 
Sunni insurgents, foreign fighters, local militias, mafia gangs, and 
agents of neighbors like Syria and Iran.
    Ethnic tension is rising to the point where civil war, though not 
yet a probability, is a real possibility.
    In the absence of security and governing capacity, reconstruction 
cannot go forward. Iraqis will not put their faith in the government, 
and we will not be able to withdraw responsibly.
    I look forward to hearing our witnesses' ideas on meeting the 
security challenge. Here is what I believe we must do:
    First, we must take advantage of foreign offers to train Iraqi 
forces outside Iraq. Iraqi recruits could then focus their energy on 
learning instead of simply staying alive.
    Second, we should accelerate the training of an Iraqi officer 
corps. That is one of the keys to standing up an Iraqi military that 
won't melt when it comes under fire. We should train large numbers of 
midranking Iraqi officers here in the United States and encourage NATO 
allies to do more of the same in their countries.
    Third, we should press our NATO allies to come up with a small 
force of some 3-5,000 to help guard Iraq's borders. NATO has the plans 
for such a mission; the President needs to lead to give the alliance 
the political will to implement those plans.
    Fourth, we need a serious field mentoring program for newly trained 
Iraqi police recruits. It is wrong to throw freshly minted and ill-
equipped police officers against suicidal insurgents and desperate 
criminals. They must be partnered with experienced officers--initially 
international police professionals and ultimately Iraqis.
    Fifth, we must refocus the Iraqi Government on a plan to eventually 
integrate militias in Iraq. Integration won't be easy. But without it, 
you cannot build a unitary, functioning state.
    Mr. Chairman, security is about much more than having competent 
security forces. Real security depends on a political process in which 
all the major communities believe they have a stake. It requires a 
reconstruction program that increases electricity, clean water, sewage 
treatment, and jobs in a country where unemployment is estimated at 
more than 40 to 50 percent. We will hear more about that in the days 
ahead.
    I look forward to the testimony.

    The Chairman. Your statement will be placed in the record 
in full. I thank the distinguished ranking member.
    Senator Biden. I welcome the witnesses and thank them for 
being here.
    The Chairman. We will proceed now with the witnesses. Let 
me state the first option for comment by our witnesses. In this 
case I will ask Dr. Pollack to comment first, then General 
McCaffrey and Dr. Cordesman. Option one is: Should the 
coalition revise its current counterinsurgency strategy in 
Iraq? To follow up to that: Should the coalition and Iraq 
security forces create safe zones and put more emphasis on 
fighting street crime and organized crime, deemphasizing the 
hunt for insurgents, so that Iraqi economic and political life 
can take root? Should the coalition attempt to take advantage 
of divisions within the insurgents, for example Sunni 
nationalists versus foreign jihadists? Can a political solution 
be reached with Sunni insurgents and could this lead to Sunni 
cooperation in isolating, capturing, or killing the 
international insurgents?
    Would you proceed with your thoughts on this area, Dr. 
Pollack?

   STATEMENT OF KENNETH M. POLLACK, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH AND 
    SENIOR FELLOW, SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE 
             BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC

    Dr. Pollack. Thank you, Senator Lugar. Thank you, Senator 
Biden, other assembled Senators. Thank you for giving me this 
opportunity to come before you to speak on this critical topic.
    As you have all repeatedly pointed out and I think very 
correctly, security undergirds the entire reconstruction of 
Iraq. Our problems with security are hampering, if not 
crippling, both the political, economic, and social development 
of the country. I increasingly believe that we have the wrong 
strategy in Iraq.
    Ultimately, with security there are two overarching and 
interlocking problems that we face in Iraq. The first is a 
diverse insurgency, but one rooted on the Sunni tribal 
community with an admixture of other elements. The second is 
the state of semilawlessness that exists elsewhere and 
throughout the country as a result of the security vacuum that 
we have left throughout much of the country.
    Our current strategy is one that I would describe as being 
one of postconflict stabilization, and its principal goal is to 
try to enforce security simultaneously across the entire 
country, largely by concentrating the available coalition 
forces, and primarily American forces, on those areas of 
greatest insurgent activity to try to quell them quickly and 
prevent them from spreading.
    This approach has several problems because of these two 
interlocking and overarching problems that we face. First of 
all, it plays into the classic failure of counterinsurgency 
operations, when in particular you do not use a true 
counterinsurgency strategy. The government forces, in this case 
the coalition forces, move into an area, they take down an 
insurgent stronghold, but, of course, the insurgents do not 
stay to fight. It is not in their nature to do so. It is not 
their objective to do so. They flee. They melt back into the 
population and, as a result, the major conventional assault has 
little impact on the actual strength of the insurgents.
    The insurgents then move on into other areas, and when our 
own forces, when the coalition forces, then shift on to follow 
them to their new strongholds, we often leave too few forces 
behind to secure the area that we have just taken down. The 
result is that we continuously chase insurgents across the 
country, we have little impact on their actual strength or even 
their ability to operate, and we continuously allow the 
insurgents to creep back into areas that we have already had to 
pacify.
    The second problem is that by pulling our troops out of the 
populated areas, by focusing them, I would say inordinately, on 
hunting down the insurgents in their strongholds and in their 
lairs, we have left far too few troops in the rest of the 
country to secure the vast bulk of the Iraqi population, 
particularly the Shi'a and the urban Sunnis, who desperately 
want reconstruction to succeed, but are increasingly distraught 
by our failure to provide them with basic security both against 
the insurgents and against typical crime, organized and 
unorganized, and to provide them with the basic services, like 
electricity and clean water and sanitation and gasoline and 
jobs, all of which are crippled by these first two security 
problems, by the problems of the insurgency and by the general 
lawlessness in the society.
    In addition, even where our troops are trying to guard the 
population, oftentimes our methods are counterproductive. We 
have placed a tremendous emphasis on force protection, on the 
protection of our own forces. While obviously force protection 
has got to be a major concern of United States and coalition 
forces, we have at times put that priority at the expense of 
the Iraqis' own security.
    Our troops stay in heavily defended cantonments. When they 
get out, they typically get out in motorized columns that move 
very quickly through Iraqi areas. There is very little 
presence. There is very little patrolling. There is very little 
sense of real security provided by our troops for the Iraqi 
people themselves.
    As a result, Iraqis are increasingly frustrated because 2 
years on they do not see any real benefits from our continued 
occupation of the country, and they have come to resent our 
occupation, not because they want us to leave, not because they 
do not want us there, but because they do not see us as 
providing them with the first benefits of reconstruction, basic 
security, and basic services.
    What I argue that the United States ought to adopt and what 
I increasingly hear from field-grade officers, American field-
grade officers in Iraq and back here in the United States, is a 
true counterinsurgency strategy. Very briefly, very broadly, 
what would a counterinsurgency strategy look like for Iraq? It 
would be based on the classic model of a counterinsurgency 
strategy, which is typically referred to as a spreading inkspot 
or a spreading oil stain.
    The idea would be to start with a smaller area, do not try 
to secure the entire country simultaneously, because frankly we 
do not have the forces in place to do so. Instead, we would 
start by securing a smaller portion of the country, one where 
the population would be already supportive of reconstruction. 
Of course, there are huge swaths of Iraq where the vast bulk of 
the population is enormously supportive of reconstruction and 
their anger at us is not because we are there, but because we 
are not there and not providing them with the security and the 
services they so desperately desire.
    We would concentrate our forces principally in that area or 
in those areas to make them safe for the Iraqis, to make them 
safe for Iraqi life to revive, for the Iraqi economy to revive, 
for Iraqi political affairs to revive at the local level. We 
would use foot patrols, a general presence, and an emphasis on 
law and order in these safe zones.
    We would then pour in economic resources into these safe 
zones to give the Iraqis tangible material benefits from our 
presence. We would help them to help their economy to revive. 
We would help them to rebuild their political processes at the 
local level and they would do so in an environment made safe by 
the coalition presence there.
    This process of pouring in resources, combined with the 
general greater safety, would create much greater popular 
support for our presence and would ultimately--and historically 
this has been the only solution to the problem--would solve the 
intelligence problem that we face in Iraq. The problem is you 
can never find all the intelligence you need if what you are 
doing is simply chasing insurgents. As the British learned in 
Northern Ireland and again in Malaya, as we learned in Bosnia 
and Kosovo, the only way that you get the intelligence that you 
need is by convincing the people that they are safe and that 
they are benefiting from your presence. Under those 
circumstances, the people come forward with all of the 
intelligence that you need and it becomes extraordinarily 
difficult for the insurgents to operate.
    We would also use these safe areas, these secure zones, to 
train indigenous Iraqi forces, both formal training, the kind 
of training that we have been doing in Iraq, but also informal 
training, the training that takes place after a unit has 
finished its basic training, its basic training cycle, but 
still needs to have unit cohesion, command relationships, and a 
sense of connection with the community all gel, all of which 
can only happen in actual operations in safe areas where there 
is a permissive environment in which these units can cut their 
teeth and not be stressed by high-intensity operations.
    The success of the secured areas should make other Iraqis, 
those outside the secured areas, more desirous of having us 
expand our presence, and as the number of indigenous forces 
that we train came on line and actually developed capability 
grew we would then use that expanded security presence to 
spread into other areas of Iraq as well. This is why this 
strategy is typically called, traditionally called, a spreading 
inkspot strategy.
    In so doing, the goal of this would be to deprive 
insurgents of a popular base and, in so doing, cause them to 
wither. This again is the classic model of counterinsurgent 
operations. It is how insurgencies have been typically defeated 
in the past and it is typically only when a government force 
has failed to employ this kind of strategy that they have 
failed, that is, failed to defeat the insurgency.
    It has a proven track record and, what is more, we have 
seen instances in Iraq where this strategy has been made to 
work. Wherever we have taken the time to put our people on the 
street, establish presence, mix with the Iraqis, establish 
mixed forces where the Iraqis are working with Americans, so 
that the Iraqis see both an American face and an Iraqi face to 
the presence, it has worked.
    Before the January elections we did this in cities like 
Mosul. We sent out foot patrols, and the Iraqis were stunned, 
and during that period of time security greatly increased in 
those cities where we did it.
    Fallujah is, in some ways, another good example. Fallujah, 
I would say, is an example of both the good and the bad. We 
took down Fallujah, we chased out the insurgents. 
Unfortunately, they moved to other areas and, as we have seen, 
there has been no actual diminution of the lethality or the 
extent of the insurgency.
    We did leave some forces behind in Fallujah. We left the 
Marines behind, who actually have a very good record in 
counterinsurgency operations, and to some extent Fallujah is 
better than it was before we took it down because we did leave 
a residual presence, and we have tried to put some economic 
resources in to take advantage of that somewhat better security 
environment.
    But we failed to put in enough troops and we have failed to 
make good on all of the economic commitments to Fallujah, and 
as a result the insurgents are creeping back, and I know that 
General McCaffrey will tell you more about the fact that 
Fallujah is, as yet, nothing to write home about.
    Mr. Chairman, I think that there is a strategy that can 
work in Iraq. It is the strategy that I have just outlined and 
which I have gone into much greater detail in my written 
testimony. But I think that we need to recognize that it is not 
a strategy without a price. Politically, it will be very 
difficult. It will take a long time, at least the decade-plus 
that Secretary Rumsfeld outlined, and it is one that will 
require us to admit to having made some mistakes and to force 
us to actually shift, very significantly, our approach to 
reconstruction in Iraq--very painful political choices.
    I think if we are willing to do that, I think there is a 
way out of this. I think that success is entirely possible in 
Iraq, because so much of the population wants reconstruction to 
succeed. But I think it is incumbent upon us to adopt a true 
counterinsurgency strategy to deal with the twin problems of a 
full-blown insurgency and the state of semilawlessness that we 
have continued to allow the country to wallow in.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Pollack follows:]

Prepared Statement of Dr. Kenneth M. Pollack, Director of Research and 
   Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings 
                      Institution, Washington, DC

    Mr. Chairman and Senator Biden, thank you for allowing me to come 
before you to discuss the future of Iraq, and particularly our efforts 
to secure that country to make reconstruction possible. As you have 
both repeatedly reminded us, the reconstruction of Iraq is a vital 
interest of the United States, just as it is vital to the people of 
Iraq. As we all know, and have repeatedly had reinforced to us, 
security is absolutely critical to the broader reconstruction effort. 
Without security, reconstruction will fail. And until we have dealt 
with the pressing problems of security, it will be impossible for us to 
perceive, let alone solve, many of the other matters troubling Iraq. If 
we get security right, everything is possible, although nothing is 
guaranteed.
    I have confined my remarks to the four options you have outlined. I 
will begin with your first option, and address each in turn.

    Option 1: Should the coalition revise its current counterinsurgency 
strategy in Iraq?

    Mr. Chairman, I believe that after 2 years of trying to secure Iraq 
with our current strategy, it is becoming increasingly clear that we 
have the wrong strategy for the job. Our current approach probably was 
the appropriate strategy in the immediate aftermath of the fall of 
Baghdad, but the inadequate number of troops we brought to Iraq and a 
series of other mistakes rendered this approach largely infeasible. 
Today, our problems have metastasized, and I believe that we must 
fundamentally change our strategy to cope with the new challenges we 
face.
    Our effort to secure Iraq faces two overarching and interlocking 
problems: A full-blown insurgency and a continuing state of semi-
lawlessness. Both are equally important. Reconstruction will likely 
fail if either is unaddressed. I believe that current U.S. strategy in 
Iraq is misguided because it is not properly tailored to defeat the 
first problem and largely ignores the second.
    Today, and since the fall of Baghdad, the United States has 
employed what I would call a ``post-conflict stabilization'' model of 
security operations. The key element of this strategy is providing 
simultaneous security for the entire country by concentrating coalition 
forces on those areas of greatest unrest to try to quell the violence 
quickly and keep it from spreading. Had the United States brought 
sufficient ground forces to blanket the country immediately after the 
fall of Saddam's regime--as many warned--and had we not made a series 
of other mistakes, like failing to provide our troops with orders to 
maintain law and order, to impose martial law and prevent looting, I 
think this strategy might very well have succeeded.
    However, our continued reliance on this approach is failing. To 
borrow a military term usually employed in a different realm of 
operations, today we are reinforcing failure. By continuing to 
concentrate our overstretched forces on the areas of greatest insurgent 
activity we are depriving most of Iraq's populated areas of desperately 
needed security forces, and by emphasizing offensive search-and-sweep 
missions, we are making ever more enemies among Iraq's Sunni tribal 
population. In other words, we are failing to protect those Iraqis who 
most want reconstruction to succeed and we are further antagonizing the 
community that is most antipathetic to our goals.
    This approach runs directly contrary to the principal lessons of 
counterinsurgent warfare.
    In 1986, Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, then a major in the Army, 
published what is widely regarded as the seminal work on American 
military performance in Vietnam, titled ``The Army and Vietnam.'' In 
this book, Krepinevich demonstrated that the Army high command--for 
reasons entirely of its own choosing--largely refused to employ a 
traditional counterinsurgency strategy against the Viet Cong and North 
Vietnamese Army Forces. The Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV) 
repeatedly shut down other efforts, by the Marines and by Army Special 
Forces, to employ a traditional counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. 
Krepinevich further demonstrated that these stillborn COIN campaigns 
had all proven far more successful before they were terminated than 
MACV's cherished offensive operations.
    Mr. Chairman, I do not know why it is that the United States has 
not yet adopted a traditional counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq. I 
suspect that it is for reasons far more mundane and far better 
intentioned than MACV's rationale was in that earlier war, because I 
know General Abizaid to be a superb soldier and a wise commander. 
However, whatever the rationale, it is clear that the United States has 
so far failed to employ a traditional counterinsurgency strategy in 
Iraq, just as we did in Vietnam, and as a result we are failing in Iraq 
just as we failed in Vietnam.
    Mr. Chairman, if you were to pick up a copy of Dr. Krepinevich's 
book, you would find, I think, a great many chilling passages. Passages 
where Krepinevich explains how history has demonstrated that a 
guerrilla campaign can be defeated, and how the United States failed to 
employ such a strategy in Vietnam. These passages are unsettling 
precisely because they so closely echo our problems and mistakes in 
Iraq today. We are once again failing to use a true COIN strategy in 
Iraq, and committing too many of the very same errors we made in 
Vietnam.
    The crux of a traditional counterinsurgency strategy is never to 
reinforce failure, but always to reinforce success. As Mao Zedong once 
wrote, the guerrilla is like a fish who swims in the sea of the 
people--thus, if you can deprive the guerrilla of support from the 
people, he will be as helpless as a fish out of water.
    The goal of a true-COIN campaign is to deprive the guerrilla of 
that access. The COIN force begins by securing a base of operations by 
denying one portion of the country to the insurgency. This portion can 
be as big or as small as the COIN force can handle--the bigger the COIN 
force available, the larger the area. Within this area, the COIN force 
provides the people with security, in all senses of the word. In Iraq, 
this would mean security from insurgent attack as well as from ordinary 
(and organized) crime. In so doing, the COIN force creates a secure 
space in which political and economic life can flourish once again. 
Ideally, the COIN force would pour resources into this area to make it 
economically dynamic and take advantage of the security the COIN 
campaign has provided, both to cement popular support for the COIN 
campaign and to make it attractive to people living outside the secure 
area so that they will support the COIN campaign when it shifts to 
their region.
    The increasing attractiveness of these safe areas also solve the 
intelligence problem that COIN forces inevitably face. Ultimately, 
there is no way that a COIN force can gather enough intelligence on 
insurgent forces through traditional means to exterminate them. 
Instead, as the British learned in Northern Ireland, the only way to 
gather adequate information on the insurgents is to convince the local 
populace to volunteer such information, which they will do only if they 
are enthusiastic supporters of the COIN campaign and feel largely safe 
from retaliation by the insurgents. When these conditions are met, the 
counterinsurgents enjoy a massive advantage in intelligence making the 
further eradication of the insurgents easy, and almost an afterthought.
    In addition, the COIN forces use these ``safe zones'' to train 
indigenous forces who can assist them in subsequent security 
operations. Once this base of operations is truly secure and can be 
maintained by local indigenous forces, the COIN forces then spread 
their control to additional parts of the country, performing the same 
set of steps as they did in the original area.
    Dr. Krepinevich describes this set of interlocking features as 
follows:

          After the army has driven off or killed the main guerrilla 
        forces, its units must remain in the area while local 
        paramilitary forces are created and the influence of the police 
        force is reestablished. The paramilitary forces should be drawn 
        from among the inhabitants of the area and trained in 
        counterinsurgency operations such as small-unit patrolling, 
        night operations, and the ambush. Resurrection of the local 
        police force is equally important. Properly trained, the police 
        can make an invaluable contribution to the defeat of the 
        insurgents by weeding out the political infrastructure, thus 
        preventing the reemergence of the insurgent movement once the 
        army departs.
          Thus, if the paramilitary forces can perform the local 
        security mission, and if the police can extinguish the embers 
        of the insurgent movement through suppression of its 
        infrastructure, the people will begin to feel secure enough to 
        provide these forces with information on the movements of local 
        guerrilla forces and on the individuals who make up the cells 
        of the insurgent movement. But before any of this can occur, it 
        is necessary for the government's main-force army units to 
        demonstrate that they will remain in the newly cleared area 
        until such time as the people are capable of assuming the bulk 
        of the responsibility for their own defense. Should the army 
        depart the area before the paramilitary units and the police 
        force are capable of effective operation, it will have 
        accomplished nothing. The insurgent infrastructure will quickly 
        reemerge from hiding, and the guerrillas will return to 
        reassert their control. The temporary control reestablished by 
        the government must be followed by the implementation of 
        measures designed to achieve permanent control. Thus, the 
        counterinsurgent must direct his efforts, not toward seeking 
        combat with the insurgent's guerrilla forces, but at the 
        insurgent political infrastructure, which is the foundation of 
        successful insurgency warfare. Keep the guerrilla bands at 
        arm's length from the people and destroy their eyes and ears--
        the infrastructure--and you can win.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., ``The Army and Vietnam'' 
(Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 13-14.

    This approach is typically referred to either as a ``spreading ink 
spot'' or a ``spreading oil stain'' because the COIN forces slowly 
spread their control over the country, depriving the guerrillas of 
support piece by piece until, in Krepinevich's words, ``Once the 
security of the population and its attendant resources is accomplished, 
the initiative in the war will pass from the insurgent to the 
government. The insurgent will either have to fight to maintain control 
of the people or see his capabilities diminish. If the insurgents 
decide to fight, they will present themselves as targets for the 
government mobile reaction forces.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Ibid, p. 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The key, as Krepinevich and every other expert on counterinsurgency 
operations observes, is to start by securing the population and 
providing them with material incentives, in the form of real security 
and a thriving economy, that will cause them to reject the insurgency 
and support the COIN campaign. This is why a COIN strategy is best 
understood as a strategy of reinforcing success, because the 
counterinsurgents concentrate their forces where their support is 
strongest, and where they therefore can do the most good.
    Instead, the approach we are employing in Iraq--concentrating our 
forces in Iraq's western provinces where the insurgents are thickest 
and support for reconstruction weakest--means reinforcing failure. Such 
an approach has repeatedly resulted in failures in guerrilla warfare 
throughout history. Our efforts to ``take the fight to the enemy'' and 
mount offensive sweep operations designed to kill insurgents and 
eliminate their strongholds have failed to even dent the insurgency so 
far, and likely will continue to do so, as was the case in Vietnam and 
other lost guerrilla wars. Here is Dr. Krepinevich on the false promise 
of hunting guerrillas:

          Should government forces attempt to defeat the insurgency 
        through the destruction of guerrilla forces in quasi-
        conventional battles, they will play into the hands of the 
        insurgent forces. Insurgent casualties suffered under these 
        circumstances will rarely be debilitating for the insurgents. 
        First, the insurgents have no need to engage the government 
        forces--they are not fighting to hold territory. Second, as 
        long as the government forces are out seeking battle with the 
        guerrilla units, the insurgents are not forced to maintain 
        access to the people. Therefore, the initiative remains with 
        the guerrillas--they can ``set'' their own level of casualties 
        (probably just enough to keep the government forces out seeking 
        the elusive big battles), thus rendering ineffective all 
        efforts by the counterinsurgent to win a traditional military 
        victory.
          As a result of these circumstances, the conventional forces 
        of the government's army must be reoriented away from 
        destroying enemy forces toward asserting government control 
        over the population and winning its support. Government forces 
        should be organized primarily around light infantry units, 
        particularly in phases 1 and 2 of the insurgency. These forces 
        must be ground-mobile in order to patrol intensively in and 
        around populated areas, keeping guerrilla bands off guard and 
        away from the people. The counterinsurgent must eliminate the 
        tendency fostered by conventional doctrine, to cluster his 
        forces in large units. Only when the insurgency moves into 
        phase 3 will the need for substantial numbers of main-force 
        conventional units arise.
          Winning the hearts and minds of the people is as desirable 
        for the government as it is for the insurgent. This objective 
        can only be realized, however, after control of the population 
        is effected and their security provided for. Developing popular 
        support often involves political participation--at least on the 
        local level; public works--irrigation ditches, dams, wells; and 
        social reform--land reform, religious toleration, access to 
        schools. These actions are designed to preempt the insurgent's 
        cause, as, for example, land reform in the Philippines during 
        the Huk rebellion . . . Nevertheless, even though the attempts 
        to co-opt the insurgents may prove successful in winning the 
        hearts of the people, they will be for naught unless the 
        government provides the security necessary to free the people 
        from the fear of insurgent retribution should they openly 
        support the government.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Ibid, pp. 11-12. [Emphasis in original].

    Against a full-blown insurgency, such as we are facing in Iraq, 
offensive operations cannot succeed and are ultimately 
counterproductive. The guerrilla does not need to stand and fight but 
can run or melt back into the population and so avoid crippling losses. 
If the COIN forces do not remain and pacify the area for the long term, 
the guerrillas will be back within weeks, months, or maybe years, but 
they will be back nonetheless. Meanwhile, the concentration of forces 
on these sweep operations means a major diversion of effort away from 
securing the population. In Iraq, this has left the vast bulk of the 
population largely unprotected both against insurgent attacks and 
normal crime--organized and unorganized.
    Moreover, the tactics of our offensive operations have contributed 
to the alienation of the Sunni tribal community, driving many otherwise 
agnostic Iraqis into the arms of the insurgents. Many American units 
continue to see the targets of their raids as enemies and treat them as 
such--invariably turning them and their neighbors into enemies 
regardless of their feelings beforehand. Often, the priority American 
formations place on force protection comes at the expense of the larger 
mission--the safety, psychological disposition, and dignity of Iraqis. 
Busting down doors, ordering families down on the floor, holding them 
down with the sole of a boot, searching women in the presence of men, 
waiving around weapons, ransacking rooms or whole houses, and 
confiscating weapons all come with a price. Because too much of the 
intelligence that the United States is relying on is poor, it is not a 
rare occurrence that houses raided turn out to be innocuous. In some 
cases, the wanted personnel may have been there at some point and fled, 
but in others no one in the house was guilty at all. Indeed, too often, 
U.S. Forces are directed to raid a house or arrest a person by someone 
else who simply has a grudge against them and turns them in to the 
Americans as an insurgent to settle a personal score.
    An example of both the potential of true counterinsurgency 
operations and the danger of refusing to employ them can be found in 
the experience of the Iraqi town of Fallujah. Until the fall of 2004, 
Fallujah was a major insurgent stronghold. The town was then taken by 
U.S. Forces in a full-scale conventional assault in which, American 
commanders touted as major victories both the number of insurgents 
killed and the psychological gains of taking this stronghold from the 
enemy. However, within just a few months, the insurgents had reemerged 
with no noticeable impact on their operations or lethality. On the 
other hand, unlike many other towns in the Sunni triangle, a fair 
number of American and Iraqi Forces remained in Fallujah after the 
assault, providing it with greater security than in most neighboring 
towns, but not as much as was the case immediately after the assault 
when large numbers of American ground troops were present. Likewise, 
the United States and the Iraqis did begin to pump resources into the 
city, and reached out to local shaykhs to try to form a new political 
process, and to give local residents an incentive to participate in the 
national political process. As a result, Fallujah has been a modest 
success story. However, because promised funds have not been 
forthcoming, because the Marines in Fallujah are spread thinly and the 
Iraqi Forces are not indigenous--and are often Shi'a--the insurgency 
has begun to make a come back in Fallujah.
    Thus Fallujah demonstrates what a successful approach might look 
like, but only if it is handled properly. And unfortunately, Fallujah 
is more the exception than the rule. Elsewhere in Iraq, U.S. Forces 
clear the areas without staying in force, without leaving behind 
indigenous security forces willing and able to secure the area, and so 
without leaving the kind of security environment that would make it 
possible to try to revive either the local economy or the local 
political process.
    Southern Iraq and the persistent popularity of Muqtada as-Sadr--and 
other, similar figures--is another example of the problems created by 
our current security strategy. The predominantly Shi'i southeast of 
Iraq is overwhelmingly supportive of reconstruction, yet we find 
growing frustration with reconstruction, the United States, and the 
transitional Iraqi Government throughout that community. Why? Because 
the people are still plagued by organized and random crime, which makes 
their economic life difficult, keeps unemployment high and incomes low, 
contributes to frequent power outages and gasoline shortages, and 
prevents the restoration of clean water and sanitation, among other 
problems. This frustration, allowed to fester over time, is driving 
Iraqis into the arms of the Muqtada as-Sadr's of Iraq, whose message is 
a simple one: The Americans are either unwilling or unable to provide 
you with the basic necessities of life, but we can. They employ the 
model that Hizballah and Hamas have used to such success, providing 
tangible, material benefits in return for support. This is exactly what 
Muqtada as-Sadr provides the residents of Sadr City and what other 
shaykhs, alims, and other would-be potentates provide other Iraqis in 
different parts of the country.
    This is a disastrous course that could push Iraq into fragmentation 
and civil war. It is already convincing any number of groups--and not 
just the Kurds--that they should pursue autonomy from the central 
government, which is increasingly seen as out of touch, corrupt, and 
wholly focused on its own (irrelevant) squabbles over power.
    Mr. Chairman, this analysis leads me to the conclusion that the 
United States must dramatically reorient our strategy for securing 
Iraq. We must adopt a true counterinsurgency strategy, of the 
traditional ``spreading oil stain'' variety. We must simultaneously 
recognize that even if we do so, securing Iraq is going to take a very 
long time. In this respect, I was heartened to hear Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld acknowledge that success in Iraq would likely require 
over a decade. He is surely right, but he is only likely to be right if 
the United States adopts the right strategy to do so.
    Painted in broad brush strokes, a true counterinsurgency strategy 
for Iraq would focus on securing enclaves--Kurdistan, much of 
southeastern Iraq, Baghdad, and a number of other major urban centers, 
along with the oilfields and some other vital economic facilities--
while, initially, leaving much of the countryside to the insurgents. 
The coalition would consolidate its security forces within those 
enclaves, thereby greatly improving the ratio of security personnel to 
civilians, and allowing a major effort to secure these enclaves to 
allow local economic and political development at a microlevel. The 
coalition would likewise redirect its political efforts and economic 
resources solely into the secured enclaves--both to ensure that they 
prosper and because those would be the only areas where it would be 
worth investing in the short run. Such a strategy might, therefore, 
mean foregoing such things as national elections or rebuilding the 
entire power grid, because they might be impossible in a situation 
where the coalition forces had abdicated control over large areas of 
the country.
    The concentrated security focus should allow local economic and 
political developments to make meaningful progress, which in turn 
should turn around public opinion within the enclaves--making the 
Iraqis living in the enclaves more willing to support the 
reconstruction effort and, hopefully, making those Iraqis outside the 
enclaves more desirous of experiencing the same benefits.
    Once these enclaves were secured, and as additional Iraqi security 
forces were trained or foreign forces brought in, they would be slowly 
expanded to include additional communities--hence the metaphor of the 
spreading oil stain. In every case, the coalition would focus the same 
security, political, and economic resources on each new community 
brought into the pacified zone. If implemented properly, a true 
counterinsurgency approach can succeed in winning back the entire 
country. However, it means ceding control over swathes of it at first 
and taking some time before Iraq will be seen as a stable, unified, 
pluralist state. Nevertheless, it may be the only option open to us if, 
as is the case at present, the U.S.-led coalition cannot control large 
parts of the country and cannot keep the peace in those areas where it 
does operate.
    At a more tactical level, a true COIN campaign in Iraq would make 
securing the Iraqi people its highest priority. American Forces in 
Iraq, unfortunately remain preoccupied with force protection and with 
tracking down the insurgents who are attacking them, and as a result 
they are providing little security to the Iraqi people. U.S. Forces 
generally remain penned up in formidable cantonments. They are cut off 
from the populace and have little interaction with them. In the field, 
they come out to attend to logistical needs and to conduct raids 
against suspected insurgents. In the cities, they generally come out 
only to make infrequent patrols--which are virtually always conducted 
mounted in Bradley fighting vehicles or HMMWVs--the ubiquitous 
``Humvees'' or ``Hummers''--at speeds of 30-50 kms per hour. Indeed, 
prior to the January elections, American Forces did--temporarily--
engage in foot patrols in cities like Mosul and the result was an 
immediate, but equally temporary, increase in morale and support for 
the U.S. presence.
    It is a constant--and fully justified--complaint of Iraqis that the 
Americans have no presence and make no effort to stop street crime or 
the attacks on them by the insurgents. Many British officers, and some 
Americans, too, argue that the United States should instead be 
employing the kind of foot patrols backed by helicopters and/or 
vehicles that the British Army learned to use in Northern Ireland, and 
that all NATO Forces eventually employed in the Balkans. This is the 
only way that American Forces can get out, reassure the Iraqi 
civilians, find out from them where the troublemakers are, and respond 
to their problems.
    Adopting a true counterinsurgency strategy, coupled with its 
attendant tactics such as guarding population centers and key 
infrastructure, foot patrols, presence, and the eradication of crime 
and attacks on Iraqis would doubtless expose U.S. personnel to greater 
risks. However, they are absolutely necessary if reconstruction is to 
succeed in Iraq. There is no question that force protection must always 
be an issue of concern to any American commander, but it cannot be the 
determining principle of U.S. operations. American military forces are 
in Iraq because the reconstruction of that country is critical to the 
stability of the Persian Gulf and a vital interest of the United 
States. In their current mode of operations, our troops are neither 
safe nor are they accomplishing their most important mission. 
Consequently, executing that mission must become the highest concern of 
U.S. military commanders, and their current strategy--focusing on force 
protection and offensive operations against the insurgents--is 
misguided. If it does not change, the reconstruction may fail outright 
and all of the sacrifices of the American people and our service men 
and women will have been for nothing.

Option 2: Could the United States successfully press its allies to 
increase aid and provide manpower to protect Iraq's borders and prevent 
foreign infiltration?

    Mr. Chairman, at some level the answer to this second question is 
undoubtedly, ``yes,'' but I do not see it as an ``option'' that would 
solve our problems in Iraq. At best, it might help ameliorate our 
current problems, but no more.
    Given how little Iraq's neighbors seem to be doing to arrest the 
steady flow of Salafi jihadists, Sunni tribesmen, and others into the 
country, it is unexceptionable to suggest that they could not be doing 
more than they currently are.
    Syria is the country that we have focused our attention on, 
although it is hardly the case that they are the only problem, or 
probably even the major source of the problem. Many U.S. and foreign 
intelligence analysts believe that far more foreign fighters are 
infiltrating into Iraq through Saudi Arabia. I have little faith in 
technical fixes to the problem of infiltration across the long Syrian 
border, simply because it is so long and long borders are notoriously 
difficult to seal--our own problems with Mexico being an obvious case 
in point. Many Sunni tribes span the Iraq-Syria border and there is 
considerable trade.
    Certainly, a political solution might persuade the Syrians to do 
more to police the border, but our expectations should remain modest 
here as well. Should we wish to try, I see only a policy of real 
carrots and real sticks as having any real likelihood of success. The 
Syrians need to have positive incentives to cooperate and see real 
threats if they do not. However, we must keep our hopes for such a 
policy in check. Syria's handling of its border is part of the larger 
issue of Syrian relations with the United States that remains very much 
undecided in Syria right now. Indeed, it may be necessary to craft a 
much broader set of carrots and sticks with Syria designed to get at 
the whole range of United States-Syrian differences if we are to have 
any real prospect of success. The Syrian regime is deeply divided over 
its course, particularly with regard to its relations with the United 
States. Until Damascus decides what kind of country it wants to rule, 
and what its relationship to the region and the world should be, it is 
unlikely to make major changes on any piece of its foreign policy, 
especially as one as tightly bound to that broader set of issues as its 
relationship with Iraq.
    Consequently, tackling infiltration across the Syrian border may 
require a new American policy to Syria, and the Syrians revamping their 
own broad foreign policy goals. Neither seems likely in the short term.
    With regard to infiltration across the Iranian border, the news is 
both worse and better. Worse because all of the problems related to 
Syria--a long border, intermingled populations spanning it, a 
government divided over its relations with Iraq and the United States, 
and an inability to isolate its Iraq policy from the overarching 
question of what kind of country it wants to be--all go double for 
Iran. The situation is better, however, because Iran is not the problem 
when it comes to the Iraqi insurgency. The insurgency is overwhelmingly 
Sunni and while not everything that Iran is doing in Iraq is helpful to 
us, they are not providing any significant degree of assistance to the 
Salafi Jihadists, Sunni tribesmen, former regime officials, and various 
other groups who comprise the bulk of the insurgency.
    Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Turkey are all staunch United 
States allies and it is likely that more could be accomplished with 
them, but also not without a price. All four of these countries is wary 
of American intentions in Iraq, and fearful that whatever our 
intentions may be, we are not making the kind of effort that will 
result in a stable Iraq. All four are Sunni Muslim nations with 
differing degrees of skittishness about the emergence of a Shi'i-led 
Iraq. On top of this, the Turks have their own longstanding concerns 
about Kurdish separatism. All four--but particularly the Saudis--have 
been ambivalent at best about slowing the flow of goods and supplies 
across their border to Iraq. And it is complicated by the fact that 
there is a portion of Saudi society that actively favors the Sunni 
``jihad'' against the United States and the Shi'a in Iraq.
    The governments of all of these countries have not been bashful 
about their own concerns in Iraq, and their price for greater 
cooperation is likely to be a straightforward one: A greater say in the 
reconstruction of Iraq. This is a tricky proposition, but not an 
unworkable one. Indeed, the solution is probably overdue.
    The United States and the new Iraqi transitional government should 
convene a contact group consisting of all of Iraq's neighbors--
including Iran and Syria. This group would meet frequently and 
regularly to receive information about reconstruction issues important 
to them, and to provide advice both to the Iraqis and to the United 
States regarding developments inside Iraq. The function of the contact 
group should be purely advisory--neither we nor the Iraqis should be 
bound by its recommendations but that advice should not be ignored 
lightly either. In a great many cases, simply tempering a policy to 
make it more palatable to Iraq's neighbors, or merely acknowledging 
their concerns and providing a full explanation of why their 
recommendation will not be the one adopted, can make a considerable 
difference. In return for their expanded role, all of the neighbors 
should be presented with detailed, and concrete plans for stemming 
illegal traffic across their borders and theft membership in the 
contact group can be made conditional upon their meeting these 
criterion.
    Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, none of these measures is likely to 
have more than an indirect impact on the success or failure of 
reconstruction in Iraq. As noted in my response to Option 1, the 
insurgency is only one of our problems in Iraq, and the insurgency is 
not principally driven by external factors.
    Our intelligence regarding Iraq has consistently established that 
foreign fighters comprise only a small percentage of the insurgents in 
Iraq. What's more, anecdotal reporting suggests that foreign-born 
jihadists are playing a less important role in the insurgency. Early on 
in the conflict, the foreigners brought with them critical know-how in 
terrorist and guerrilla operations that the Iraqis largely lacked. 
However, today, more than 2 years after the fall of Baghdad, the Iraqis 
have learned what they need to know and so are much less reliant on the 
foreigners for training. Likewise, while it was once the case that 
suicide bombings in Iraq seemed to be the exclusive purview of the 
foreign-born jihadists who came to Iraq to martyr themselves, this is 
no longer the case. The evidence is sparse, but it does seem to be the 
case that a growing percentage of suicide attacks are being carried out 
by Iraqis themselves.
    Thus, even if you could somehow hermetically seal Iraq's borders, 
doing so would be unlikely to extinguish the insurgency, nor would the 
elimination of the insurgency solve all of Iraq's problems. The best 
intelligence indicates that the bulk of the insurgency is drawn from 
Iraq's Sunni tribal population, a great many of whom were recruited for 
Saddam's Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard, the Fidayin, 
and other key security forces. They have lost their prestige and their 
paychecks; they have been dispossessed by a society they once ruled; 
and they are fearful that we intend to put the Shi'a and the Kurds into 
the same position of authority their community once occupied--and that 
they will be oppressed in the same manner that they once oppressed the 
Shi'a and the Kurds. Thus there are plenty of Iraqis fighting us out of 
fear and a lack of anything else to do.
    As I have argued elsewhere, there are much better ways to make 
major dents in the insurgency. One method would be to allow the Iraqi 
economy to revive in a manner that it so far has not. Many of Iraq's 
angry young men would probably be quite a bit less angry if they had 
jobs, steady sources of income, and all of the benefits that come with 
it.
    Another approach would be to effectively buy off the Sunni shaykhs. 
Although our intelligence remains sketchy, it is clear that an 
important element of our problems with the insurgency comes from the 
active participation or passive acceptance by a huge range of Sunni 
shaykhs. In some cases, they appear to be ordering the young men under 
their authority to take up arms against the United States and the new 
regime because they feel politically and economically excluded from it, 
and they are well aware of the corruption of the new government, and 
probably exaggerate it to themselves, because they do fear a Shi'ite 
dictatorship, and because no one is paying them not to. In other cases, 
they simply make no effort to stop their tribesmen and followers from 
participating because they have no incentive to do so.
    However, for centuries, if not millennia, the central government in 
Baghdad successfully paid these shaykhs to cooperate with the regime 
rather than fighting against it. This seems unpalatable to American 
ears, but it is part of Iraq's societal traditions. The tribes of the 
west and south were never fully under central government control and 
would often fight against it or simply ignore its efforts at law and 
order unless they were paid not to do so. But in return for such 
payments--which could come in the form of government contracts, 
infrastructure development, and other forms of aid, not just cash--the 
shaykhs generally were quite content to avoid attacks on the goverment 
and even to keep order in those areas effectively beyond Baghdad's 
control.
    In the 20th century, the shaykhs were often paid not to attack and 
even to police the roads, bridges, power lines, and pipelines the 
insurgency currently targets. At times when relations between the 
shaykhs and Baghdad soured, attacks on this infrastructure invariably 
increased.
    Moreover, the shaykhs have shown a willingness to ``do business'' 
with a wide range of governments in Baghdad: The Ottomans, the British-
backed monarchy, various Iraqi military dictators, and Saddam's 
Stalinist regime. Of course, all of these regimes were all Sunni-
dominated, at least for their facade, and it does remain to be seen 
whether they would give such fealty to a Shi'a-led government, but 
there is every reason to expect that, coupled with an effort to 
increase Sunni tribal representation in the new government, the Sunni 
shaykhs would be willing to decrease or even end their support for the 
insurgency. To a great extent, it would mean giving this key segment of 
the Sunni community a real stake in the success of the new Iraqi 
Government--just as we have talked about doing right from the start--
and doing so in a very tangible way.
    Indeed, anecdotal reporting indicates that whenever American 
military and political personnel have reached out to local Sunni 
shaykhs, and provided them with material incentives to cooperate, they 
have been willing to do so, at least on a selective basis. This, too, 
provides evidence that it should be possible to co-opt many, perhaps 
most, of the Sunni tribal shaykhs and get them to stop fighting us and 
instead help us.
    Even if we were to successfully find ways to buy off the Sunni 
tribal shaykhs, we should not expect this to end the insurgency 
altogether. The Sunni shaykhs probably could convince a significant 
number of their followers to desist, either by their authority, or by 
the patronage they would in turn buy among their people with the 
resources we would be paying them. However, because the insurgency is 
so diverse, others would likely fight on: The foreign fighters, of 
course; homegrown Salafi jihadists, of whom there is also a significant 
number; true regime ``dead-enders'' who have so much blood on their 
hands that they could never expect anything but a hangman's noose from 
a new, democratic Iraqi Government; and a number of others of diverse 
motives. But it is clear that this would be a greatly diminished cohort 
from present numbers.
    Thus, if you are looking to weaken the insurgency, shutting down 
Iraq's borders can't hurt, but doing so will be much harder and less 
likely to have real impact than convincing Iraq's tribal shaykhs to 
withdraw their support from the insurgency. The first approach assumes 
that the insurgency is principally a foreign-driven phenomenon, which 
it unquestionably is not, the latter relies on traditional Iraqi 
techniques to get at what is largely a homegrown problem.

Option 3: Should the United States reprioritize the training schedule 
of Iraqi Forces and support more training in other countries?

    With regard to the specifics of the actual training of various 
Iraqi security personnel, my understanding is rudimentary at best, but 
I know of nothing particularly amiss. Instead, let me offer some 
comments regarding the duration, goals, and location of training.
    Without question, longer training schedules are better than shorter 
ones. Iraq's security forces need to be taught a range of military 
skills. However, of equal or greater importance, they need to be given 
the psychological tools to handle their very difficult 
responsibilities. They need to be integrated into multiethnic 
formations. They need to be convinced that reconstruction is the best 
course for Iraq and that their own sacrifices are crucial to the 
success of reconstruction. They need to believe that what they are 
doing is of immediate benefit to their country, their people, their 
sect, their town, and their family. They need to be able to trust their 
comrades, their American and coalition allies, and themselves. All of 
that takes a great deal of time.
    In addition, even after their formal training is completed, Iraqi 
units need time to further gel. Unit cohesion needs to be formed in 
training, but it is inevitably tested by the first operations that a 
formation undertakes. So, too, with the confidence of Iraqi recruits. 
So, too, with the leadership skills of their officers. What's more, the 
process of vetting--weeding out those unsuited for the tasks at hand, 
or those working for the enemy--is a lengthy one, and it is not 
infrequent for soldiers and officers to do well in training but fail 
once placed in actual combat situations, especially if the initial test 
is an extremely challenging one.
    For all of these reasons, it is critical that Iraqi units begin 
their operational tours under the most permissive conditions. They need 
to crawl before they can walk. This has not always been the case, 
although Iraqi and American friends tell me that it is increasingly so. 
If so, this is a very positive development. However, it once again 
emphasizes the length of the training process and the need to do it 
right and do it slowly. Nothing will undermine morale across Iraq's 
security forces--and undermine Iraqi confidence in reconstruction--so 
much as large-scale disintegration of their formations in combat, as 
was the case when units were rushed into combat in the spring of 2004.
    As far as the goals of training are concerned, while we do need 
some highly capable Iraqi units capable of conducting special forces 
type missions to help assault insurgent strongholds, of far greater 
utility will be large numbers of competent and trustworthy Iraqi 
formations capable of conducting basic protection missions--patrolling, 
searches, ambushes, point defense, infrastructure defense, and the 
like. Again, these are the tasks that are critical to victory in 
counterinsurgent warfare, as our experiences in Vietnam and elsewhere 
have repeatedly demonstrated.
    As far as the location of training is concerned, I don't think 
beggars should be choosers. Training forces out of country has positive 
and negative elements. Obvious positives include greater access to 
higher caliber trainers and reduced likelihood of attack by insurgents. 
Another less obvious benefit of such training is that taking a group 
out of their accustomed environment might change their perspective and 
encourage the formation of bonds of loyally to one another. Negatives 
include the distancing of the group from mainstream society and the 
possibility that the training will be less realistic--or simply less 
tailored to the circumstances they will face. In addition, there is the 
possibility that the population at large will be suspicious of them and 
may even treat them as foreign ``agents.''
    On the whole, I see these various plusses and minuses as 
effectively canceling one another out. As a result, I see the key issue 
as our need to train as many Iraqis as we can, and be able to provide 
them with the luxury of time and proper training--not to mention the 
related issue of proper equipment--so that they are someday able to 
shoulder the burden we need them to. If there are countries willing and 
able to provide such training abroad--and if not sending Iraqi units or 
personnel abroad would limit that training--then so be it. Our need for 
properly trained Iraqi security forces, in all senses of the words 
``properly trained,'' should be decisive given the rough equivalence in 
the liabilities and incurred compared to the benefits to be derived.

Option 4: Should the President change the force structure of the United 
States presence in Iraq?

    Mr. Chairman, I believe that it would be of tremendous benefit for 
the United States to significantly increase the number of high-caliber 
foreign troops in Iraq. Ironically, this is vital if the United States 
sticks with its current approach to security, which I have already 
described as a ``post-conflict stabilization'' model; but is only 
desirable, not necessary, if the United States shifts to a true 
counterinsurgency strategy.
    We simply do not have the troops on hand--American, allied, or 
fully capable Iraqi--to handle the number and extent of the tasks at 
hand. We do not have the forces available both to provide security in 
Iraq's populated areas and to suppress the insurgency in western and 
southern Iraq. In truth, we do not have sufficient troops for either 
one of those missions independently. As a result, with our current 
force structure, we can reduce towns in the Sunni triangle, but we 
cannot secure them long term. Inevitably, the forces needed to take 
down an insurgent stronghold must move on to the next one, allowing the 
last to quickly slip back into guerrilla control. This is a classic 
mistake of counterguerrilla warfare and it is tragic that we are 
repeating it. Moreover, our focus on trying to come to grips with the 
insurgents and clear out their strongholds has largely denuded southern 
and central Iraq's cities of sizable coalition forces, leaving them 
prey not only to insurgent attacks, but to crime and lawlessness more 
generally.
    If we stick with our current strategy, I see no alternative to a 
major increase in coalition forces over the next 2-3 years, probably on 
the order of 100,000 or more troops, if it is to have any chance of 
success. At some point, if our training program is allowed to mature, 
we will have several hundred thousand capable Iraqi security personnel 
able to take over responsibility for most, if not all, of the security 
mission. However, we are still several years away from that day, and in 
the interim, someone will have to make up for that deficit. Given the 
reluctance of our allies to provide significant numbers of ground 
troops, only the United States can do so, although providing so many 
more ground troops for several years to come may necessitate a thorough 
restructuring of U.S. ground forces more generally.
    At the risk of being redundant, let me repeat this point for the 
sake of clarity: We do not presently have adequate numbers of troops in 
country to execute the strategy that we have set out for ourselves--
setting aside the question of whether this strategy can succeed at all. 
As a result, we have provided too little basic security for the bulk of 
Iraq's population, and have inadequate forces even to suppress the 
insurgency in western and southern Iraq. Only a massive increase in 
troop strength--which the Iraqis will be unable to provide for several 
years--is likely to remedy that problem.
    Could we simply muddle through with the inadequate forces we have 
on hand. Perhaps. However, this would be a huge gamble for the United 
States, Iraq, the region, and perhaps the world. As I noted earlier, 
there are powerful centripetal forces in Iraq that are gaining 
influence because of our failure to deal with the various problems of 
the insurgency and basic insecurity. We may be able to keep them at bay 
until several years down the road when sufficient Iraqi Forces become 
available to address these missions. But doing so strikes me as 
reckless and irresponsible.
    Moreover, any objective analyst would have to recognize that the 
chances of this bet paying off look poor at this time. The Iraqi people 
are frustrated and growing more so. And it is this frustration that is 
our greatest threat. Because it is out of frustration with the 
inability, or unwillingness, of the United States and the transitional 
Iraqi Government to deliver on basic security--and the basic services 
like electricity, gasoline, clean water, and jobs for which basic 
security is the prerequisite--that Iraqis are beginning to turn to 
local shaykhs, alims, and other would-be warlords to provide them what 
the reconstruction authorities cannot. Thus it seems, at least, equally 
likely that the current trend will produce a slide toward fragmentation 
and civil war, as it is that it will allow for muddling through until 
the Iraqis can handle the security situation by themselves.
    Another advantage of adopting a true counterinsurgency strategy, 
however, is that while it would certainly benefit from the addition of 
more troops, it is not required. COIN strategies work by building 
popular support and using that popular support to deny support to the 
insurgency, as well as to generate indigenous forces capable both of 
fighting the insurgency and providing protection to ever greater 
portions of the population. When employed correctly, it is a self-
generating and self-sustaining strategy, which it is why it is able to 
defeat the converse strategy that lies at the heart of any insurgency. 
The size of the initial commitment of resources principally influences 
only the length of time that the COIN strategy takes to work. Thus, in 
theory, one could begin with nothing but a platoon, although starting 
with such a tiny force pool means that it would take an extraordinarily 
long time for the COIN strategy to succeed.
    In Iraq, we are fortunate to have a very large segment of the 
population that is at least passively supportive of the goals of 
reconstruction, as well as a force base of over 150,000 American, 
Iraqi, and coalition troops. That is a pretty good starting point for a 
true COIN strategy. It looks even better when one considers that the 
Kurdish population is fully supportive of reconstruction--at least in 
the sense of desiring an end both to the insurgency and to the state of 
semilawlessness in much of the rest of the country--and already has the 
security forces to effectively police their own territory,
    With these forces alone and employing a true COIN strategy, the 
coalition could probably secure much, perhaps all, of southern Iraq 
with its strongly pro-reconstruction Shi'a and urban Sunni populations. 
Along with Iraqi Kurdistan, this is a very good start, and suggests a 
reasonably rapid window of success, perhaps as little as 8-10 years, 
although probably more like 10-15, because it is the nature of COIN 
strategies to work slowly. It would be difficult, with only the forces 
on hand to also secure central Iraq, possibly including Baghdad and 
some of the key infrastructure of that area like the Bayji oil 
refinery, as well as roads, power lines, and oil pipelines connecting 
the north and the south.
    An alternative initial pacification effort could include Baghdad, 
and given its importance to Iraq, there is a compelling logic to do so, 
but in this case, the forces on hand probably could then only secure a 
more limited number of the Shi'i cities of the south, leaving large 
chunks of an otherwise supportive population outside of the initial 
``secure'' zone, and possibly driving them into the arms of the 
opponents of reconstruction. In other words, a true COIN campaign would 
have difficulty including both Baghdad and all of southeastern Iraq in 
its initial security zone with only the forces currently on hand.
    It is for that reason that even a COIN strategy would greatly 
benefit from more fully trained forces right from the start. The 
addition of another 30-50,000 troops might prove sufficient to make it 
possible to begin the COIN campaign by securing both Baghdad and key 
sites in central Iraq and nearly all of southeastern Iraq--in addition 
to Kurdistan. This is a very preliminary assessment that would require 
considerable additional planning and analysis, but it does seem likely 
at first blush.
    This would obviously be a far more desirable starting point, since 
it would mean including both the large Shi'a population of southeastern 
Iraq as well as the vital capital within the initial ``oil stain'' of 
the COIN campaign. Under these circumstances, it might be possible to 
achieve success within as little as 5-8 years, although 8-10 years 
still seems more realistic.
    Thus, under any circumstances, more first-rate forces in Iraq would 
be highly desirable, although if we persist with our current strategy, 
then they are indispensable.
    There is one last element of this option that needs to be 
addressed, and this is the question of whether more U.S. troops will 
help or hurt the cause of reconstruction. I am wholly of the opinion 
that, on balance, they will greatly help the cause of reconstruction.
    First, it is wrong-headed and perverse to suggest that more 
American troops in Iraq will simply stimulate more terrorist attacks, 
either because they will provide more targets or because they will 
generate more animosity. As for the insurgents, they have repeatedly 
demonstrated that they oppose not just the United States presence, but 
the entire project of reconstruction and--for the Sunnis who comprise 
the vast bulk of the insurgency--the ascendance of the Shi'ite 
majority. The insurgents have committed far more acts of violence 
against other Iraqis than they have against American Forces. What's 
more, they have made clear that they believe they are already waging a 
civil war against the Shi'a, whom the Salafi jihadists regard as 
apostates and for whom they reserve far greater venom than for infidel 
Americans.
    All of the evidence we have indicates that were U.S. Forces to 
leave Iraq, the insurgents would be even less restrained and would 
greatly increase their attacks on the new Iraqi Government, on the 
Shi'a, on the Kurds, and on anyone else they don't like. If you don't 
believe me, ask any Iraqi Shi'ite, any Iraqi Kurd, or any Sunni Iraqi 
who simply wants to lead a normal life; they are terrified of the hard 
core of the insurgency for this very reason.
    Second, it is wrong to simply postulate that Iraqis want the 
Americans out, and that their resentment of the American presence is a 
major source of the violence there. Iraqi views about the American 
presence are very complicated and, at times, contradictory.
    As best I can glean, both from public opinion polling and my own 
contact with Iraqis from across the ethnic and religious spectrum, most 
Iraqis dislike the U.S. occupation, but they regard it as more than a 
necessary evil. Because of the fears I have just described, and because 
they are realistic about the state of their country, the vast majority 
of Iraqis know that it is vital for American Forces to remain in Iraq 
for the foreseeable future because the alternative is chaos and civil 
war. However, Iraqis are deeply frustrated by the course of 
reconstruction. They are frustrated that 2 years after the fall of 
Baghdad they still face electricity and gasoline shortages, that much 
of the country still lacks clean water and sanitation, that 
unemployment remains so high, and that they still do not feel safe in 
their own country. This frustration is compounded by their sense that 
American soldiers go to great lengths to protect themselves and do 
little to protect them. Indeed, many Iraqis say that our obsession with 
force protection for our own troops comes at their expense; not only do 
our force protection measures greatly inconvenience them, but they will 
argue that these measures actually decrease their own security. For 
instance, the long lines to get through security check points around 
American bases become prime targeting grounds for insurgents and 
criminals.
    Often times, this frustration gets expressed--especially in badly 
constructed public opinion polls--by the sentiment that the United 
States ``should just leave Iraq.'' However, a bit more digging usually 
reveals the more subtle and, I have found, far more common, opinion 
among Iraqis that they want us to stay, but they just wish that we were 
doing more to help them with what really matters to them.
    I think it's probably likely that increasing the number of U.S. 
Forces in Iraq and redeploying them to Iraq's populated areas, and to 
guard key infrastructure, would probably be resented by some Iraqis. I 
think a great many others, however, would feel that it was a move long 
overdue. Especially if additional American Forces were deployed to 
provide security for the bulk of Iraq's population, were deployed in 
mixed formations with Iraqi units, were deployed on regular foot 
patrols and encouraged to get to know the residents of the 
neighborhoods in which they were stationed, all of the evidence 
suggests that Iraqi attitudes would range from grudging acceptance to 
positive relief.

    The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Pollack. Let me 
mention that all of your testimony, prepared testimony, as well 
as that which you have delivered, will be made a part of the 
record. That will be true for each of our witnesses. We 
appreciate the careful preparation you have given to the 
hearing and your remarkable opening statement.
    General McCaffrey, would you offer us your thoughts?

STATEMENT OF GEN BARRY R. McCAFFREY, USA (RET.), PRESIDENT, BR 
            McCAFFREY ASSOCIATES, LLC, ARLINGTON, VA

    General McCaffrey. Well, Senator, let me thank you and 
Senator Biden and the other members of your committee for the 
chance to come down here and share some of these ideas. I very 
much appreciate the very determined and active leadership that 
all of you have shown on this issue.
    I just had a terrific session with Congressman Duncan 
Hunter over on the House Armed Services Committee and was able 
to remind them that Article I of the Constitution, the lead on 
shaping and forming our Armed Forces, in particular, lies in 
the Congress, not in the administration. So I think the 
resurgence of attention to these issues in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and the war on terror is timely and warranted.
    Let me also say I am appreciative of the opportunity to 
appear with Ken Pollack and Tony Cordesman, both of whom have 
works that I use in my own classes at West Point and I have 
great respect for their work and their insights.
    I have just returned from another periodic visit in support 
of our joint military commanders, GEN John Abizaid, GEN George 
Casey, our tactical commander on the ground, LTG John Vines, 
and a brilliant young officer, LTG Dave Petraeus who, as we 
have mentioned, has been charged with forming the Iraqi 
security forces. I do not know of a more talented and 
determined person we could have put in charge of that effort.
    Going directly to the first question at hand, the nature of 
the counterinsurgency and how well are we doing at it, let me, 
if I may come into this from a slightly different perspective. 
It seems to me we finally have a strategy. We went in there 
with no notion at all except to knock down a million-man active 
and reserve army. We had no phase two. It was astonishing to me 
the egregious misjudgments of Secretary Rumsfeld and some of 
the civilian leadership in the Pentagon. I think they were 
warned very categorically, and very directly, by many of us 
prior to that war that we would end up with 26 million people 
and we had not confronted the coercive security forces of the 
Saddam regime.
    That is, obviously, water under the bridge. I think this 
brilliant man John Negroponte and John Abizaid, the two of them 
have crafted a policy, a strategy, which to my astonishment, 
just having gone in and having compared it to the Jerry Bremer, 
LTG Rick Sanchez efforts, appears to be gathering momentum.
    That strategy, number one, says create a legitimate Iraqi 
State. Get a constitution, get a referendum, get an election, 
get the Sunnis back in the political process. I think, 
collectively, the Sunnis, to my surprise, have decided that 
they want to get back in control of Iraq, but this time they 
are going to get back in the political process. I think there 
is a very high likelihood of political integration of the 
Sunnis between now and December, although clearly this is high 
risk and nonlinear political development.
    I think the second part of our strategy is build the Iraqi 
security forces. I think Senator Biden has pointed accurately 
to some terrific overstatements in the past couple years in 
which we have kluged together numbers that included oil derrick 
security guards as being the equivalent of trained military 
forces.
    Having said that, I think this fellow Dave Petraeus, backed 
up by John Abizaid, our Arabic-speaking, extremely experienced 
joint commander, I think we have finally got this thing moving 
in the right direction. I do not know what the right number is; 
170,000 on paper--my gut instinct was there is probably 60,000 
or more of them out there right now that actually are armed and 
determined to create a new Iraqi State. Some parts of Iraq, 
some parts of Baghdad, they are actually the lead elements. I 
think the majority of operations now in country have at a 
minimum Iraqi participation, if not Iraqi lead.
    So build the ISF; that is the effort. I hope we focus on 
that, though, because I consider it grossly underresourced. If 
we are spending $5 billion a month fighting an active coalition 
campaign and then you look at the level of effort on creating a 
250,000-man force of border patrol, customs agents, police, we 
are not in the ball game yet in providing the resources we 
need. We can talk about it more, but I wrote a Wall Street 
Journal op-ed: We ought to be talking about 120 Blackhawk 
helicopters, about 2,000 up-armored Humvees, about a couple of 
thousand M-113 up-armored vehicles.
    We are not even close to that. We have got these Iraqi kids 
out there with AKs, badly engineered light trucks, no 
maintenance system, no logistics system, no command and 
control. We've got to get serious about it.
    The one parallel besides the domestic politics that strikes 
me as eerily similar to Vietnam is the failure to focus on 
creating the Iraqi security forces as the dominant aspect of 
our strategy. Petraeus is saying it, Abizaid is saying it, but 
are we actually giving them the tools they need to do their 
job?
    Then third, we are doing economic reconstruction. Somebody 
ought to bring before this hearing, there is a brilliant young 
engineer, BG Tom Bostic. We are about to give him his second 
star. The last time I was there the economic reconstruction was 
a zero. This time around I saw a couple of thousand projects 
that are painfully under way, corruption being the single 
biggest threat to the economic reconstruction of Iraq.
    Then finally, we are doing counterinsurgency. I would take 
a slightly different viewpoint than Dr. Pollack. I think the 
counterinsurgency is the least important aspect of what we are 
doing. Every Iraqi police battalion, commando battalion, is 
worth 15 U.S. Army or Marine battalions in downtown Baghdad, 
Talifar, Ramadi. They can spot somebody who is Syrian. They 
know things are out of order.
    So I think our primary contribution--the Marines are doing 
a brilliant job out in Anbar Province doing spoiling attacks 
and trying to reestablish the border. But I do not think the 
counterinsurgency piece is actually central to what is going on 
in Iraq.
    I think, essentially, we are so dangerous to screw around 
with, meaning ``we'' the United States Armed Forces, the 
jihadists, a tiny element of that struggle, are now targeting 
Iraqi police and innocent civilians as opposed to going after a 
Third Infantry Division platoon in Baghdad.
    I would also argue that the massive slaughter of the 
innocents that these foreign jihadists are carrying out is the 
least relevant part of the problem. They will not bring down 
the Iraqi Government. They will not prevent the consolidation 
of a new political system and they darn sure are not a major 
threat to the U.S. Armed Forces.
    What we have to worry about, it seems to me, is preventing 
this civil war that is going on now--that is what we are 
looking at, is a low-grade civil war--from spinning out of 
control, either by lack of wisdom or premature withdrawal. By 
next summer, in my judgment--we have got 17 combat brigades 
there right now--we will be forced into a drawdown and have 10 
brigades or less on the ground by next summer. The Army and 
Marines are starting to come apart under this overly aggressive 
foreign policy in terms of the resources we have in national 
security.
    So I thank you for allowing me to offer those initial 
ideas.
    [The prepared statement of General McCaffrey follows:]

Prepared Statement of GEN Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.), President, BR 
                McCaffrey Associates, LLC, Arlington, VA

                  10 observations from iraq: june 2005
    1. Superb Status of Armed Forces Unchanged (courage, discipline, 
leadership).
    2. Effectiveness of MNF-I Command and Control and Interagency 
Process is impressive.
    3. Growing effectiveness of the Iraqi Armed Forces and Police: 
169,000 troops fielding 100(+) battalions. (60,000(+) armed and 
effective.)
    4. Sunni Political Participation--they will vote in December.
    5. Ineffectiveness of U.S. Public Diplomacy--media and military 
failure.
    6. Sustaining the War--Inadequate Base of Army and Marines.
    7. Engineering work in Fallujah--an angry city in ruins.
    8. Add Helicopter mobility to ISF: 120(+) Blackhawks.
    9. Add armor to ISF: 2,000(+) M113A3s Up-armor plus Transparent 
Turret; 2,000(+) Up-armor Humvees; 500(+) ASUs.
    10. General Officer turnover and Impact on Region. (General 
Abizaid/General Casey/Lieutenant General Petreaus/Lieutenant General 
Vines--a collective national treasure.)
                                 ______
                                 
Memorandum for: Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Subject: Trip Report--Kuwait and Iraq; Saturday, 4 June, through 
        Saturday, 11 June 2005
1. Purpose
    This memo provides feedback reference visit 4-11 June 2005 by GEN 
Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.), to Kuwait and Iraq.
2. Sources
    a. GEN George Casey, Commander, MNF-I--one-on-one discussions and 
staff briefings.
    b. LTG JR Vines, Commander MNC-I--one-on-one discussions and staff 
briefings.
    c. LTG Dave Petreaus, Commander, Multinational Security Transition 
Command--one-on-one discussions/briefings.
    d. LTG Robin Brims (U.K. Army), Deputy Commanding General of MNF-
I--one-on-one discussions.
    e. Charge d'Affairs James Jeffrey--office call one-on-one with U.S. 
Embassy Iraq.
    f. MG Tim Donovan (USMC), Chief of Staff, MNF-I--one-on-one 
discussions.
    g. MG Steve Johnson (USMC), Acting Commanding General, II MEF--one-
on-one discussion and staff briefing.
    h. BG Peter Palmer and BG John Defreitas--MNF-I Operations and 
Intel briefings.
    i. MG Rusty Findley (USAF) and Colonel Bill Hix--MNF-I Campaign 
Action Plan Brief.
    j. BG Tom Bostick--Army Corps Engineers. Gulf Region Division 
Brief.
    k. MG William Webster, Commanding General, Multi-National Division 
Baghdad--General Officer Briefing and 3rd ID Battle Staff briefing.
    l. 2nd Brigade 3rd ID Commander and Staff Briefing. Bagdad security 
operations.
    m. Ambassador Ahraf Oazi and U.N. Iraq Delegation--Lunch Meeting 
with Special Representative to the Secretary General of the U.N. in 
Iraq.
    n. MG Robert Heine, Acting Director IRMO (U.S. Embassy 
Reconstruction Program Officer)--one-on-one discussion/briefings.
    o. MG Hank Stratman--Political-Military-Economic Brief, U.S. 
Embassy.
    p. MG Eldon Bargewell, Joint Contracting--one-on-one discussions.
    q. Field Visit. U.S. Marine Infantry Battalion. Fallujah.
    r. Field Visit. U.S. Army Mechanized Infantry Battalion. Vicinity 
Tikrit.
    s. Briefing Iraqi Army Brigade Commander. Fallujah.
    t. Briefing by U.S. Army Embedded Training Team. Fallujah ISF Army 
Brigade.
    u. Briefing USMC Embedded Trainer. Fallujah Police.
    v. Briefing U.S. Army Captain. Embedded Training Team. ISF Army 
Infantry Battalion--Vicinity Tikrit.
    w. Briefing Iraqi Army Colonel. ISF Training Center. Vicinity 
Tikrit.
    x. Lunch discussions. Iraqi Army Battalion XO, S3, SGM. Vicinity 
Tikrit.
    y. Live Fire Demo/Briefing. Iraqi Army Commando Battalion.
    z. Demo/Briefing Iraqi Police ERU (Emergency Response Unit). 
Baghdad.
    aa. Field Sensing Session. U.S. Army Combat Division. Fifteen U.S. 
Army Company Grade Officers.
    bb. Field Sensing Session. U.S. Army Combat Battalion. Junior 
Enlisted Soldiers.
    cc. Field Sensing Sessions. U.S. Army/Navy/Air Force/Marine Senior 
NCOs.
    dd. Discussion Sessions. Two U.S. Contractor Teams (Logistics and 
Security)--Senior Leadership.
3. The Bottom Line--Observations from Operation Iraqi Freedom: June 
        2005
    1st--U.S. Military Forces in Iraq are superb. Our Army-Marine 
ground combat units with supporting Air and Naval Power are 
characterized by quality military leadership, solid discipline, high 
morale, and enormous individual and unit courage. Unit effectiveness is 
as good as we can get. This is the most competent and battle-wise force 
in our Nation's history. They are also beautifully cared for by the 
chain-of-command--and they know it. (Food, A/C sleeping areas, medical 
care, mental health care, home leave, phone/e-mail contact with 
families, personal equipment, individual and unit training, targeted 
economic incentives in the battle area, visibility of tactical 
leadership, home station care for their families, access to news 
information, etc.)
    2nd--The point of the U.S. war effort is to create legitimate and 
competent Iraqi national, provincial, and municipal governance. We are 
at a turning point in the coming 6 months. The momentum is now clearly 
with the Iraqi Government and the coalition security forces. The Sunnis 
are coming into the political process. They will vote in December. 
Unlike the Balkans--the Iraqis want this to succeed. Foreign fighters 
are an enormously lethal threat to the Iraqi civilian population, the 
ISF, and coalition forces in that order. However, they will be an 
increasing political disaster for the insurgency. Over time they are 
actually adding to the credibility of the emerging Iraqi Government. We 
should expect to see a dwindling number of competent, suicide capable 
jihadist. Those who come to Iraq--will be rapidly killed in Iraq. The 
picture by next summer will be unfavorable to recruiting foreigners to 
die in Iraq while attacking fellow Arabs.

  <bullet> The initial U.S./U.K. OIF intervention took down a criminal 
        regime and left a nation without an operational state.
  <bullet> The transitional Bremer-appointed Iraqi Government created a 
        weak state of waning factions.
  <bullet> The January 2005 Iraqi elections created the beginnings of 
        legitimacy and have fostered a supportive political base to 
        create the new Iraqi Security Forces.
  <bullet> The August Iraqi Constitutional Referendum and the December-
        January election and formation of a new government will build 
        the prototype for the evolution of an effective, law-based 
        Iraqi State with a reliable security force.
  <bullet> January thru September 2006 will be the peak period of the 
        insurgency--and the bottom rung of the new Iraq. The positive 
        trend lines following the January 2006 elections, if they 
        continue, will likely permit the withdrawal of substantial U.S. 
        combat forces by late summer of 2006. With 250,000 Iraqi 
        security forces successfully operating in support of a 
        government which includes substantial Sunni participation--the 
        energy will start rapidly draining out of the insurgency.

    3rd--The Iraqi security forces are now a real and hugely 
significant factor. LTG Dave Petreaus has done a brilliant job with his 
supporting trainers.

  <bullet> 169,000 Army and police exist in various stages of 
        readiness. They have uniforms, automatic weapons, body armor, 
        some radios, some armor, light trucks, and battalion-level 
        organization. At least 60,000 are courageous Patriots who are 
        actively fighting. By next summer--250,000 Iraqi troops and 10 
        division HQS will be the dominant security factor in Iraq.
  <bullet> However, much remains to be done. There is no maintenance or 
        logistics system. There is no national command and control. 
        Corruption is a threat factor of greater long-range danger than 
        the armed insurgency. The insurgents have widely infiltrated 
        the ISF. The ISF desperately needs more effective, long-term 
        NCO and Officer training.
  <bullet> Finally, the ISF absolutely must have enough helicopter air 
        mobility--120+ Black Hawk UH 60s--and a substantial number of 
        armored vehicles to lower casualties and give them a 
        competitive edge over the insurgents they will fight. (2,000 
        up-armor Humvee's, 500 ASVs, and 2,000 M113A3s with add-on 
        armor package.)
4. Top CENTCOM Vulnerabilities
    1st--Premature drawdown of U.S. ground forces driven by dwindling 
U.S. domestic political support and the progressive deterioration of 
Army and Marine manpower. (In particular, the expected meltdown of the 
Army National Guard and Army Reserve in the coming 36 months.)
    2nd--Alienation of the U.S. Congress or the American people caused 
by Iraqi public ingratitude and corruption.
    3rd--Political ineptitude of Shi'a civil leadership that freezes 
out the Sunnis and creates a civil war during our drawdown.
    4th--``The other shoe''--a war with North Korea, Venezuela, Syria, 
Iran, or Cuba that draws away U.S. military forces and political 
energy.
    5th--The loss or constraint of our logistics support bases in 
Kuwait. Clearly we need constant diplomatic attention and care to this 
vital ally. If Kuwait became unstable or severely alienated to U.S. 
military objectives in the region, then our posture in Iraq would be 
placed in immediate fatal peril.
    6th--Open intervention by Iranian intelligence or military forces 
to support rogue Shi'a Iraqi insurgency. (Assassination of Sustani--
armed rebellion by Sadr.)
    7th--Continued undermanning and too rapid turnover in State 
Department interagency representation in Iraq.
    8th--Lack of continuity in CENTCOM strategic and operational senior 
leadership. The CENTCOM military leadership we now have is a collective 
national treasure.

  <bullet> General Abizaid's value to the war effort based on his 
        credibility to U.S. Military Forces--and ability to communicate 
        and relate to the Iraqi emergent leadership--cannot be 
        overstated.
  <bullet> The combination of a three-star tactical Headquarters (LTG 
        John Vines is the most experienced and effective operational 
        battle leader we have produced in a generation)--and an in-
        country four-star strategic commander (GEN George Casey) has 
        improved the situation from the overwhelmed, underresourced 
        Bremer-Sanchez ad-hoc arrangement.
  <bullet> LTG Dave Petreaus has done a superb job building the ISF. 
        Relationships are everything in this campaign. We need to lock 
        in our senior team for the coming 24 months.
  <bullet> Suggest that the three key U.S./coalition military HQS of 
        Casey-Petreaus-Vines need to stop unit rotation and go to 
        individual replacement rotation.
  <bullet> The very senior U.S. military leadership needs their 
        families based in a Kuwait compound with periodic visits 
        authorized. (We did this with General Abrams and his senior 
        leaders during the final phase of Vietnam.)
5. The Enemy Threat
    1st--The Iraqi insurgency threat is enormously more complex than 
Vietnam.
  <bullet> There we faced a single opposing ideology; known enemy 
        leaders; a template enemy organizational structure; an external 
        sanctuary which was vital to the insurgency to bring in 
        fighters, ammunition, resources; and relative security in urban 
        areas under Allied/Vietnamese government control.
  <bullet> Iraq is much tougher. The enemy forces in this struggle are 
        principally Sunni irredentists--but there is also a substantial 
        criminal class determined to murder, rob, kidnap, and create 
        chaos.
  <bullet> We also face a small but violent foreign jihadist terrorist 
        element. These terrorists do not depend on foreign sanctuary. 
        They can arm themselves with the incredible mass of munitions 
        and weapons scattered from one end of Iraq to the other.
  <bullet> Finally, Iraq is encircled by six bordering nations--all of 
        whom harbor ill-will for the struggling democratic Iraqi State.

    2nd--On the positive side of the ledger:

  <bullet> High Sunni voting turnout and political participation in 
        December will likely set the conditions for the downhill slide 
        of the insurgency.
  <bullet> The insurgency can no longer mass against coalition forces 
        with units greater than squad level--they all get killed in 
        short order by very aggressive U.S./U.K. combat forces. The 
        insurgents have been forced to principally target the weak 
        links--the Iraqi police and innocent civilians. This will be a 
        counterproductive strategy in the mid-term. It has been forced 
        on them by the effective counterinsurgency operations and 
        information operations of coalition forces.
  <bullet> Insurgents now have a reduced capability to attack coalition 
        forces by direct fire: 80 percent (+) of the attacks are 
        carried out with standoff weapons or suicide bombings (mortars, 
        rockets, IEDs).
  <bullet> Suicide IED attack is enormously effective. However, it will 
        soon likely become a fragile tool. The jihadists will begin to 
        run short of human bombs. Most are killed or die while carrying 
        out missions which are marginally effective. This must be a 
        prime enemy vulnerability for coalition information warfare 
        operations.
  <bullet> We must continue to level with the American people. We still 
        have a 5-year fight facing us in Iraq.

    3rd--The Fallujah Situation:

  <bullet> The city has huge symbolic importance throughout Mideast.
  <bullet> Unrealistic expectations were raised on how rapidly the 
        coalition could rebuild.
  <bullet> The city appears to be an angry disaster. Money doesn't 
        rebuild infrastructure--bulldozers and workers and cement do. 
        The coalition needs an Iraqi/coalition effort principally 
        executed by military engineers--and thousands of Iraqi 
        workers--to rebuild the city. We need a ``Pierre L'Enfant'' of 
        Fallujah.
  <bullet> Police stations are planned but barely started. The train 
        station is mined and the trains do not function. Roads must be 
        paved. We need to eliminate major signs of U.S.-caused war 
        damage, etc.
6. Coalition Public Diplomacy Policy is a Disaster
    1st--The U.S. media is putting the second team in Iraq with some 
exceptions. Unfortunately, the situation is extremely dangerous for 
journalists. The working conditions for a reporter are terrible. They 
cannot travel independently of U.S. military forces without risking 
abduction or death. In some cases, the press has degraded to reporting 
based on secondary sources, press briefings which they do not believe, 
and alarmist video of the aftermath of suicide bombings obtained from 
Iraqi employees of unknown reliability.
    2nd--Our unbelievably competent, articulate, objective, and 
courageous Battalion, Brigade, and Division Commanders are not on TV. 
These commanders represent an Army-Marine Corps which is rated as the 
most trusted institution in America by every poll.
    3rd--We are not aggressively providing support (transportation, 
security, food, return of film to an upload site, etc.) to reporters to 
allow them to follow the course of the war.
    4th--Military leaders on the ground are talking to people they 
trust instead of talking to all reporters who command the attention of 
the American people. (We need to educate and support AP, Reuters, 
Gannet, Hearst, the Washington Post, the New York Times, etc.)
7. Summary
  <bullet> This is the darkness before dawn in the efforts to construct 
        a viable Iraqi State. The enterprise was badly launched--but we 
        are now well organized and beginning to develop successful 
        momentum. The future outcomes are largely a function of the 
        degree to which Iraqi men and women will overcome fear and step 
        forward to seize the leadership opportunity to create a new 
        future.
  <bullet> We face some very difficult days in the coming 2-5 years. In 
        my judgment, if we retain the support of the American people--
        we can achieve our objectives of creating a law-based Iraqi 
        State which will be an influencing example on the entire 
        region.
  <bullet> A successful outcome would potentially usher in a very 
        dramatically changed environment throughout the Middle East and 
        signal in this region the end of an era of incompetent and 
        corrupt government which fosters frustration and violence on 
        the part of much of the population.
  <bullet> It was an honor and a very encouraging experience to visit 
        CENTCOM Forces in Iraq and Kuwait and see the progress achieved 
        by the bravery and dedication of our military forces.

    The Chairman. Thank you, General.
    Dr. Cordesman.

STATEMENT OF DR. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, ARLEIGH A. BURKE FELLOW 
 IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 
                         WASHINGTON, DC

    Dr. Cordesman. Senator, let me express my thanks as well to 
the committee for the opportunity to appear here. Let me also 
begin with a caution. Some 30 years ago at the collapse of the 
forces in Vietnam, the ARVN, I was the Director of Intelligence 
Assessment and I was asked to do an analysis of our 
intelligence on both the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese and the 
ARVN.
    As part of that assessment, we prepared two chronologies. 
One was a chronology of all the brilliant ideas we had 
implemented to try to defeat the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. 
The other was a chronology of all the brilliant ideas we had to 
try to train and fix the ARVN forces.
    I do not believe there is any classic approach to 
counterinsurgency. I think people write very interesting 
classic books about the issue, and it is very easy to put 
forward suggestions when you are 7,000 miles away--as long as 
you do not have to figure out how much time is involved, the 
disruptive effect on current plans, how many men are involved, 
what the cost is, whether the end result will be interoperable 
or standardized, what the political and internal costs are.
    In short, I think you need to be very careful about these 
options, because as long as they are a strategic generalization 
it can always sound very convincing. The problem is we have a 
long history of going from generalization to failed practice.
    Let me be more specific about the three elements of the 
option, that is option one. It is not an option; it is two or 
three very different suggestions. I do not believe that there 
is any practical chance of creating safe zones. Watching what 
has happened in Baghdad, in Mosul, and elsewhere, the truth is 
that to create security simply takes too many men, even in the 
areas which are relatively stable provinces. As you look at the 
history of bombings, attacks, and sabotage, the fact is we are 
talking a vast amount of effort.
    I do not believe that we are unpopular because we have 
failed to secure Iraq. In the Oxford Analytica polls, the early 
polls of our presence in Iraq, some 67 percent of the Arab 
Sunnis polled saw the invasion as illegitimate. The figure was 
roughly 37 percent of Shiites. Well over a third, even then, of 
Arab Sunnis supported attacks on coalition forces. Then it was 
11 percent of the Shiites.
    If we are going to deal with these problems, it is going to 
have to be by pursuing the strategy that General McCaffrey has 
summarized. It is by creating Iraqi forces, Iraqi politics, and 
Iraqi governments that can establish security. It is going to 
have to be a combination of denying the insurgents sanctuaries 
and areas to operate in and expanding operations in the areas 
that are threatened. From what I have seen, we also need to 
recognize that these differ sharply by city and by governorate. 
This is not something that can be dealt with in terms of 
generalizations.
    I somewhat disagree with the point that Senator Biden has 
raised. He is perfectly correct in saying that when we talk 
about 172,000 trained and equipped troops many of these are not 
combat capable to act on their own. But as we saw during the 
election, even forces that are not particularly capable in 
terms of standing on their own can perform useful functions. 
Out of those, out of the 172,000 today, 63 to 64,000 are 
regular police, another 30,000 are special security forces, 
which provide area security in the so-called safe zones. Those 
units are just becoming ready, and in my written testimony I 
outline the pattern of readiness.
    They will take probably a year at a minimum to reach 
critical mass and readiness. Yet, they are moving toward that. 
As they expand and develop capability, they will provide the 
kind of security in the areas that we can use these forces in 
while the army units and other units can begin to move into the 
west.
    But I would absolutely agree with General McCaffrey, none 
of this is going to happen unless there is an inclusive 
political structure that brings a large number of Sunnis into 
it, as well as the kind of sticks which make it clear to the 
Sunni insurgents, who can be persuaded to change their mind, 
they cannot continue to operate safely and easily and have 
sanctuaries.
    I also would have to say that Fallujah, Ramadi, and the 
rest, even parts of Baghdad, or for that matter Basra and 
Mosul, demonstrate that it is not enough to have politics. You 
also need to have governance. One of the basic problems we have 
is it is not just the United States which cannot occupy space. 
Today if Iraqi troops go in, far too often no governance 
follows them up, or provides a structure of functioning 
government to supplement the presence of forces. That is 
critical, because for all of the skills and talent we bring, 
Americans rote at 6-month, 3-month, 9-month, and 1-year 
intervals. There is a major shortage of civilians to supplement 
the U.S. military in civil-military and political areas that I 
do not believe is correctable. The truth of the matter is not 
only are we seen as occupiers and crusaders in far too many 
areas, we simply lack continuity and area expertise. We simply 
are not there long enough to achieve the kind of effectiveness 
that only Iraqis can achieve.
    Now let me answer two other questions that the committee 
has asked. Should the coalition attempt to take advantage of 
divisions within the insurgents, e.g, the Sunni nationalists 
versus the foreign jihadists? I think this begins with a wrong 
assumption. Politically it is all very well to blame the most 
extreme bombings on foreign insurgents. People have said there 
are no such Iraqi bombings. When I was there people talked 
about 10 percent as being Iraq. When I then asked how many of 
these bombings could you really quantify as to what country 
they came from and who the bombers really were, the fact is we 
had no basis for making these judgments.
    Now, the committee may be able to get more detail in 
executive session, but we are making, as we have in the past, 
far too many generalizations about the nature of the 
insurgency. There is the same filtering process going from the 
field to the center through to Washington and then into the 
political structure, that I saw in Vietnam, in Somalia, or for 
that matter Lebanon.
    There has to be much better transmission of the hard data 
and intelligence and far fewer sweeping generalizations. Having 
said that, it is not the United States that can take the lead 
in negotiating between Sunni and Shiite and Kurd. General 
McCaffrey pointed out--and I think this is the key--if Iraq is 
to work in any form, there must be an Iraqi political structure 
which is inclusive. We need to give as much effort as we can to 
helping the Iraqis become inclusive, and then use as much 
influence as we can to keep them inclusive.
    I saw leaders in Iraq committed to inclusiveness, but I saw 
people under them, Sunnis fearing being purged, Shiites wanting 
to purge, Kurds wishing to basically separate themselves from 
the government.
    Senator Biden raised the risk of civil war. It is very 
real. This is a very fragile political structure. I do not 
believe that the constitution will perform miracles, even if it 
is passed in a referendum, and I think the political process is 
going to take as long as making Iraqi forces effective, and it 
is going to take United States focus on that.
    Similarly, when we talk about, can a political solution be 
reached with the Sunni insurgents and could this lead to Sunni 
cooperation; yes. But here again, let me say that political 
inclusiveness is something the Iraqis have to do, and from what 
I have seen a lot of the reason that Sunnis want to be in the 
political process. First, they see that the election has put 
Kurds and Shiites in control of the oil money and the power, 
and second, they see themselves in an area where, as the less 
extreme Sunni groups, they are not winning. There is ever more 
turmoil and uncertainty and instability and they are not secure 
from United States and Iraqi forces.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Cordesman follows:]

Prepared Statement of Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Fellow 
     in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
                             Washington, DC

                              introduction
    One key issue in answering questions is whether they are the right 
questions to ask. Let me begin my testimony by stating that the 
``options'' and questions the committee has asked us to address are not 
necessarily the right options and questions. There are five major 
reasons why this is the case.

  <bullet> First, the questions as presented in the form of the four 
        ``options'' do not really describe options, and include mixes 
        of different issues and questions. As a result, the answers to 
        each option have to mix positive and negative responses that 
        are not directly connected. In my responses, I have chosen to 
        address each question separately.
  <bullet> Second, from a purely military perspective, the committee 
        does not address what may be the most important option, or set 
        of issues, affecting the current U.S. effort in Iraq: Whether 
        the mix of Iraqi military, regular police (those on the street 
        or in stations, in traffic or on highways, and at the borders), 
        and police units (Emergency Response Unit and Special Police; 
        the latter include Special Police Commandos, Public Order 
        Brigades, and the Mechanized Police Brigade) that is gradually 
        coming online in combat-ready form will be effective in 
        replacing coalition forces, how soon this is likely, and what 
        kind of, and when, reductions in U.S. and allied forces will be 
        possible.
          The coalition may have made serious mistakes in developing 
        Iraqi forces in the past, but a recent trip to Iraq indicates 
        that it is now beginning to have far more success. If current 
        plans are successfully implemented, the total number of Iraqi 
        military, regular police, and police units that can honestly be 
        described as ``trained and equipped'' should rise from 96,000 
        in September 2004, and 172,000 today, to 230,000 forces by the 
        end of December 2005, and 270,000 by mid-2006. The December 
        total could be a bit lower due to the extension of the police 
        basic course from 8 to 10 weeks, one of several initiatives to 
        raise the quality of the police and military forces.
          There will be a good balance of military, regular police, and 
        police units. Plans call for about 85,000 military in the MOD 
        by December, and 145,000 special police and police in the MOI. 
        The 85,000 in the military will include about 83,000 in the 
        army (including the ``national'' forces originally envisioned, 
        along with the former National Guard; also including combat 
        support, service support and training units). The remaining 
        manpower will include the Special Operations Forces and the Air 
        Force and Navy. About 100,000 of the personnel in the MOI will 
        be station/traffic/patrol police; in addition, nearly 20,000 
        more will be in the Special Police and the Emergency Response 
        Unit. The remainder covers the Border Forces, the Highway 
        Patrol, and Dignitary Protection. By June 2006, the total 
        number in the Iraqi Security Forces (military, regular police, 
        and police units) will go to approximately 270K, The MOD will 
        have about 90,000, and the MOI will have about 180,000--
        provided that there is no change in the currently planned level 
        of regular police.
          Included in the numbers of individuals trained and equipped 
        will be significant numbers of combat battalions. In July 2004, 
        just after the Iraqi resumption of sovereignty, neither the 
        Iraqi military nor the Iraqi police had any battalions that 
        could be deployed nationally. Under current plans, the numbers 
        of combat battalions in the MOD will total around 106 by 
        December of this year. On top of this, Iraq will have 35 
        brigade and 10 division headquarters providing command and 
        control of MOD forces. Of these headquarters elements, some 
        will be relatively mature, but at least a small number of each 
        will still be relatively ``young'' or inexperienced.
          In fact, much of the force generation effort will have 
        shifted to giving Iraqi combat forces the combat support and 
        combat service support units they need. By December, Iraq will 
        have fielded four Motorized Transportation Regiments (working 
        on the goal of one per division). Iraq will also have generated 
        six bomb disposal companies (with the goal of one per 
        division). In addition, nearly 70 Headquarters and Service 
        Companies will have been generated (although some equipment 
        shortages will remain). The goal for these Headquarters and 
        Service Companies is one per battalion. There will be slightly 
        under 30 combat battalions in the police units of the MOI.
          By June 2006, the numbers of MOD battalions is planned to 
        reach 114. The number of the MOI battalions will remain 
        unchanged, although their training will have been improved 
        through recently initiated advanced programs.
          Iraqi planning for Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (to 
        protect oil infrastructure initially and possibly other 
        infrastructure later) is not mature enough yet to give a solid 
        estimate of how many of those forces will be available on any 
        given timeline. The MNF is, however, working with the MOD to 
        help ``professionalize'' the first four or five of these units.
  <bullet> Third, the committee has chosen to separate its military 
        options and questions from the need for an overall strategy to 
        deal with Iraq. In practice, the most important options for 
        military success may not involve changes in military forces and 
        tactics. This is a political struggle. No purely military 
        options can substitute for success in creating an effective 
        political structure that is both inclusive and protects the 
        rights of minorities, representing each major ethnic and 
        sectarian faction. No military option can substitute for the 
        creation of effective patterns of governance at the national, 
        regional, and local level--including the presence of both 
        police and civil authorities, especially a fair judicial system 
        and humanitarian detention facilities. No option based on force 
        can substitute for economic security; dollars are as important 
        as bullets. No American use of force can be decoupled from 
        public diplomacy that convinces Iraqis that the United States 
        and its allies will phase out their presence as Iraqi forces 
        become effective. (Note.--Careful with this one. Seems to 
        suggest some one-for-one tradeoff as Iraqi forces become 
        effective, coalition forces can go home, but only if the 
        security success has been accompanied by political and economic 
        success.)
  <bullet> Fourth, for the same reasons, the committee ignores the most 
        critical weakness in U.S. policy and programs in Iraq that 
        currently affects the prospects for military success. The 
        United States seems to have succeeded in restructuring its 
        effort to create effective Iraqi forces. Senior U.S. officials 
        have pressed the Iraqis hard to create an inclusive political 
        system and there are clear signs of limited success, 
        particularly in the Sunni representation on the Constitution 
        Drafting Committee. Although without any specific timeline, 
        President Bush has said that the United States will eventually 
        withdraw all of its military forces from Iraq, and this, at 
        least, seems to reassure Iraqis that the United States has no 
        intention of permanently occupying Iraq or maintaining military 
        bases.
          In contrast, much of the U.S. economic aid effort is an 
        incompetent and ineffective nightmare. While the reprogramming 
        of aid to meet short-term security needs has served a vital 
        purpose in substituting dollars for bullets, and some projects 
        have been successful, far too much money has been spent and is 
        being spent on U.S.-conceived efforts that pour money into U.S. 
        and foreign contracts, spend that money outside Iraq or on 
        overhead and security, and do not lead Iraq toward effective 
        economic development. This spending has failed to create jobs 
        and investment activity that has a meaningful macroeconomic 
        scale or that will act to meet the needs of key sectors and 
        governorates. The USAID and Department of Defense aid planning 
        and contracting effort is a self-inflicted wound that needs to 
        be replaced by Iraqi planning and management as soon as 
        possible.
  <bullet> Finally, the committee's ``options'' do not address the 
        military problem of shaping Iraqi forces that can affordably 
        deal with both the risk of prolonged low-level terrorism and 
        insurgency, and the need to defend Iraq's borders. This need, 
        for continued coalition aid that goes beyond counterterrorism 
        and counterinsurgency capability cannot be ignored while the 
        present ``war'' is being won. It is a critical issue with long 
        lead times that must be addressed as soon as possible in terms 
        of shaping mid- and long-term Iraqi force development. 
        Decisions need to be taken about the level of Iraqi forces that 
        the Iraqi budget can actually afford, and U.S. aid and advisory 
        plans to support this effort. These issues were not critical 
        while Iraqi forces were small and light; they are critical as 
        they become large and seek to acquire armor, artillery, 
        aircraft, and ships.
Option 1--Should the coalition revise its current counterinsurgency 
        strategy in Iraq?
    At this point in time, the key issues affecting strategy are not 
military, but politics, governance, aid, and economics. The United 
States and the Iraqi Government have largely ``cast the die'' in 
military terms, and the issue is not one of strategy as much as finding 
ways to ensure that the development of Iraqi forces will actually 
succeed.
    The committee's questions under this option do, however, raise 
important individual issues:

  <bullet> Should the coalition and Iraqi security forces create safe 
        zones, and put more emphasis on fighting street crime and 
        organized crime, deemphasizing the hunt for insurgents, so 
        Iraqi economic and political life can take root? Such an 
        approach ignores the fact that Iraqi forces are already being 
        developed into three major components: Military, regular 
        police, and police units. It is true that the fact that 
        insurgents and terrorists can attack almost anywhere in Iraq, 
        even when the coalition and/or Iraqi forces are conducting 
        operations in the border area or in so-called secure areas. 
        Such coalition and Iraqi military and security efforts simply 
        make it harder for them to do so.
          However, this situation would be much worse if major ongoing 
        efforts were not being made to defeat them directly in the 
        areas where they have the most strength and to deny them 
        sanctuaries. Furthermore, reductions in present 
        counterinsurgency operations outside ``safe areas'' will tend 
        to cede control to the most extreme and violent groups and make 
        it even harder to include Sunnis in such areas in Iraq's 
        political process and economic development.
  <bullet> Should the coalition attempt to take advantage of divisions 
        within the insurgents--e.g. Sunni nationalists vs. foreign 
        jihadists? The answer is ``Yes''; but only as a secondary and 
        supportive endeavor to the efforts made by the Iraqi 
        Government, and with great care to avoid being seen as somehow 
        dictating government actions or still acting as an occupier. 
        This question puts the lead role in the wrong place. The United 
        States should--and does--encourage the Iraqi Government to be 
        as inclusive as possible and to bring as many Sunnis into the 
        political process as possible; this should not be a U.S.-led or 
        coalition-led strategy. The coalition may need to make some 
        tactical accommodations with insurgents, but any major 
        negotiations must be led by the Iraqis.
  <bullet> Can a political solution be reached with Sunni insurgents, 
        and could this lead to Sunni cooperation in isolating, 
        capturing, or killing the international insurgents? The basic 
        assumption in this question is wrong. Tying Islamic extremist 
        groups in Iraq to foreigners, and to al-Qaeda and Zarqawi, 
        addresses only one part of the threat and ignores the large 
        part--perhaps the true nature--of the threat. The most 
        dangerous ``international insurgents'' can operate in Iraq 
        because they are part of Islamist extremist groups with large 
        Iraqi membership. The key will be to split the more moderate 
        and pragmatic Iraqi Sunni groups from such extremist groups, 
        and give them an incentive to support government operations 
        against such extremist groups or take action on their own.
Option 2--Could the United States successfully press its allies to 
        increase aid and provide manpower to protect Iraq's borders and 
        prevent foreign infiltration?
    The main goal should be to increase the presence of Iraqi forces in 
securing the border and in providing security to governance in troubled 
areas. The MNC-I, MNSTC-I, and MOD are already working to help Iraq 
regain control of its borders in the tough spots (primarily the border 
with Syria) as soon as possible. This will take time and is already in 
its early stages. But reconstruction of the border forts in those 
areas, generation of additional border guards, generation of additional 
Iraqi Army units, and support for the Ports of Entry (where Department 
of Homeland Security Border Support Teams are helpful) are all 
underway.
    Border Transition Teams will begin linking up with Iraqi Border 
Guard units in the weeks ahead as well; they're already in Iraq and 
completing their final prep. This is a large and complex effort, but it 
is at least underway and will be very important to reduce the number of 
foreign suicide bombers and movement of funds/leaders. It will also 
have major impact on smuggling, which saps some of Iraq's economic 
power. It will also require additional equipment and technology, such 
as backscatter x-ray machines (already finding contraband at the Ports 
of Entry) and the PISCES system (which requires significant database 
development to be effective in the mid-term).
    In contrast, it is unrealistic to think that other coalition 
members or nations are going to help in the border areas that are 
really contested as the following answers to the committee's detailed 
questions indicate:

  <bullet> Is there a reasonable prospect that allied or friendly 
        governments would agree to increase their military 
        participation for this purpose, which is perceived as less 
        dangerous than patrolling Iraqi hotspots? The answer is ``No.'' 
        It would take very large forces to make even the slightest 
        difference, and foreign countries are no more likely to deploy 
        troops to remote areas than elsewhere. Moreover, small, 
        isolated deployments would rapidly become targets, while 
        staying in large bases would be pointless. As various coalition 
        partners end their role in Iraq, some say they will be willing 
        to turn their forces from combat to training. This means that 
        it may be realistic to preserve some contributions that are now 
        planned to decline, but it is unrealistic to assume that any 
        such forces would go to ``hot'' areas on the border.
  <bullet> What would the United States have to do to convince allies 
        to participate in this manner? Would this free up significant 
        numbers of U.S. troops for other duties, or would the gains be 
        insignificant? The United States would have to form a 
        ``Coalition of the Mercenary'' or the ``Compelled,'' and either 
        drag unwilling allies into the mission or pay them off. The 
        savings in U.S. manpower would be negligible at best. The 
        United States would have to provide secure logistic support and 
        rapid deployment capabilities to protect such units.
  <bullet> Can foreign infiltration of Iraq be stopped by enhancing 
        border security? Some reductions may be possible, but most 
        infiltrators consist of men, not supplies. Border security and 
        customs posts will remain corrupt, infiltration can shift to 
        different border points, and better covers and documentation 
        will always allow infiltrators to enter the country. Attempts 
        to provide reasonable security at the borders should continue, 
        but the primary battle, in any case, will be inside Iraq and 
        not at the border.
  <bullet> If foreign infiltration of Iraq could be stopped or slowed 
        significantly, how much impact would that have on the 
        insurgency? It would have an impact over time, particularly on 
        suicide bombings, but it could just as easily lead to a 
        widening of the attacks on targets outside Iraq. The question 
        may assume that Iraq has become the target of foreign Sunni 
        Islamist extremists. It has not. It is a target, along with 
        many other countries as the fighting in Afghanistan and the 
        rest of Central Asia, infiltration into countries like Saudi 
        Arabia, and the London and Madrid bombings clearly demonstrate.
Option 3--Should the United States reprioritize the training schedule 
        of Iraqi forces and support more training in other countries?
    A detailed analysis of the current MNF-I and MNSTC-I effort to 
train and equip Iraqi forces is attached, and it is requested that this 
be included in the record.\1\ It indicates that this effort has been 
comprehensively reorganized over the course of the last year, that it 
now includes far better readiness standards and significant allied 
contributions, and the two main issues to be addressed are providing 
the full range of civilian advisors needed to supplement the military 
in training the police forces, and how Iraqi forces should acquire 
armor and other heavier weaponry over time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Three detailed papers are available: ``Staying the Course? What 
Can be Done in Iraq,'' ``Iraq's Evolving Insurgency,'' ``Iraqi Force 
Development: Can Iraqi Forces Do the Job?'' All can be found in PDF 
format in the ``Iraq Briefing Book'' section of the CSIS Web site at 
www.csis.org/features/iraq.cfm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Progress in unit generation is necessarily much slower than 
progress in creating trained and equipped individuals. According to 
some press reports, the Iraqi Army had a total of 81 operating combat 
battalions by late May 2005, but a new evaluation matrix developed by 
MNF-I rated only three of those battalions at the top level of 
readiness and capability. (At the top level of readiness, a unit is 
capable of independent operations without coalition support). [Bradley 
Graham, ``A Report Card on Iraqi Troops,'' Washington Post, May 18, 
2005, p. A10.] Only one of 26 brigade headquarters had such a rating. 
However, many other combat battalions were still contributing to the 
fight, either with some support provided by coalition forces (the 
second level of readiness) or fighting alongside coalition forces (the 
third level).
    If one included all of the special police battalions, the press 
reported that the total force had risen from 81 battalions to 101, but 
the number of battalions rated in the top category of mission 
capability only rose from 3 to 5. Although the other operating combat 
battalions were contributing to the counterinsurgency to varying 
degrees, MNF-I concluded that it needed to make further major increases 
in the number of U.S. advisory or ``transition teams'' embedded in 
Iraqi units and was seeking to deploy rapidly 2,500 more soldiers by 
mid-June.
    Coalition leaders are concerned that detailed reports on the 
ranking of Iraqi forces will be used by insurgents to focus attacks on 
weaker units, but coalition experts summarized the status of Iraqi 
forces in mid-June as follows: No special police units and less than a 
handful of army units were rated ``fully capable'' of independent 
counterinsurgency operations. Some 40 percent of the special police 
units and 20 percent of army units were rated capable of leading 
operations with coalition support. Some 40 percent of the special 
police units and 45 percent of army units were rated capable of 
conducting counterinsurgency operations when ``fighting alongside'' 
coalition units. Less than 10 percent of the special police units and 
20 percent of army units were rated as ``forming'' or incapable of 
conducting counterinsurgency operations.
    Put differently, more than 60 Iraqi Army combat battalions could 
then perform a counterinsurgency role when operating with coalition 
forces; more than 20 combat battalions were capable of 
counterinsurgency operations, but needed some specific coalition 
support to do so. In the case of special police forces--which included 
the Public Order Brigades, the Mechanized Police Brigade, and the 
Special Police Commando Brigades, there were roughly 27 battalions 
authorized and 14 actually operational, all of them either fighting 
alongside or with coalition support. A long way from a perfect force, 
but a vast improvement over a single active battalion in July 2004.
    Looking toward the future, the focus of Iraqi and MNF efforts has 
clearly shifted from force formation to force effectiveness, and the 
MNSTC-I goal is to ``graduate'' most remaining units from basic/small 
unit training at Level 3 (``Fighting Alongside'' coalition forces). 
Their progression to Level 2 or Level 1 will follow on varying 
timelines. Some ``graduated'' units may still be assessed as Level 4 
(Forming), but they should be the exception.

  <bullet> Are Iraqi troops being deployed before they are ready in an 
        attempt to demonstrate progress? This may have been the case 
        through the spring of 2004. It no longer seems to be an issue. 
        As is noted above, far better readiness and training standards 
        are being applied.
  <bullet> Should there be a more gradual training schedule to allow 
        Iraqi units to develop greater cohesion and capabilities before 
        exposing them to hostilities? Iraqi forces are deployed into 
        more-demanding missions only on the basis of their actual 
        performance, as reflected by their transition readiness 
        assessment. The coalition transition teams that guide them 
        through their initial training and equipping remain with them 
        as they transition to operational status and as they are slowly 
        introduced to more-demanding missions over time. Keeping them 
        in training status would make things worse, not better. Their 
        involvement in appropriate operations will give them needed 
        experience and ensure that leaders and other ranks are 
        competent and active while they build practical cohesion and 
        capability.
  <bullet> Should the number of Iraqi security forces be increased by 
        integrating the Badr brigade (an anti-Saddam Shi'a militia 
        group), the Peshmurga (Kurdish forces), or other local militias 
        into the Iraqi Army or National Guard? Would the political 
        ramifications of such integration outweigh the security 
        benefits? The problem lies in the word ``integration.'' If it 
        means properly vetted, fully trained, and dispersed as 
        individuals into a wide range of units to create truly national 
        forces, the answer is ``Yes.'' In the real world, Iraqi forces 
        have been recruiting militia members as individuals for almost 
        a year--as part of the Transition and Reintegration of Militias 
        program. Success in these endeavors has been mixed. Total 
        dissolution of militias will take time and serious negotiations 
        and will probably be successful only when the political parties 
        see the militias as no longer required because the central 
        government is providing adequate security.
          MNF-I and the Iraqi Government have avoided bringing militias 
        in as entire elements for very good reasons. The temptation of 
        using militias as an expedient short-term measure to establish 
        control somewhere in Iraq has a major long-range downside. The 
        biggest single challenge to the Iraqi leaders is to get all 
        ethnic groups, political parties, religious sects, etc., to 
        work together as part of the Iraqi State and political 
        processes. This means militias should not be legitimized and 
        that the government should retain the monopoly on the 
        legitimate use of power.
          There may be a need to find some mission for selected militia 
        units that will ensure they do not become involved in ethnic/
        sectarian struggles, but Iraq does not need low-grade ethnic 
        and sectarian forces. It needs effective national forces. 
        Furthermore, not every militia has the goal of remaining a 
        paramilitary force. For example, the Badr Corps (not Brigade) 
        is trying to be known as the Badr Organization and to shed its 
        militia image for a political role. This process may be simply 
        rhetorical, and has certainly not been completed, but offers 
        the possibility of another approach to the problem.
  <bullet> Can we increase the number of troops trained in other 
        countries, such as France, Jordan, and Egypt? Or will these 
        countries provide training only if the cost is picked up by the 
        United States? Iraq now has at least 10 major training 
        facilities, the better part of a training brigade, special 
        skill training elements/schools, and countless ranges, shooting 
        houses, and other training facilities--and they prefer to train 
        their troops at home, as it's cheaper, done by Iraqis, and 
        avoids expensive/dangerous movements.
          There already are typically well over 3,200 Iraqis out of 
        country in training at any given time. Iraqis are taking 
        advantage of training offers that are fully funded and provide 
        the training they really want and can't do for themselves yet, 
        such as the German training of Iraqi engineer unit cadre and 
        trainers, which now train Iraqis at Tadji in the UAE. They have 
        other individuals all over the world in short and long courses. 
        But the movement of large elements is costly, difficult, and 
        time-consuming to the Iraqis.
          The United States can always push for additional increases, 
        and might have limited success (probably only token). The end 
        result in terms of problems in interoperability and men simply 
        seeking good foreign assignments might, however, outweigh any 
        benefits. Any apparent cost savings would probably be mythical 
        in the case of Egypt or Jordan; they would end up being paid 
        for by other aspects of U.S. foreign aid.
  <bullet> Will we be diverting training assets in Egypt and Jordan 
        that would be better devoted to training Palestinian security 
        forces? The Jordanian training facilities are operating now at 
        essentially full capacity. Egyptian capabilities require on-
        the-scene study.
  <bullet> Should we put more emphasis on training Iraqi military 
        officers in the United States in an effort to create 
        professional military leadership? The MNF-I and MNSTC-I are 
        pushing hard to create lasting institutions in Iraq. These 
        programs are having considerable success acquiring Iraqi 
        instructors, and being tailored to local combat conditions. It 
        is always valuable to train cadres in the United States to 
        ensure that foreign military officers understand U.S. concepts 
        and values, but this seems a doubtful way of having much impact 
        on Iraq's near-term force capabilities. Some limited amounts of 
        training are being accomplished in various elements of the U.S. 
        professional military education and training system, but the 
        effects of such training may not be felt for years.

Option 4--Should the President change the force structure of the U.S. 
        presence in Iraq?
    If the President has the magic wand necessary to create new forces, 
and is willing to ignore the impact on our All-Volunteer Force 
structure of increasing deployments, he should make three immediate 
changes in the U.S. force posture in Iraq. First, he should deploy far 
more military specialists in civil-military and counterinsurgency 
operations with suitable language and area skills. Second, he should 
extend all tours for the duration so that U.S. troops acquire real 
operational expertise and establish stable and lasting personal 
relations with Iraqis. And third, he should supplement the U.S. 
military with large numbers of skilled and highly motivated civilian 
counterparts to handle the wide range of civil missions in the field 
that are now badly undermanned or handled by the U.S. military. U.S. 
commanders in Iraq have every reason to ask why other agencies do not 
provide the civilians need to support many types of operations, and 
``Where is the rest of the U.S. Government?''

  <bullet> Do we have the right number and types of troops in Iraq? 
        Unless we can suddenly create far more forces of the kind we 
        need, the number seems adequate. The problem is more force 
        quality than force quantity. As is suggested above, we have 
        serious limitations because we started this war with a global 
        force structure oriented for conventional war. The need for 
        change has been recognized, at least in some quarters. Change, 
        however, takes time, and must be made with caution. The U.S. 
        Army is already reorganizing and serious efforts are underway 
        to create more deployable forces with the necessary training 
        and area and language skills. These, however, will probably 
        take several more years to have a major impact. (Note.--You 
        really don't answer the question about the number; you do well 
        with the types.)
  <bullet> In the short run, should the United States increase the 
        number of troops in Iraq to provide greater security in support 
        of critical political milestones, such as the writing of the 
        Constitution, the October constitutional referendum, and the 
        December 2005 elections? The commander of MNF-I should have 
        this flexibility. There should, however, be a clearly apparent 
        need for such action and one that the Iraqi Government and 
        Iraqis clearly recognize and accept. Significant additional 
        mission-capable Iraqi forces should be available by this fall 
        and winter. Wherever possible, Iraqi forces are what Iraqis 
        should see protecting them.
  <bullet> Would an increase in U.S. troops have a discernable impact 
        on security? The problem with this question is that it ignores 
        the quality, expertise, and motivation of the U.S. troops 
        involved. Having more highly motivated and expert U.S. troops 
        deployed in areas with limited political visibility and impact 
        would always be desirable. The United States can always surge 
        troops for specific needs by altering rotation rates or using 
        the theater reserve. Short of a magic wand, however, it is not 
        clear where the United States could get enough of the right 
        kind of troops to make a major increase on a long-term basis 
        that would provide major new mission capabilities, or how it 
        could deploy large numbers in time to be effective without 
        seriously affecting the length of deployments and future 
        integrity of an All-Volunteer Force.
  <bullet> Would it upset Iraqi public opinion? Or should we begin 
        drawing down some forces based on the presumption that the U.S. 
        troop presence fuels the insurgents and undergirds their 
        propaganda? We need to emphasize Iraqi forces, not U.S. Forces, 
        but we also need to understand that it is the visibility and 
        actions of U.S. Forces, not just numbers, that affect Iraqi 
        resentments. No coalition presence will ever be acceptable to 
        true hardliners, whether they are Sunnis or 
        Shi'ites like Sadr.

                        PERSONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

    My personal priorities and recommendations have already been 
addressed above, but there are several points that may be worth 
stressing. If Iraqi military, security, and police forces are to be 
created at anything like the levels of strength and competence that are 
required, the United States needs to take--or reinforce--the following 
steps:
 United States and Coalition Policy Priorities
  <bullet> Accept the fact that success in Iraq is dependent on the 
        ability to create effective counterinsurgency forces in the 
        Iraqi police and military forces as soon as possible, and that 
        this is a top priority mission. U.S. and other coalition forces 
        can win every clash and encounter and still decisively lose the 
        war after the war.
  <bullet> Make it fully clear to the Iraqi people and the world that 
        the United States and its allies recognize that Iraqis must 
        replace U.S. and coalition forces in ``visibility'' and 
        eventually take over almost all missions.
  <bullet> Keep reiterating that the United States and its key allies 
        will set no deadlines for withdrawal--or fixed limits on its 
        military effort--and will support Iraq until it is ready to 
        take over the mission and the insurgents are largely defeated.
  <bullet> Fully implement plans to strengthen Iraqi forces with large 
        numbers of U.S. transition teams as soon as possible, but 
        clearly plan to phase out the teams and eliminate Iraqi 
        dependence on them as soon as is practicable.
  <bullet> Keep constant pressure on the Iraqi Government to improve 
        its effectiveness at the central, regional, and local level in 
        supporting Iraqi forces and in providing aid and governance 
        efforts that match the deployment and mission priorities of the 
        security and police forces. (This is an area where the rest of 
        the U.S. Government truly needs to help, particularly with 
        developing the ministerial capabilities needed to complement 
        our successes with the military and police.) Push the Iraqi 
        Government toward unified and timely action toward promoting 
        competence and removing incompetent personnel.
  <bullet> Make the supporting economic aid effort as relevant to the 
        counterinsurgency campaign as possible, and link it to the 
        development of Iraqi Goverment and security activity effort in 
        the field. The aid effort must become vastly more effective in 
        insurgent and high threat areas. One of the most senior 
        officers pointed out as early as mid-2003 that, ``Dollars are 
        more effective than bullets. Physical security is only a 
        prelude to economic security.''
  <bullet> Take a much harder look at the problems in Iraqi governance 
        at the central, regional, and local level. Force the issue in 
        ensuring suitable Iraqi Government coordination, 
        responsiveness, and action. Tie aid carefully to the reality of 
        Iraqi Government civil efforts to put government in the field 
        and follow up military action with effective governance.
  <bullet> Make it clear that the United States and Britain will not 
        maintain post-insurgency bases in Iraq, and that they will stay 
        only as long as the Iraqi Government requests and needs their 
        support.
  <bullet> Accept the need for a true partnership with the Iraqis and 
        give them the lead and ability to take command decisions at the 
        national, regional, and local levels as soon as they are ready. 
        Make nation building real. Some work already being done with 
        this with the Provincial Support Teams and the Provincial 
        Reconstruction and Development Councils.
  <bullet> Accept the reality that the United States cannot find 
        proxies to do its work for it. NATO may provide helpful aid in 
        training, but will not provide major aid or training on the 
        required scale. Other countries may provide politically useful 
        contingents, but United States, British, and Iraqi forces must 
        take all major action. Continue efforts to build coalition 
        support, but don't provoke needless confrontations with allies 
        or other countries over levels of troops and training aid that 
        the United States simply will not get. Concentrate on the 
        mission at hand. [For a discussion of the futility of placing 
        too much emphasis on NATO, see ``NATO Fails to Agree on Iraq 
        Training Mission,'' Washington Post, July 29, 2004, p. A18.]
Priorities for Iraqi Force Development
  <bullet> Continue pressure on the government to be as inclusive as 
        possible in every activity, to find some inclusive and federal 
        approach to draft the new Constitution, to keep the Iraqi 
        forces and civil service ``national'' and avoid purges of any 
        kind, and do everything possible to avoid the risk of 
        escalating to civil war.
  <bullet> Prepare and execute a transition plan to help the new Iraqi 
        Government that emerged out of the January 30, 2005, elections 
        understand the true security priorities in the country, and 
        ensure it acts as effectively as possible in developing 
        effective governance and efforts to create Iraqi forces. Create 
        an effective transition plan for the December 2005 elections.
  <bullet> Resist U.S. and Iraqi Government efforts to rush force 
        development in ways that emphasize quantity over quality, and 
        continue the focus on leadership, creating effective units, and 
        ensuring that training and equipment are adequate to the task.
  <bullet> Continue efforts to ensure that the ethnic and religious 
        makeup of all facets of the Iraqi military and security forces 
        are ethnically and religiously diverse to prevent any one group 
        or religion from feeling persecuted by the rest.
  <bullet> Continue the development of Iraqi military and police forces 
        that can stand on their own and largely or fully replace 
        coalition forces as independent units. In particular, continue 
        development of the combat support and combat service support 
        forces that will enable Iraqi operations following the 
        departure of coalition forces, including transportation, 
        supply, military intelligence, military police, etc. Give Iraqi 
        military and police forces the equipment and facilities they 
        need to take on insurgents without U.S. or other support and 
        reinforcement.
  <bullet> Ensure that the ``defeat'' of criminal elements receives 
        high priority. Make creating an effective police and security 
        presence in Iraqi populated areas a critical part of the effort 
        to develop effective governance.
  <bullet> Pay careful attention to the integration of the former Iraqi 
        National Guard into the Iraqi Army. Careless integration risks 
        creating a force that is larger, but not effective. This cannot 
        be dealt with by treating the merger simply as a name change.
  <bullet> Focus on the importance of political security. Security for 
        both Iraqi governance and Iraqi elections must come as soon and 
        as much as possible from Iraqi forces. Iraqi forces will not be 
        ready to undertake such missions throughout the country through 
        mid-2005 and probably well into 2006, but they are able now to 
        have local and regional impact. Wherever they are operating, 
        they must be given the highest possible visibility in the roles 
        where they are most needed. Careful planning will let them 
        contribute significantly to the success of the constitutional 
        referendum in October and to the full national election at the 
        end of 2005.
  <bullet> Create command, communications, and intelligence systems 
        that can tie together the Iraqi, United States, and British 
        efforts, and that will give the new Iraqi Government and forces 
        the capability they need once the United States leaves.
  <bullet> Carefully review U.S. military doctrine and guidance in the 
        field to ensure that Iraqi forces get full force protection 
        from U.S. commanders, and suitable support, and that U.S. 
        forces actively work with, and encourage, Iraqi units as they 
        develop and deploy.
  <bullet> Further develop the Iraqis' ability to engage in public 
        affairs and strategic communications. Make sure that Iraqi 
        information is briefed by Iraqis, and not by coalition 
        spokesmen.
  <bullet> Reexamine the present equipment and facilities program to 
        see if it will give all elements of Iraqi forces the level of 
        weapons, communications, protection, and armor necessary to 
        function effectively in a terrorist/insurgent environment. 
        Ensure a proper match between training, equipment, facilities, 
        and U.S. support in force protection.
  <bullet> Encourage the Iraqi Government to provide reporting on Iraqi 
        casualties, and provide U.S. reporting on Iraqi casualties and 
        not simply U.S. and coalition forces. Fully report on the Iraqi 
        as well as the U.S. role in press reports and briefings. Treat 
        the Iraqis as true partners and give their sacrifices the 
        recognition they deserve.

    Finally, it is not enough to do the right things; the United States 
must also be seen to do the right things. This means the United States 
and its allies need to develop not only a comprehensive strategy for 
Iraq that ties together all of the efforts to improve Iraqi forces 
described above, but also a strategy that can publicly and convincingly 
show Iraq, the region, and the world that the United States is 
committed to the kind of political, economic, and security development 
that the Iraqi people want and need.
    U.S. public diplomacy tends to make broad ideological statements 
based on American values. It tends to deal in slogans, and be 
``ethnocentric'' to put it mildly. What Iraqis need is something very 
different. It is confidence that the United States now has plans to 
respond to what they want. They need to see that the United States is 
tangibly committed to achieving success in Iraq, and not an ``exit 
strategy'' or the kind of continuing presence that serves American and 
not Iraqi interests.
    This means issuing public U.S. plans for continued economic and 
security aid that clearly give the Iraqi Government decisionmaking 
authority, and administrative and execution authority wherever 
possible. It means a commitment to expanding the role of the United 
Nations and other countries where possible, and to working with key 
allies in some form of contact group. It also means providing 
benchmarks and reports on progress that show Iraqis a convincing and 
honest picture of what the United States had done and is doing; not the 
kind of shallow ``spin'' that dominates far too much of what the U.S. 
Goverment says in public.
    Another key to success is to have a public strategy that formally 
commits the United States in ways that, at least, defuse many of the 
conspiracy theories that still shape Iraqi public opinion, and the 
private views of many senior Iraqi officials and officers. The United 
States can scarcely address every conspiracy theory. Their number is 
legion and constantly growing. It can and must address the ones that 
really matter.
    There are three essential elements that U.S. and coalition public 
diplomacy must have to be convincing:

  <bullet> Make it unambiguously clear that the United States fully 
        respects Iraqi sovereignty, and that it will leave if any 
        freely elected Iraqi Government asks it to leave, or alter its 
        role and presence in accordance with Iraqi views.
  <bullet> Make it equally clear that the United States has no 
        intention to dominate or exploit any part of the Iraqi economy, 
        and will support Iraq in renovating and expanding its petroleum 
        industry in accordance with Iraqi plans and on the basis of 
        supporting Iraqi exports on a globally competitive basis that 
        maximizes revenues to Iraq.
  <bullet> Finally, make it clear that the United States will phase 
        down troops as soon as the Iraqi Government finds this 
        desirable, and will sustain the kind of advisory and aid 
        mission necessary to rebuild Iraqi forces to the point where 
        they can independently defend Iraq, but will not seek permanent 
        military bases in Iraq.

    This latter point is not a casual issue. Nothing could be worse 
than trying to maintain bases in a country with Iraq's past and where 
the people do not want them. Virtually from the start of the U.S. 
invasion, Iraqis have been deeply concerned about ``permanent bases.'' 
Yet even some of the most senior Iraqi officials and officers have 
privately expressed the view that the United States was seeking to 
create some 4 to 18 such bases.

    The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Cordesman.
    Let me raise a second area for our discussion, and in this 
case I am going to ask you, General McCaffrey, for the first 
comment, then Dr. Cordesman, and then Dr. Pollack. Could the 
United States successfully press its allies to increase aid and 
provide manpower to protect Iraq's borders and prevent foreign 
infiltration? Is there a reasonable prospect that allied or 
friendly governments would agree to increase their military 
participation for this purpose, which is perceived as less 
dangerous than patrolling Iraqi hot spots?
    What would the United States have to do to convince allies 
to participate in this manner, and would this free up 
significant numbers of U.S. troops for other duties or would 
the gains be insignificant? Can foreign infiltration of Iraq be 
stopped by enhancing border security, and if foreign 
infiltration of Iraq could be stopped or slowed significantly, 
how much impact would that have ultimately on the insurgency?
    General McCaffrey, would you comment on this area of 
consideration?
    General McCaffrey. Senator, it seems to me there is no 
question that having allies active, with robust rules of 
engagement, with strong political backing, who bring their own 
resources, would be a vital addition to this struggle, 
certainly to garb ourselves in legitimacy of a broader mandate, 
to have U.N. support. All of this would be to the good.
    I personally believe the misjudgments of the first year, 
actually, will prevent us ever getting significant support out 
of any of our major allies--the Japanese, Western Europe, Latin 
America. It is just not going to happen. No one in their right 
mind would step into this mess this late in the game.
    I think most of our coalition--and although I am grateful 
and respectful of their individual sacrifice, the soldiers on 
the ground--I think they bring little to bear on the problem, 
with the exception of these terrific British forces. The rest 
of them do not make much impact in the situation. Some of them 
are a positive drawback. I mean, these--and I am sympathetic to 
the Japanese Self-Defense Force problems, but they literally 
have to be guarded while they are in Iraq.
    It is not going to happen. We are just not going to get 
people to come in and establish security on the borders, or 
even to put significant training resources into Iraq. Now, I 
also think that the few hundred people crossing the border, 
many of them out of Syria, bunches of people coming in out of 
Iran, massive movement cross-border, intelligence operatives, 
political operatives, et cetera, and certainly the Saudi border 
is completely unguarded--we can attempt to establish an Iraqi 
border presence. The Marines are doing that right now, trying 
to put back in all the posts that were rolled up.
    But that is not going to stop small determined numbers of 
people from entering to become jihadists. I also think it's 
fairly transparent that we do not have, unlike Vietnam, an 
external enemy who has to move munitions and money and 
leadership and training bases and sanctuary. That is not what 
we are dealing with. Poor Iraq may have had 900,000 metric tons 
of munitions scattered from one end of this country to another. 
Every farmer now has a hundred 155 artillery shells buried in 
the back yard. They are all carrying automatic weapons.
    So I do not think our problem is external. Our problem is 
internal. I really endorse, fully endorse, the comments of Dr. 
Cordesman along those lines.
    Now, I would also suggest to you--and this is sort of a 
parallel observation--the foreign jihadists who come to Iraq 
get killed in Iraq and fairly rapidly. I think many of them 
find, to their horror, that they came to get war stories to go 
back to Kuwait or Algeria and find out they have been 
volunteered to be a human bomb.
    Those attacks in the short run are going to be a problem 
for the insurgency. It is going to, in my judgment, add 
legitimacy to a viewpoint by the Iraqi people that they need 
the police and the army to protect them.
    I think the other thing that struck me as a major 
shortcoming of our so-called allies, what we lack is political 
and economic significant support in the Arab world, and in 
particular, from Sunni Muslim governments. Where are the 
Egyptians, the Saudis, the Kuwaitis, to come in and tell this 
minority, 20 percent of Iraq, who are most of the violence we 
are facing, most of the political opposition, and for them to 
enter and say: It is okay, cooperate; we will back you up, but 
we want you to get into the government. Where are the public 
visits of the Saudi Foreign Minister and the chief of the armed 
forces and others that would come in and say: Look, we are 
going to try and help you. Never mind significant economic 
investment on the order of $5 billion a month from the 
surrounding oil powers.
    So again, I think one thing we have been remiss in the 
first 2 years of the intervention was some maladroit diplomatic 
support for some very brave U.S. military efforts. But I think 
the rhetoric of old Europe and the rhetoric really of saying 
that the military contributions are insignificant and, 
therefore, the political contributions follow, has led us to a 
situation in which it is unlikely that our allies are going to 
play a serious role in this. And if we put the attention 
anywhere, it ought to be among the Islamic world: Stand with 
us, create a new state.
    But those six surrounding nations, not a one of them has 
the best interests of a law-based democratic Iraq at heart.
    The Chairman. Dr. Cordesman.
    Dr. Cordesman. I think that General McCaffrey has raised 
the key issues here. I was stationed in Iran. I spent, I guess, 
20 or 30 visits to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war and previous 
years. I have been along the Saudi border and the Syrian border 
in the past. Frankly, I think the idea that you can secure 
those borders against the level of infiltration that takes 
place today, which is largely simply young men coming in as 
volunteers, plus limited numbers of sniper rifles, and a few 
night-vision devices is unworkable. Nobody has ever been able 
to secure those borders against smuggling and the idea that 
U.S. or foreign troops are going to somehow stop everybody who 
is a foreign young man who comes in through the trade routes or 
the legitimate lines of communication, or stop gear from being 
smuggled in on any border, strikes me as unrealistic.
    Right now you have a reasonable number of border forts 
under construction. Looking at what it is going to take to 
train the border police for the Iraqis, my guess is that it is 
a minimum of a year, before enough will be ready. However, if 
it is not Iraqis working with Iraqis--and corruption will be a 
constant problem even then--having foreign troops wander 
through various Iraqi villages and lines of communication near 
the border is going to make people angry without really 
accomplishing a great deal.
    It also does not take many outsider volunteers to sustain 
the threat. I heard different figures when I was in Iraq. But 
out of the detainees, there seem to be about 600 to 700 
foreigners out of over 15,000 Iraqis. If that is the case, the 
problem is not really foreign terrorists. It is rather that we 
have a serious problem with Iraqi insurgency, although it is 
quite clear that foreign young men are being recruited and used 
basically as bomb detonation devices.
    The other caution I would give you is, if you do not have 
those foreign young men, is it all that much harder to place 
bombs that do not use a human being to commit suicide in the 
same areas in the same attacks, simply using remote detonators 
or other devices? The answer is probably not. It may not have 
the same political impact to Islamists, but it is not going to 
solve the problem.
    I think at this point the only way that we could get more 
troops to perform this kind of mission would be a coalition of 
the mercenary or a coalition of the pressured, and frankly, I 
think the mission is not the one that I believe we should put 
effort into. I think it is far more--if we are going to put 
pressure on our allies, what do we want? Well, we'd like to see 
more debt forgiveness. We would like to see a forgiveness of 
reparations. There are lots of economic and other concessions 
and forms of aid which would be more important than getting 
token border defense contributions.
    It would be more useful to have people training the Iraqi 
border force with the numbers we are likely to get than it 
would be to put a few people on a few border forts. External 
pressure to try to get more Syrian cooperation may or may not 
work. Certainly, working with the Saudis, who have a physical 
problem simply in securing the border, would be an issue. We 
cannot talk to Iran, but we might wish to have Britain or 
others talk to Iran and clarify a lot of the uncertainties 
about infiltration on that border.
    Without getting into detail that I do not think is 
appropriate this morning, the problems we have with Turkey 
along the Turkish border are such where we might wish to see if 
there is some way, at least, to establish a better relationship 
between them, the Kurds, the Iraqis, and ourselves than exists 
today. But those only illustrate the kind of problems that 
General McCaffrey raised. Each of the neighbors is an issue, 
not just the border.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Cordesman.
    Dr. Pollack.
    Dr. Pollack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me begin by saying that I largely agree with both 
General McCaffrey and Dr. Cordesman on this issue as well. I 
think that the claims that shutting down the border with Syria 
or with other countries--most of the information that I have 
seen indicates that, in fact, infiltration from Saudi Arabia is 
at least as great, if not a greater, problem than infiltration 
from Syria, but that closing down those borders is a little bit 
like shutting the barn door after the bull has left the stable, 
the horse has left the stable.
    It assumes that Iraq's insurgency is largely a foreign-
inspired movement, which our intelligence has repeatedly shown 
it not to be. It is overwhelmingly homegrown. Anecdotal reports 
that I have heard from Iraqis indicate that that foreign 
element, even though we make a great deal of it, is actually 
less important now than it was 2 years ago. Two years ago the 
Iraqis did not know how to mount insurgent or terrorist 
operations and were heavily dependent on foreign jihadists to 
show them how to do things--how to make bombs, how to set up 
IEDs, how to set up operational plans and do everything else 
for themselves. Today they have internalized most of those 
lessons and they are increasingly less dependent on foreigners 
for the know-how.
    Likewise, we tend to blame foreigners for most of the 
suicide attacks, but there is increasing amounts of information 
to suggest that even those are increasingly being committed by 
Iraqis themselves.
    So shutting down the borders would obviously be nice. It 
certainly could not hurt, but I do not think it is going to 
solve the problems that we have in Iraq.
    If we would like to garner additional support on the 
borders, I certainly think that there are some things that we 
can do. But again, even these are going to be modest, and again 
we should keep in mind the overarching point which I think all 
three of us have made, which is that the borders are not the 
real problem in terms of security in Iraq.
    One solution, one idea that we might try, is a contact 
group involving Iraq's neighbors. One of the claims that we 
have repeatedly heard from our allies--from the Turks, the 
Jordanians, the Saudis, and the Kuwaitis--is that they do not 
feel that they have enough of a say in Iraqi reconstruction and 
in political and economic developments, let alone security 
developments, inside the country. We might create a constant 
contact group at which all of Iraq's neighbors would be 
participating, along with the Iraqis and ourselves, and we 
would, at least, give them the opportunity to receive regular 
briefings on developments inside Iraq and provide a regular 
forum at which they could express their views.
    They would have to understand that this would be a purely 
advisory function and we and the Iraqis would not be compelled 
to accept their advice. But nevertheless, it would give them a 
sounding board. My own experience in the U.S. Government, both 
at the CIA and at the White House, has demonstrated to me that 
oftentimes just allowing our allies a say in the matter can be 
very helpful in securing some additional support from them.
    I will also say that I tend to agree with General 
McCaffrey's opening statement that because of the way that we 
handled both the war and the immediate reconstruction projects, 
I think it very unlikely that we are going to get major 
contributions from our allies.
    That said, I certainly think that it is possible to get 
more and I think that we certainly ought to try to get more. 
For me, this comes back to the central question of security 
that we have been dealing with. I think it unlikely that we are 
going to get large foreign contingents of ground troops. I just 
do not see that in the cards. Many of our most enthusiastic 
allies do not have the forces to send and those that do seem to 
be most reluctant to actually commit them.
    What we could conceivably get, and what we have been 
notably lacking, are personnel with the know-how to deal with 
the political and economic circumstances of reconstruction. 
Before the war I had the opportunity to go and speak with the 
352nd and 354th Military Civil Affairs Battalions, located out 
here in Maryland, who are the ones who are the point of the 
spear in terms of heading up the civilian economic 
reconstruction efforts on the part of the military in Iraq. 
Before they went in I spent an afternoon with them to try to 
help them understand the problems that they were likely to face 
in Iraq.
    One thing I heard continually from their officers was: Are 
we going to have the United Nations with us? Because what they 
said was: When we were in Bosnia, we did not do development, we 
did not do reconstruction; we guarded the people who were 
actually doing the development and reconstruction. The people 
who were doing development and reconstruction were led by the 
UNDP, who could pull in enormous numbers of people with the 
requisite skills and experience from around the world who knew 
how to do these things.
    Those people are notably lacking in Iraq and in many 
circumstances our own forces and our own personnel are being 
forced to learn on the job, and in some cases they have done 
brilliantly, in other cases less so. But across the board there 
are simply too few of them.
    Now, those skills are out there. There are more personnel 
in the world who have those skills and could be very helpful in 
Iraq. But they will not come because of the security situation.
    I will very respectfully disagree entirely with my good 
friend Dr. Cordesman's comments earlier about the ability to 
create safe zones in Iraq. It is possible. We have done it in 
Iraq. We have done it elsewhere. Other nations have done so, as 
well. But it is about making the security of the Iraqi people 
and their populated areas the first priority, something that we 
have notably failed to do in Iraq. As a result the cities are 
not safe and we cannot get foreigners to come to Iraq and to 
participate in the process.
    As a final point, let me add that we have all been talking 
a great deal about the legitimacy of the Iraqi political 
process and I, absolutely, 100 percent, agree with both General 
McCaffrey and Dr. Cordesman. What I would suggest, though, is 
that when you talk to Iraqis their ideas about legitimacy are 
less rooted in what we look at. They are not really interested, 
to tell you the truth, in what that constitution has to say. 
For them the legitimacy of this government is all about its 
ability to deliver on basic security, electricity, clean water, 
sanitation, jobs, and the other necessities of life. That is 
what they have continuously looked both to us and to these new 
Iraqi governments which we have successively put in place to 
deliver. The legitimacy, which is absolutely critical for 
success, is all about security, because the only way that the 
Iraqis are going to get those things is if their urban areas 
and their infrastructure is secure, and it is entirely within 
our ability to provide security for, at least, parts of Iraq, 
in fact, major parts of Iraq.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much, doctor.
    We will have a third area of discussion. On this occasion I 
am going to ask Dr. Cordesman to make the first comment, to be 
followed by Dr. Pollack and then by General McCaffrey. Should 
the United States reprioritize the training schedule of Iraqi 
forces and support more training in other countries? Are Iraqi 
troops being deployed before they are ready in an attempt to 
demonstrate progress? Should there be more gradual training 
schedules to allow Iraqi units to develop greater cohesion and 
capabilities before exposing them to hostilities? Should the 
number of Iraqi security forces be increased by integrating the 
Badr Brigade, an anti-Saddam Shi'a militia group, the Pesh 
Merga, the Kurdish forces, or other local militias into the 
Iraqi Army or the National Guard? Would the political 
ramifications of such integration outweigh the security 
benefits?
    Can we increase the number of troops trained in other 
countries, such as France, Jordan, and Egypt, or will those 
countries provide training only if the cost is picked up by the 
United States? And would we be diverting training assets in 
Egypt and Jordan that would better be devoted to training 
Palestinian security forces? Should we put more emphasis on 
training Iraqi military officers perhaps in the United States, 
in an effort to create professional military leadership?
    Dr. Cordesman, would you begin our discussion on these 
issues of security training?
    Dr. Cordesman. Senator, if you had asked me this question a 
year ago I think I would have said that we had failed to ever 
begin. At that point in time we had actually more people being 
reported as being in the Iraqi police, military, and security 
forces than we have today but we only had one battalion worth 
of Iraqi forces actually in service in the army and no 
battalion equivalents being deployed.
    But, things have changed. A lot of reference has been made 
to General Petraeus. I think that you could give the same 
praise to the people under him at almost every level. I think 
it is important to give it to General Abizaid and to General 
Casey, and certainly to the missions that visited Iraqi under 
both General Ikenberry and under General Luck, because a lot 
has changed.
    When we look at Iraqi force strength as of May 2005, we had 
put a great deal of emphasis on getting battalion-level 
elements ready and in some form where they could perform 
missions. You now had, counting the National Guard, 81 
battalions, not one.
    Now, many of those were not fully ready. You only had 1 out 
of 26 brigades with an operating headquarters. There was not 
combat or service support. But to put forces in the field who 
could establish a presence and move toward some kind of 
security in urban and other areas was a tremendous change. And 
if you threw in the special police units, which to me are much 
more critical in urban security and in providing the kind of 
counterinsurgency efforts needed to establish security in 
stable areas than the Iraqi Army or United States or foreign 
troops, the number went up to 101 battalions.
    The problem--and here I have to say Senator Biden is 
correct in raising the issue--is those numbers are impressive, 
but their readiness is still so low that it is going to take 
between 1 year and 2 years to bring to the kind of levels we 
need and probably 6 months to a year to really get to the kind 
of levels where major coalition reductions would be possible.
    Out of those 101 battalions, the top level of readiness, 
which is the ability to operate on their own, only applied to 
5. If you look at the other units involved--and all of them 
could do something--only about 40 percent were capable of 
performing the kind of missions where they could provide rear 
area security, where they could provide the kind of stability, 
the political structures, economic structures, that were really 
needed.
    That is still, however, a tremendous improvement, and I 
have broken out the details in the testimony I have given. The 
systems involved are too new to make some clear projections, 
but my guess is that by the end of this year, if this works, 
then you will have enough troops in some of the urban areas so 
you can get security.
    Now, let me note that the ability to make this work is 
again political. For example, there are two councils and, 
effectively two mayors, operating in Baghdad. In Basra, even 
though you had a Shiite group that was the alliance dominate, 
the actual local government in Basra is essentially a Shiite 
Islamist government which is basically bypassing at this point 
much of the police force. In Mosul you have major security 
divisions along very clear lines and to move police in is only 
gradually beginning to happen.
    So this is a political issue, not just a military one. Let 
me be a little more specific about your questions. Are Iraqi 
forces being deployed before they are ready in an attempt to 
demonstrate progress? No. But they are being deployed before 
they are combat-ready. The system General Luck recommended was 
to put 10-man training teams into each battalion and each major 
combat and service support element to have those units help 
develop leaders, to work to develop each unit, so the leaders 
that stay are the leaders who can lead, and to take the 
reality, which is many of the people we recruit are not people 
who are going to stay, and build up the units with the people 
who will stay so they actually can come on line as effective 
forces.
    No amount of training in the rear, no amount of exercises, 
is going to create effective Iraqi forces. If you wait for 
everybody to have dotted all of the i's on some theoretical 
checklist, you are basically going to end up with no real 
capability and a tremendous waste of time.
    Should a more gradual training schedule to develop Iraqi 
units, to develop greater cohesion and capabilities, be 
adopted? No. Frankly, the schedule you have is about as 
effective as it is going to be. The truth is that the 
recruiting structure, even though it has been greatly improved, 
is always going to have a very high rate of attrition. So is 
the leadership structure. You are going to have to put these 
people gradually into different missions, raise them up to the 
point where they can operate on their own, from the less 
demanding to the more demanding missions. This is not something 
where people can sit around in a base and be trained.
    Should the number of Iraqi security forces be increased by 
integrating the Badr Brigade, the Pesh Merga, and other local 
militias? A lot of that, to the extent that it is going to 
happen, has happened. It is already a serious problem in terms 
of the Badr Corps, not the Badr Brigade. Fortunately, the Badr 
Corps seems to be more interested in politics now than any kind 
of military adventures. But it is already seen as a force which 
is operating against the Sunnis as a potential cause of civil 
war.
    Taking these units and putting them into the Iraqi police 
or army on any terms acceptable to them is simply not a 
feasible solution. In the case of the Pesh Merga, some units 
are already operating. Others under the TAL agreement, which I 
think many people in Iraq as Iraqis still endorse, were to 
become the border security force as a way of preserving some 
kind of Kurdish force elements without having them be divided 
or creating divisive units. I think that nothing could be worse 
than trying to use these militias to solve a military problem 
at the cost of making the political problem worse. And having 
watched some of them in operation, I think that the idea that 
they are going to perform anything other than ethnic or 
sectarian missions is a dangerous illusion.
    Can we increase the number of troops trained in foreign 
countries? Sure, you can always do that at the margin. The 
problem is scale. Much of this would be on the so-what 
category. Okay, you can get a few more people trained here and 
there, maybe even several hundred or several thousand. But 
given the numbers involved, what you also get is a lot of 
people rotating in and out to foreign countries. It should not 
come as a surprise to the committee that the people who 
desperately want to go overseas for training, or outside Iraq, 
are not always among the most highly motivated of the forces. 
Nor does bringing them back always produce the best results. 
They have, actually, often a very serious rate of desertion 
after they are required to return.
    You have already got about 3,200 Iraqis training outside 
Iraq. I think that you need to be very careful about the idea 
that we can get any kind of scale that matters.
    Diverting training assets in Egypt and Jordan that should 
better be devoted to the training of Palestinian forces? I 
think you have done as much in Jordan as you possibly can 
already. There is not any surplus capacity to take on 
Palestinian forces at this point. Egyptian capabilities I 
cannot generalize on, but I think you need to be very careful 
about exactly what you are training the Palestinians to do.
    Finally, more emphasis on training Iraqi military officers 
in the United States in an effort to create military 
professional leadership. Let me go back. What we need are 
people who will stay in their units, lead in their units, who 
have the kind of experience to deal with the missions that need 
to be developed. It is true over time we need people to go to 
academies, to staff schools, to the equivalent of a national 
war college or defense university, but those people are not 
what we need most at this point in time. The kind of 
reorganization that has taken place in the MNF training effort 
and in the MNSTCI training effort is a lot more practical than 
sending people overseas, something that needs to be done 
constantly over time, but is not a way to win a 
counterinsurgency battle.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, doctor.
    Dr. Pollack.
    Dr. Pollack. Mr. Chairman, let me start by saying that I 
completely agree with Dr. Cordesman's comments, and I know also 
that General McCaffrey is going to spend a good deal of time 
also talking on the training program that we have. So let me 
confine my remarks to making a somewhat broader point.
    I think all three of us would agree that we now have in 
place, in fact, a very good training program for Iraqis. Again, 
I am sure that General McCaffrey will talk more about that. He 
may want to tweak it. But I think, overall, it is a good 
training program.
    Let me also say that while we are praising U.S. military 
officers for doing a good job and I heartily agree with the 
praise that has already been lavished on Generals Abizaid, 
Casey, and Petraeus, there is one other person who is worth 
mentioning, and I think that this is, for me, the crux of the 
problem with regard to training, and that is General Eton, who 
occupied the job that General Petraeus has before General 
Petraeus. I think that General Eton and his team also came up 
with a very good program, an initial program.
    The problem with the initial program, devised by General 
Eton and his team and the American coalition forces who were 
brought in to try to start things up, was political pressure, 
quite frankly. The word from Washington was: Generate more 
Iraqi battalions, get them on line because we desperately need 
manpower. And it was the short-circuiting of that original 
training program which caused the problems that we have now.
    Now, again, we have a new training program in place. I 
think it is a very good one. I think the main issue out there 
is allowing it to take its course. I completely agree with Tony 
Cordesman's point that training is a process and it is a 
process that is both formal and informal. There is training 
that has to go on in the barracks, there is training that has 
to go on in classrooms, there is training that has to go on in 
exercise fields. But there is also training that needs to go on 
in actual operations. It is a long process and we need to allow 
that process to develop.
    I think that Tony, again, correctly pointed out the 
distinction between troops that have some degree of readiness 
and those that are fully combat capable. We need to allow all 
of the Iraqi units to come up to full combat capability.
    I think the key question that we are all asking ourselves, 
and that is inherent in the entire nature of these hearings, is 
the question of how we get from here to there. I think we all 
agree that the long-term solution to security in Iraq is a 
fully capable Iraqi force that is capable of simultaneously 
dealing with the insurgency and providing law and order 
throughout the country. But we are not there yet, and it is 
unclear how long it is going to take.
    As I wrote in the New York Times a couple weeks ago, before 
he left General Petraeus took the opportunity to pull me aside 
at an event that he and I were both at, to try to drill home to 
me his feeling that it would take 3 to 5 years to stand up the 
Iraqi security forces that he needed to do the job. I still 
think that number is exactly right, and 3 years may actually be 
optimistic, looking at developments right now.
    So the question before us is how we get from here to there. 
I think that the big question for us is whether we have the 
right strategy now to get us to that point, at some point in 
the future, or do we need to start making changes.
    The Chairman. General McCaffrey.
    General McCaffrey. I do endorse the comments of Dr. 
Cordesman. In fact, one of the things I think that is unique 
about his work has been to painstakingly go through and get 
numbers that I trust. I have gotten to be a real skeptic about 
much of what I read unless I saw it myself on the ground.
    A couple of thoughts. First of all, there is no question 
that we have a huge responsibility to train and equip and 
design the right kind of Iraqi security forces. I am not sure 
the distinction between police commando battalions and army 
units is all that important. They tend to be light infantry 
units, hopefully with good intelligence, that have a will to 
fight.
    I think we are off an order of magnitude on the resources 
we have provided that effort. When Negroponte got in there he 
and Abizaid and Casey and Petraeus finally got it organized. It 
is starting to happen. I think the last number I saw was 3 
billion dollars' worth of material is coming in country. So you 
do see AK-47s, light radios, light trucks, some body armor, 22 
SWAT teams that have the same stuff as the NYPD. It is starting 
to move, there is no question.
    More has to be done. Some of them are long lead-time items. 
I would be astonished if we do not have a minimum right now as 
an example of 1,500 aircraft in country. We cannot leave unless 
there is an Iraqi helicopter mobility force. It takes a year to 
get some kid to fly a Blackhawk. We have got to buy them, and 
the price tags on those things are going to look monumental 
unless you compare it to the costs of staying in Iraq for 10 
years at $5 billion a month.
    But I see no foresight yet to get us up to the level of 
effort we need to create an ISF that will allow us to withdraw, 
and I think we need to push in that direction.
    I also have argued we have got to lock our senior military 
and political, diplomatic leadership and CIA into that war for 
the next 24 to 36 months. I have argued to the chairman of the 
JCS and others: Go get a compound in Kuwait and keep people 
like Petraeus there for 24 months. We are on the line. The 
State Department people are rotating in and out, 90 days, 180 
days. The most important people in this effort are not rifle 
company commanders. They are political officers in the U.S. 
Embassy and USAID people.
    Now, let me also, though, back off this issue. Train and 
equip; yes. The Iraqi military were the Germans of the Middle 
East. These are some of the most brutal, courageous people in 
uniform within a thousand miles of that country. They fought 7 
years of war against the Iranians. They took ferocious 
casualties. They fought the Brits, the Americans, the Saudis. 
They have conducted brutal internal counterinsurgency.
    We should not kid ourselves that--we are fighting, by the 
way, an insurgent force that is out of this minority of the 
Sunni population. I say there is probably 20,000 of them 
actively involved in taking shots at us, maybe as many as 
80,000 active sympathizers. Our problem is not organizing the 
Iraqi Armed Forces. It is creating the political conditions 
upon which these people think it is worth fighting and dying 
for: Either the provincial leadership, the urban leadership, 
the national leadership, religious leadership, or someone. That 
is why police and army fight and that is what has been lacking, 
and I think is now beginning to appear because of the January 
elections and so the general notion--and Sistani's leadership 
and others--many of the Shi'a, many of the Kurds, are 
grudgingly seeing a reason to create a federal security force, 
and that is starting to happen.
    Again, if the constitution, regardless of its final shape, 
creates Sunni inclusion in the government, I think we will see 
more reaction.
    I would also suggest to you that--and I think I may be a 
lone voice on this one--when we said we are going to disarm the 
militias, the Pesh Merga need to go away, it struck me as the 
height of naivete. Why would anybody in their right mind in the 
Kurdish leadership agree to disarm and throw their future in 
the hands of a federal Iraqi State is beyond me. Why would the 
Shi'a, who got slaughtered by the hundreds of thousands--300,00 
Shi'a dead, maybe 180,000 Kurds, out of the Iraqi Sunni 
dictatorship. Why would either group disarm?
    So my own notion is we ought to recognize that there is a 
place for them, certainly in countercriminal operations, 
counterinsurgency in their own regions. Maybe they ought to be 
in the national uniform. But we should not expect that the 
Iraqis, at any level, will or should voluntarily disarm.
    Nor should we, in my view, expect that in the short run we 
are going to get a Sunni police battalion to go into Ramadi on 
its own and conduct active intelligent counterinsurgency 
operations. It will not happen until they think the Sunnis are 
in the political process.
    Finally on the training notion, in country, out of country. 
I watched this process in Afghanistan also with great interest. 
I think the single most effective thing is John Abizaid and 
George Casey and Petraeus have put these training teams inside 
Iraqi battalions. A lot of them are Marine and Army Reservists 
and National Guard. A Utah State Police, Marine major I talked 
to--it is not surprising to me they immediately fall in love 
with the people they are training. They are happy they are 
there. They have a huge sense of courage to stay out there and 
live out there with these unknown foreign units. They are 
starting to have an impact.
    I have had a lot of conversations in small groups with 
Iraqi officers--the leadership of an infantry battalion, two 
Republican Guard officers, a sergeant major with 14 years in 
the Hamurabi Division. The three of them told me: Hey, you gave 
us our chance, our lives are unimportant; we intend to seize on 
this and create a new Iraq. And I believe them. I might add 
when I say that, I started my Vietnam experience as an adviser 
with a Vietnamese airborne infantry battalion. I think it is 
actually taking hold.
    Now, the other thing Generals Abizaid and Casey have done 
is, they have put a U.S. Marine or Army battalion linked into 
each of these emerging army battalions. That is having a huge 
impact. I went up to the 1st of the 30th Infantry southeast of 
Tikrit. Their infantry battalion is collocated with them. They 
are actively out there, but the people kicking down the door--
and by the way, they are trying to teach them to knock on the 
door and ask for permission to enter. The entry forces are 
Iraqi, not United States Army. I think that is having an 
impact.
    Finally, I agree with Dr. Cordesman. We have got a limited 
number of fighters and people who are good leaders in that 
emerging Iraqi security force. The last thing we want to do is 
send them to Germany for the year course in how to be a police 
officer in Munich or to send them to West Point for 4 years to 
emerge with a balanced education.
    These people are in the same situation we were in 1941; 
250,000 troops to 16 million in the space of 36 months. The 
Iraqis have got to stay there and fight because I would argue 
by the end of next summer we are going to be halfway out of 
Iraq, and hopefully with a stabilizing backup force. But we are 
reaching end game.
    I went into Fallujah, an angry, ruined city, which I 
personally do not believe three-quarters of the population is 
back in there; 250,000 people? Come on. I saw 900 threatening 
looking males driving around the city. But when you get in 
there, the Iraqi police now are manning the checkpoints. The 
entry control points are Iraqis and the Marines are backing 
them up.
    Again, thank God for--and I think Dr. Cordesman is right. 
It is not just Petraeus. There is a lot of Army Reservists 
doing this also and Marine Reservists. They have got a huge 
sense of momentum going. But we need an infusion at a serious 
level of equipment and then we need to let the political 
process create legitimacy under which these Iraqi young people 
will fight.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much, General.
    Let me raise now a fourth area, and I will ask Dr. Pollack 
to initiate the dialog on that, and then General and Dr. 
Cordesman. Should the President of the United States change the 
force structure of the United States presence in Iraq? Do we 
have the right number and types of troops in Iraq now? In the 
short run, should the United States increase the number of 
troops in Iraq to provide greater security and support of 
critical political milestones, such as the writing of the 
constitution, the October constitutional referendum, the 
December 2005 elections?
    Would an increase in United States troops have a 
discernible impact on security? Would it upset Iraqi public 
opinion? Or should we begin drawing down some forces, based on 
the presumption that the United States troop presence fuels the 
insurgents and undergirds their propaganda?
    Dr. Pollack.
    Dr. Pollack. Thank you, Senator.
    Let me begin my response by starting with the end of your 
last question, because I think it is actually related as much 
to this one. This is the question of the militias in Iraq. I 
completely agree with Dr. Cordesman that the militias are not 
ready to go away, nor are they ready to be integrated into some 
larger force.
    This is part of the dilemma that we face in Iraq. The 
dilemma we face is that we have not created the circumstances 
in Iraq in which it is politically, economically, or militarily 
conceivable to do away with those militias. Frankly, those 
militias are very popular in many parts of Iraq because they 
are the only forces that are providing day-to-day security for 
the Iraqi people.
    In fact, what I have seen over the past year is the 
proliferation of militias throughout Iraq, and to a great 
extent you see all throughout Iraqi, local alims, local 
sheikhs, other figures who are gathering weaponry, gathering 
ammunition, and tapping personnel to say, if the balloon goes 
up, if civil war breaks out, will you be there to fight for the 
neighborhood, and putting together their own militias.
    This, I think, is a clear sign that the militias are not 
ready to go away because we have not yet solved the security 
problems of the country.
    Keeping simply the needs of Iraq in mind, moving from that 
to the bigger picture, would it be useful to have more troops 
in Iraq? Yes, it would be more useful to have more troops in 
Iraq. I think regardless of our strategy it would be more 
useful to have more troops in Iraq. I would argue that if we 
continue with the current strategy that we have been employing 
it is absolutely essential because, again, while it is the best 
solution to have Iraqis performing these missions for us, we 
are a long way from having the numbers of fully capable Iraqi 
forces who can do these things.
    The interim, the period between now and when we will have 
those forces available, is very important, because in that 
interim if things go awry the country could easily slide into 
the civil war that Senator Biden talked about in his opening 
statement. That civil war is on the minds of Iraqis. It is 
always in the back of their heads. It is something that they 
fear on a regular basis. It is one of the reasons why they 
continue to tolerate and, to some extent, are enthusiastic 
about our continuing presence, despite the fact that we 
continue to disappoint them in our inability to provide them 
with basic security and basic services.
    Strangely, I think that if we continue with our current 
strategy, it is absolutely essential to have more forces in 
Iraq and, in fact, it will require a massive infusion of 
troops, because, at present, we do not have the fully capable 
forces capable of both suppressing the insurgency, as we are 
attempting to do, and providing security for the Iraqi people, 
and only a massive increase in forces will allow us to do those 
two things simultaneously.
    The alternative which I have suggested, a true, a 
traditional counterinsurgency approach, a spreading inkspot, a 
spreading oil stain, would greatly benefit from more troops, 
but it is not essential. In point of fact, it is one of the 
reasons why I am increasingly drawn to this, because it is 
possible to begin this kind of a counterinsurgency strategy 
with a smaller contingent of forces. Certainly the contingent 
of forces that we have on hand, given the widespread support of 
reconstruction, is actually a very significant amount of forces 
and probably would allow us to start building an enclave, 
building safe zones, in a very significant chunk of the country 
already.
    But this is the whole point of a traditional 
counterinsurgency strategy. You start with only a portion of 
the country. You make it secure, you make people enthusiastic 
about it, and as you train additional indigenous forces that 
allows you to spread out and encompass ever-greater regions of 
the population.
    So it would certainly be useful to have more troops because 
the more troops that we have the larger the area that we could 
start off pacifying. But if we stick with our current strategy, 
as I said, I think it is absolutely critical that we do so.
    Now, let me come to the question that you raised at the end 
of your option, which is: Would it be counterproductive to 
increase American troop levels in Iraq? There I will say 
unequivocally ``No''; it would not. I think it is truly 
perverse to argue that the presence of American troops are 
actually causing the terrorist attacks and insurgency. This is 
simply false. The insurgents attack the Iraqis as much, if not 
more, than they attack American forces. As Dr. Cordesman 
pointed out, the insurgents believe that they are waging the 
beginning of a civil war.
    The removal of American forces would not eliminate the 
insurgency or the terrorist attacks. It would simply unleash 
that civil war.
    As for whether it would create greater animosity among 
Iraqis, here it is a little bit thornier. It is true that 
Iraqis resent, many Iraqis resent, our presence in the country. 
It is also true that some Iraqis simply have soured completely 
on our presence. I think that there truly are Iraqis who may 
have welcomed us in 2003 and today just want to see us go at 
all costs. But it has been my experience and reading the public 
opinions carefully--and I think you do have to read them very 
carefully because they are often very misleading--because 
oftentimes it is the only moment that Iraqis have to speak 
truth to power.
    But reading them carefully and listening to Iraqis on a 
regular basis, what I consistently hear from Iraqis is, if you 
start out asking them about the American presence they will say 
something along the lines of: Why do you not just leave? But if 
you push them hard, if you try to get beyond that initial 
point, what you typically hear from them is some version of: 
Actually, we do not want you to go at all; what we want is, we 
want you to actually do something for us; we want you to 
provide us with the security and the basic services that we 
have been clamoring for for 2 years and frankly what I think is 
perfectly reasonable for them to expect 2 years after the fall 
of Baghdad.
    I think that for the Iraqis an infusion of additional 
American or other coalition forces, if somehow we could find 
those troops, would grudgingly be accepted. In many quarters it 
would be welcomed. But it would only be welcomed if those 
forces were used to actually provide security for the Iraqi 
people themselves. If our forces continue to operate the way 
that they have and if we continue to have the priorities that 
we do, then I think that the Iraqis will look at it and say: 
Why are you bringing more forces into our country if you are 
not helping us? Under those circumstances it could breed 
greater animosity.
    But it gets to the point that Senator Biden made at the 
beginning. Just as I believe he is correct that the American 
people are not concerned so much at the rising body count, 
although that is obviously tragic for every family who has a 
member of that list, they are more concerned about the strategy 
and their sense that we do not yet know what we are doing in 
Iraq.
    So, too, I think is that the case for the Iraqis. They are 
less concerned with the number of American troops in our 
country than what it is we are doing in their country.
    That, of course, brings me to the last point, which is 
where do you find these troops? Frankly, Senator, I do not have 
a good answer for that question. As I said, the problem that we 
face is a short- to medium-term problem. It is the question of 
what we do between now and 5 years from now, when we probably 
will have large indigenous Iraqi forces that are capable of 
shouldering most if not all of the mission at hand.
    But there is a long road between then and now. And while I 
think it would be extremely beneficial to increase our troop 
presence in Iraq, I think it would be very difficult, given our 
current force structure, to do so over the long term. I do not 
dispute General McCaffrey's point about how we are hurting both 
the Army and the Marines by this protracted deployment and how 
we have handled it. It is one of the reasons why I think that 
it may be time to look at the general force structure of the 
U.S. military.
    We created a military in the wake of the cold war that was 
sized for certain missions. I think the Iraqi mission has 
demonstrated that that military is incapable of handling this 
mission, and this mission is critical, is vital to the national 
interests of the United States.
    In the short term, I think we probably can plus-up our 
forces. Alternatively, as I said, we can move to a true 
counterinsurgency strategy, which will be a very politically 
difficult choice to make because it probably will mean saying 
we are not going to provide security for parts of the country 
and we are going to focus our efforts on parts that we think we 
can secure and there are going to be parts of it that are going 
to wind up looking like the Wild West, and it is going to take 
us quite some time before we can get there. That is going to 
be, politically, very unpalatable.
    But I think that may be our only solution, at least in the 
immediate term. Over the longer term, again we will train Iraqi 
forces, but we probably should be thinking about how we can 
reexpand our own order of battle so that we can start 
committing greater forces to Iraq and be able to sustain them 
without breaking the Army and the Marines.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Pollack.
    General McCaffrey.
    General McCaffrey. Well, I would clearly agree that we have 
a 5-year challenge facing us in Iraq. It will probably take 
that long to create a legitimate Iraqi State, get economic 
reconstruction under way, and create Iraqi security forces that 
are fully capable of, on their own, maintaining internal order 
and protecting the country.
    But I think the next 18 months are crucial. In my judgment 
we are running out of domestic political support rapidly. The 
U.S. National Guard, this huge professional, disciplined force, 
is in a stage of meltdown and within 24 months will be coming 
apart. The wheels are coming off the National Guard.
    The U.S. Army now using year combat tours. Most of our 
fighting forces are rolling into their third combat tour since 
9/11. The Marines are running 7 months, a little bit better way 
of operating it, a very different force structure requirement. 
They are starting into their fifth combat tours.
    The U.S. Army and Marine Corps are incapable of sustaining 
this campaign. The question of more United States military 
forces for Iraq at the start is a moot point. They are not 
there. They will not be there. We can surge one, two, three 
brigades for the election. We will probably do that. This game 
is coming to an end.
    By next summer the National Guard combat brigades will have 
been used up unless we fundamentally change the rules of the 
game. Right now it says mandatory 24-month callup once in 5 
years. If we change it, we will accelerate the self-destruction 
of the Guard. But they are expended as of this summer, so we 
are now back to Active-Duty Army and Marines. Who are rapidly 
trying to create a fourth brigade in each U.S. Army division 
using the same manpower, two-battalion brigades. To some extent 
it is a shell game that will work as long as we are only doing 
counterinsurgency in Iraq. So the bottom line is there will not 
be any more United States forces for Iraq.
    Now, the second point. Personally, I would argue the last 
thing we are in Iraq to do is to conduct counterinsurgency 
operations to pacify the country and to win their hearts and 
minds. That ideology, that language, belongs in a different 
environment. It seems to me we have done a tremendous gift to 
the Iraqi people and the region by destroying the Saddam regime 
and its coercive tools. Now what we are trying to do is create 
a new political government, create new Iraqi security forces, 
and get out of there.
    So I would hope by December 2006 you would see perhaps 
three U.S. Army and Marine divisions outside the urban areas, 
particularly near Baghdad, but not involved in 
counterinsurgency in any way, but only backing up the emergent 
security force.
    Finally, it seems to me that the larger issue, for your 
committee and the Armed Services Committee to face, is not 
Iraq. We are not going to--my guess is we have got about a .80 
chance of pulling this off by the end of next summer. I am 
reasonably optimistic this is--we are in a race against time, 
lack of political will on the part of the American people being 
the big factor. I would be surprised if we do not pull it off.
    But we have got the wheels coming off the U.S. Armed 
Forces. We are running our capital fleet into the ground. It is 
not being rebuilt. Some time in the next 5 years, Castro is 
going to die. We are going to have a million Cuba refugees at 
sea. We are going to have an incipient civil war on the island. 
We are going to have to think through Venezuela and our oil 
energy. We are going to have to deter aggression against 
Taiwan. We are going to have to add military legitimacy to the 
political dialog with North Korea.
    We are--and now the rhetoric coming out of the QDR is let 
us go to a one-war capability, meaning you cannot use even the 
force you have got because you have told the world when you 
commit it, it is gone, there is no backup. So I think we are 
underresourced and I believe in personal judgment--I join many 
others--I think Secretary Rumsfeld is in denial of the evidence 
in front of his eyes that this military structure is not 
achieving its purpose and that we have to transform.
    I would also probably take partial issue with Dr. Pollack, 
the military we had was a World War II military, a cold-war 
military, it is tanks and artillery, and these guys just do not 
get it. That military took down the Afghan situation in under 
100 days. That military went in and took down a million-man 
army. The only cohesive force in Iraq for the last 2 years have 
been U.S. Army and Marine company commanders and battalion 
commanders, not on counterinsurgency, but on economic 
reconstruction. That is who built city councils.
    We are not new to the counterinsurgency game, for God's 
sake. We have been doing this for 200 years, starting with 
fighting our own indigenous warrior, Native Americans. I think 
when you look at downtown Iraq, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, 
the Stryker units up north, the combination of armor and 
special ops and intel and Army aviation, the force structure is 
pretty good.
    It is not to argue against transformation. We get some real 
problems out there to change SOCOM's credentials and resourcing 
in particular. But I do not think the U.S. Armed Forces are the 
key factor, the bottom line, in Iraq right now. They are so 
tough, so disciplined, so determined, that the insurgency is 
leaving them alone. The insurgents are not operating in units 
bigger than squad-sized units. They had 50 of them attack Abu 
Ghraib 60 days ago and we killed damn near all of them almost 
immediately.
    They have stopped using mortars in most cases against our 
troop cantonments and they are going to rockets because when 
they do we use counterbattery and nail the shooter, or overhead 
systems or Predator.
    So I think the military is doing a terrific job. What we 
need is this new Ambassador on the ground and a 36-month 
strategy to get us out of there and to leave a determined Iraqi 
Government with its own security forces.
    Thank you, sir.
    The Chairman. Dr. Cordesman.
    Dr. Cordesman. I think that both Dr. Pollack and General 
McCaffrey have raised an issue which is not related directly to 
your questions, but absolutely critical. It is somewhat 
striking that 6 years after we began talking about force 
transformation we have one practical example, which is General 
Schoomaker's reorganization of the Army, and no meaningful 
future year defense program, no meaningful cost containment of 
procurement, no plans to reorganize our force structure in 
terms of the Reserves, the Guard, or any of the other elements 
that address not only this contingency, but any other 
contingency that we face.
    I do not know if we are going to talk our way through 
another quadrennial defense review, but at this point all I can 
say is, who cares? I learned when I worked in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense if you are not shaping the budget it is 
all nonsense. What we have had, frankly, is 6 years, to be 
polite about it, in which we have not shaped the budget. And if 
all of those studies were burned tomorrow, who would ever know?
    That, unfortunately, has set the groundwork that we now 
have to face. Whether or not I agree with Dr. Pollack--and I do 
not--on how I would use the troops, I would love to have more 
people with language skills, civil-military experience. I would 
love to have people who could actually stay long enough and 
provide the continuity that is the key, regardless of how you 
are using people.
    But we have not got them. We have already over-rotated the 
people who are really good and we really need. Putting more men 
and women in simply for the sake of more men and women is not 
going to serve a purpose. If we cannot answer the question of 
where skilled people are coming from, the question, as General 
McCaffrey has said, is moot.
    I have to say there is one area where we could potentially 
find more people and where it would serve a purpose of, I 
think, really helping in the areas which are relatively secure. 
I found it amazing how few foreign service officers, who are 
career officers, have actually volunteered, who are actually 
performing duties in the field. In many cases these are people 
who are taking extended tours. A small part of the foreign 
service is taking on far too much of the job, supplemented in 
many cases by young contract personnel.
    One real issue here is why do we not have the civilian 
counterparts for the military? That is one of the critical 
aspects of the police training effort. One problem has been the 
Department of Homeland Security, other elements of the civilian 
side of the government. These are skills the military do not 
have. They are also skills we have not really drawn on.
    If I was to look at a priority where there may be some 
leeway for action, that is one of the critical ones. A more 
general issue for this committee is do we need a foreign 
service trained to hide in the embassies and pursue its careers 
in Washington, and if not should we change retention, 
promotion, and recruiting fundamentally?
    In a world where we talk about wars on terrorism and 
constant risk, having a foreign service oriented toward its own 
security and having civilian agencies which cannot be the 
military counterpart is a warning that goes far beyond Iraq.
    Now let me address the more specific issues here. I do not 
believe that it is 3 to 5 years before we find out whether 
Iraqis can perform the security mission. I agree with General 
McCaffrey that in the next 6 to 18 months we either pull this 
thing together or we do not. We are going to pull it together 
by finding out whether Iraqi forces come on line, not in full 
strength, but enough strength to make a difference, in areas 
which are more secure. We are going to find out whether Iraqi 
governants can actually deploy outside Baghdad and handle the 
regional issues involved, and we are going to find out whether 
Iraqi politics are inclusive.
    We are going to find out whether we can hold together the 
relationship between the Kurds and the Arabs, something that is 
basically uncertain. We are going to find out whether the 
Shiite areas which are relatively secure can establish, not 
security in any classic sense, but governance, of which 
effective police forces and security forces are part. Basra is 
a warning. United States-British troops could not address a 
single problem that is a security problem in Basra today. All 
they could do is add to the tensions between Shiite groups. 
Over far too much of the south that is the case.
    Iraqi pulls it together with Iraqi security and police 
forces or General McCaffrey's 80-percent chance of success 
comes a lot closer to mine, which is 50 percent and dropping.
    Similarly, in the Sunni areas we either can put people into 
the field who can govern, who can be a police force, and at the 
same time pressure Sunnis while the inclusive structure works 
or we fail.
    That to me is the key set of priorities, and U.S. troops 
simply are not capable of handling it. We may have to surge 
them. There may be a need, even at the cost of even further 
future problems for our all-volunteer force structure, to pull 
in specialized units to meet specialized needs. But sheer 
numbers, 10,000 men and women, what on earth does that mean? 
Ten thousand men and women with what capability to do what?
    I was trained from the start in the Department of Defense 
that whenever you start quoting total manpower numbers you have 
become irrelevant. I think in general that is one of the 
problems here. If you cannot say who to do what, when, and 
where, this is the kind of strategic generalization that does 
more harm than good.
    But let me make a final point here, and that is, would it 
upset Iraqi public opinion, is there hostility? I here--I do 
very much disagree with Dr. Pollack. I think in much of the 
south people sincerely do not want any kind of foreign military 
presence. In most Sunni areas I do not think they want us to do 
security missions.
    I think this is a very sincere nationalism, antagonism. It 
goes beyond Islamists. It is something I watched in Iraqi from 
1971 onward and I do not believe it has changed on the basis of 
my recent visits to Iraq. That is why I think, one way or 
another, either the Iraqis do this or we fail, and we need to 
understand that and begin to accept the risk.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Cordesman.
    In our invitation to the witnesses we indicated that at 
this point there would be an opportunity for each of you to 
make concluding points or to reinforce something that you have 
said in view of what others have said. You have all been 
interacting remarkably in any event, but let me at this point 
ask you, Dr. Pollack, if you would like to make a final 
comment.
    Dr. Pollack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I have said 
all that I need to say about my views about our military 
strategy and the need to adopt a traditional counterinsurgency 
approach. Let me make just a couple of additional points and I 
will make them very briefly.
    I do think that we need to adopt as well a new political 
approach. I think that this is critical and we have all been 
talking about the importance of both the political and economic 
environments in Iraq to solving the security situation. I have 
repeatedly come back to the security situation because in my 
conversations with Iraqis, in my conversations with Americans 
working out in the field with Iraqis, it is security that is 
the first problem. It is security that is hampering the 
political and economic reconstruction programs, and, therefore, 
if we do not tackle security and start to make changes there, I 
think it very difficult to deal with the political and economic 
solutions, which are critical elements in the reconstruction of 
Iraq and the solution to dealing with the insurgency and the 
broader problems of the country.
    But one of the problems that we have facing us--and it is a 
point that I made with regard to General McCaffrey's very apt 
point about the importance of a legitimate political process--
is that the Iraqis see this as a legitimate political process. 
It is all well and good for the United States to stand up and 
say this is a legitimate process, but if the Iraqis do not buy 
it it is meaningless, because, back to Dr. Cordesman's earlier 
point and his repeated point, that we need Iraqis who are 
willing to fight and die for this country.
    Unfortunately, what we have increasingly seen is that for 
many Iraqis a piece of paper that looks very nice to us does 
not necessarily do it for them. In particular, one thing that I 
am increasingly hearing from Iraqis and seeing in both press 
reports and in United States Government reports is increasing 
disconnect between the Government in Iraq, in Baghdad, in the 
green zone, and the rest of the country. I am very frightened 
when I hear Iraqi friends talking about ``those people in 
Baghdad,'' meaning the new transitional governments, whom they 
seem to believe are not really interested in their lives and 
are not making much of an effort to help them, largely because 
they do not see any sort of improvement in the basic material 
aspects of their lives--security, electricity, these other 
factors that I have mentioned repeatedly.
    This is a tremendous problem. Iraqis complain about the 
corruption that General McCaffrey mentioned. They complain 
about the corruption within the government itself. Here I want 
to be very careful. As best I can tell, most Iraqis very much 
like Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari. They believe that he is not 
corrupt and that he is very well-intentioned. But other members 
of their government do not seem to get that same impression, or 
give that same impression to the rest of the country.
    There is enormous corruption in the country. As I wrote in 
the New York Times, the Iraqi oil ministry seems to be nothing 
but a sieve. I would urge this committee in particular to try 
to get to the bottom of where that money is going, because it 
is an awful lot of money that ought to be going to the Iraqi 
people and does not seem to be.
    But our focus has been on this political process in 
Baghdad, and that political process needs to succeed. Do not 
get me wrong, please. It is necessary. It is a necessary 
element of success. But it is not sufficient. For Iraqis to see 
this political process as being legitimate, they need a 
connection to their government which does not yet exist.
    Many of these political parties have not made an effort to 
put down roots in the community, to recognize what the 
complaints are of their constituents, and to try to bring them 
real material benefits. As a result, Iraqis often feel 
disconnected from what we claim is their political leadership 
in Baghdad, and increasingly they are looking to go their own 
way.
    It is why you increasingly hear calls for autonomy, not 
just from Kurdistan, but from the Shi'a areas of southeastern 
Iraq, and that is extremely troubling. Again, that is the road 
to civil war.
    As a final point, since we have been jousting all morning, 
let me make one final rejoinder to Dr. Cordesman, which is his 
statement that the Iraqis either do this or we fail. I am in 
mortal danger of that statement. I think that is an enormous 
gamble. What I have seen from the Iraqis in Iraq, studying them 
for 17 years--and I recognize that Tony's numbers are double 
mine--the Iraqis cannot do this for themselves.
    We need to help them get past the first hurdles, and these 
are big hurdles, because they cannot do it for themselves. They 
are not culturally, politically, or socially inclined.
    Just one point. Let us remember that this is a society that 
for 30 years Saddam reinforced to the notion that they should 
not do for themselves, that the state should do everything for 
them and that Baghdad should be the arbiter of all 
decisionmaking in the country. When you get out into the 
countryside of Iraq and you talk to American personnel, 
military and civilian talking to Iraqis, they will say this 
again and again and again: We cannot get the Iraqis to do it 
for themselves. They expect us, they expect Baghdad, to do 
everything for them.
    It is going to take time to get past that, and it is going 
to take time before we have an Iraqi military that is capable 
of dealing with the security system. Just saying that it is 
either sink or swim, the Iraqis are going to do it, or not, in 
6 or 18 months, frankly, I would say that the chances of 
success are a lot less than 80 or 50 percent.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Pollack.
    I just have to interject at this point that under my 
distinguished friend Joe Biden's chairmanship, we had a good 
number of hearings before the war commenced. And distinguished 
persons just like yourself sat in front of us. Many of them 
were what I have termed to be the ``dancing-in-the-street 
crowd.'' They claimed that we would be welcomed, there was no 
need to have a whole lot of troops out there; the Iraqis, once 
rid of Saddam, would take care of their situation.
    Obviously, these views were not well founded, but 
nevertheless that was then; this is now. And I appreciate your 
testimony this morning very much.
    Let me just indicate----
    Senator Biden. I think the record should note Dr. Pollack 
was not one of them.
    Dr. Pollack. Thank you, Senator Biden.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden, for making that 
interjection.
    Senator Biden. Others were more inclined to think that.
    The Chairman. Well, we will not go there.
    The fact is that there is not an easy bifurcation between 
security, politics, and economics. On Wednesday, as a matter of 
fact, we hope to discover where the oil money is or how much 
there is, because, somehow, despite the fact that security must 
be provided, and likewise a constitution or a political 
framework, someone must pay for all of this. Revenues must be 
raised in Iraq. There must be a functioning economy. So we want 
to discover all of these things sort of ad seriatim in the 
early days of this week.
    General McCaffrey, do you have some final comments?
    General McCaffrey. Well, I provided an after-action report, 
Senator Lugar, to you and your members of the committee.
    The Chairman. Yes.
    General McCaffrey. I tried to bring together some of the 
insights, to include a listing of the vulnerabilities I thought 
we faced, because I think the situation--essentially, I came 
back this time saying, reminding myself how impressed I was by 
the courage, the dedication, and skill of the U.S. Armed 
Forces. We have never had more creative, brave young men and 
women in uniform in our history. They are doing a remarkable 
job.
    The second observation, I thought we are finally getting--
Negroponte and Abizaid and Casey put together a decent 
strategy. I told them the strategy should not be classified; it 
ought to be up on billboards outside all of their encampments. 
Essentially it says we are going to create an Iraqi State and 
Iraqi security forces and we are leaving in some measured way.
    Then finally, I think I saw some chance that the Sunnis 
would decide to participate politically instead of just 
fighting.
    Now, balancing that, a couple of other observations. I 
steadfastly, and certainly on TV or radio, never allowed myself 
to be drawn into a comparison of Vietnam and Iraq. To be blunt, 
there are no political or economic or national security 
comparisons, except possibly U.S. domestic politics. But one 
thing struck me this last time. I was able to move around the 
whole country because I had this terrific young group of kids, 
Texas National Guard, security, two Blackhawks, two Apaches, 
advance parties, et cetera.
    Baghdad is 10 times more complex and dangerous than Saigon 
ever was. I used to live in an air-conditioned BOQ and drive, 
normally with two beers under our belts, down to Vung Tao to 
the beach with two bodyguards. This whole situation in Iraq is 
a real demanding, dangerous enterprise, where we have huge 
national security interests at stake. I personally would 
underscore in my judgment we had better pull this off. If it 
requires further resources or sacrifice on the part of the 
American people, we will be making a terrible misjudgment if we 
do not stay the game.
    Finally, sort of a minor observation. About one of the few 
things I was critical of the U.S. Armed Forces leaving country 
was our public diplomacy, our press policy, our media policy. I 
think the media are starting to send the second team to Iraq. 
It is dangerous. They are using unknown Arabic stringers to do 
their reporting. They are focusing on the bomb blasts with 
borrowed video. They cannot get out of their hotels, and the 
U.S. Armed Forces had better support them.
    Conversely, the Pentagon--I, debriefing this trip, said, 
can you imagine in World War II; we would have had a guy like 
Petraeus, who was widely hammered around Washington for 
appearing on the front page of Time Magazine or something--can 
you imagine taking in World War II some brave-hearted battle 
leader with a doctorate from Princeton who is telegenic and 
likes creating Arabic forces and telling him to stay out of the 
eyesight of the American people?
    What are we doing? The most trusted institution in American 
society now are the U.S. Armed Forces, hands down. They are up 
in the 80th percentile or higher. Our battalion and brigade and 
division commanders ought to be responding to the American 
people on TV and to the print media, and they are not doing it. 
So I think there is room for a little energy to get that 
process going. A free press, there will be no argument in this 
hearing room, is essential to what we are trying to achieve 
there.
    I thank you, sir, to you and your committee for the 
opportunity to share these ideas with you.
    The Chairman. Well, I appreciate your comments very much. 
On the last one, in another forum, I am going to be testifying 
at a Wednesday hearing on the media shield law. It strikes me 
this is another media shield situation. We really need to have 
persons who are articulate and well-informed talking about 
Iraq.
    Senator Biden. That is uniforms and not suits at the 
Pentagon.
    The Chairman. Dr. Cordesman.
    Dr. Cordesman. Thank you.
    This is an enormous gamble and the stakes are 
extraordinarily high, and they go far beyond Iraq. They affect 
the gulf, our strategic energy interests, the overall problem 
that we are struggling with, which is Islamist extremist 
terror.
    I agree that it is going to take years. I have no idea how 
many, whether it is 5, 10, or 12. The point is not that we can 
set the calendar. The point is we cannot set the calendar and 
we need a prolonged commitment.
    But I think General McCaffrey made the point, perhaps we 
all have made it in different ways, we have got to get through 
the next 18 months to get to those other periods. When I talk 
about Iraqi forces, I do not mean they will be ready. We will 
need significant United States troops until Iraqi forces can 
take over, and I do not know when that is. What I am certain of 
is that if the current procedure for training and expanding the 
role of Iraqi forces fails, we do not have a backup with United 
States military presence or anyone else.
    We have a political calendar where we can make many 
slippages in time or content. Iraq already had a good 
constitution. It did not really help very much. Perhaps having 
a better one may help or it may not. I think in the real 
world--Ken touched on the issue--the constitution counts when 
it touches on three things: Money, mostly how the oil money 
gets allocated; power, who has the power in the center; and 
then federalism or regionalism, how do you protect the 
minorities. Everything else is a little too Jeffersonian to 
reach Iraqi hearts and minds.
    The election that is coming may, or may not, make things 
better. We may see a lot more selfish ethnic, sectarian, and 
service politics. But what we have to have is unity and avoid 
civil war. To me, the exit strategy that is inevitable is we 
cannot fix Iraq if Iraq attacks itself, and we have to bear 
that in mind and I hope you will bear it in mind in your 
hearings on the political and economic dimension.
    We have talked here about a number of issues on the 
military side. Let me conclude with a few points--you asked for 
recommendations--that really do not relate to the military 
side, but to the other aspects of U.S. policy that I think are 
critical.
    I believe we face three major enemies in Iraq. One is the 
mainstream of Sunni insurgents, the other is Islamist 
extremists, and the third is the management of the aid process 
here in Washington. We have now committed as of this week $19 
billion out of $20 billion in aid money. Ken noted the problems 
in figuring out where the oil money is going. I think time and 
again it does not matter whether we have completed most of 
these projects. If we drew a map, they will be in the wrong 
area, they did not affect real world service, and they are not 
sustainable.
    The reporting going to this committee and to the public is 
like the Russian reporting. It is a number of project starts 
with a member of project completions, nothing on meeting 
project needs, no mapping of who it influences. It also is 
putting U.S. contractors, U.S. security teams, foreign 
contractors, and foreign security teams everywhere that it is 
operating. Whatever the hostility may be toward U.S. troops, I 
suggest the committee might want to drive behind some of those 
personal security detachments for contractors some day and see 
how they behave and see the level of hostility that is there.
    When we talk about Iraqi corruption, let me say that Iraqi 
corruption is infinitely preferable to ours. At least most of 
the money will be spent in Iraq and stay there.
    I think you need to ask some very searching questions in 
your next hearing. I see that Ambassador Khalilzad has already 
talked about moving the management of aid to the Iraqis into 
the Embassy and to the team in Iraq, and I think anything you 
do to bypass USAID in Washington and the defense contracting 
effort in Washington will be as effective a counterinsurgency 
action as anything you can do militarily. They are part of the 
threat, not part of the solution.
    Let me say in terms of public diplomacy here, General 
McCaffrey and Ken also raised a critical issue. What bothers me 
is our inability to communicate in Iraqi terms clearly and 
unambiguously that we will not be guilty of the conspiracy 
theories that they see us as most potentially guilty of, and 
those essentially are permanent bases versus advisory efforts, 
taking the oil, taking the land.
    We do not seem to have the public diplomacy here to support 
the public diplomacy in the field, and the public diplomacy in 
the field is badly underfunded and badly underpersoned simply 
because it is not given the seriousness it needs. So that adds 
to the aid dimension another issue.
    I think we have not touched on international organization. 
I do not believe we can go for foreign troops. I do believe we 
badly need to go for foreign help, and Ken mentioned the idea 
of having some kind of contact groups, of expanding our role 
here. I think that is absolutely critical.
    Let me just make one final point about oil, and I think it 
sums up what the committee might want to focus on. I get a 
little surprised when I look at my watch and find it is 2005 
and I then read the status report from the Department of State 
as of 13 July 2005 and read: ``On July 10th, bilateral energy 
consultations were held between the Iraqi Oil and Electricity 
Ministries and the U.S. Departments of Energy and State 
covering issues such as developing a needs assessment into 
Iraq's natural gas utilization for power generation.''
    We have spent $19.1 billion out of $20.9 billion and we do 
not have a clear assessment of the needs for Iraq's major 
source of revenue? We face a situation next year where the 
Iraqi budget is in excess of $18 billion. That is virtually the 
total of its entire oil revenues. And you have not even started 
planning for your $30 billion supplemental in aid for Iraq for 
the coming fiscal year. There is something wrong here that goes 
far beyond the military dimension.
    The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Cordesman.
    Let me just indicate, before we begin our questioning, how 
much we appreciate the preparation each of you have made and 
even more the testimony you have given this morning. I think 
each one of us has benefited tremendously from the intellectual 
stimulation and also, hopefully, more than that from the action 
steps that we would feel impelled to take listening to the 
three of you talk.
    But now we want to ask some questions of you. We will have 
a 10-minute round and maybe more as members may have additional 
questions. I would like to begin my portion by asking you, 
General McCaffrey, in your testimony, in your written 
testimony, you suggest the period between January to September 
2006, that is next year, would be the peak of the insurgency. 
Can you discuss a bit more this conclusion? In other words, all 
three of you have identified this period from July 2005 to the 
end of 2006 as roughly the 18 months of critical time.
    You have introduced, General McCaffrey, the suggestion that 
6 months from now, more or less, the insurgency may pick up and 
continue on in its strongest form for maybe that 8- or 9-month 
period. What is your thought about that?
    General McCaffrey. Well, it will be interesting to see what 
I say in January 2006.
    My sort of gut instinct was that the new Ambassador we are 
going to send in there to replace Negroponte is a national 
treasure. This fellow has a tremendous sense of dealing with 
these kind of issues. I think if we can lock Abizaid and some 
of the other senior military leadership in place, the current 
trend lines say if the Sunnis come into the government--and I 
actually--I have been sort of fascinated listening to my two 
colleagues here, in particular the notion that they used to 
have a decent constitution anyway, but it made no impact. So if 
we can get a constitution that is not viewed as malignant to 
the Sunnis and if there is a vote, and if there is a 
pluralistic government of some sort in January, and if the 
construction of the Iraqi security forces continues on its 
current lines, in which by December we are alleging we will 
have even more people on the ground, 60 to 100,000 that are 
determined to try and support this political process, then I 
think that would be the high point of the insurgency.
    I have said all along the foreign jihadists, the suicide 
bombers, the slaughter of the innocents, the nailing of the 
Iraqi police forces as they are lined up to take rollcall, will 
not materially affect the outcome of this conflict. What we are 
watching in Iraq is: Can you take three warring factions--the 
Kurds, the Shi'a, and the Sunni--cobble together some loose 
federal structure, and have some way of capitalizing on their 
oil income and creating law and order?
    I am betting that, the current trend lines, we will 
probably see January be the high point of the insurgency, and 
then by, hopefully, the end of next summer, as we are forced 
into large-scale drawdowns of our military forces, that the 
Iraqis will be there to pick up the energy.
    The Chairman. Each of you in a way talked about our 
problems, our military structure. The drawdown seems to be 
there in the vision. It seems to be with all three of you. But 
as you are pointing out, success, whether it is the 80 percent 
you suggested, General McCaffrey, or the 50 percent you 
suggested, Dr. Cordesman, is dependent upon these factors of 
the inclusion of all the parties in the government and their 
respect for this constitution. That means respect for a process 
that has allocated oil revenues, or for a sense of federalism 
or autonomy, as that might be a part of the constitutional 
structure. The Kurds have certainly called for this, others 
maybe, so that there will be some loyalty felt by all the 
parties toward the center and, therefore, some willingness to 
fight for it.
    When Prime Minister Jafari came to this country recently to 
visit with our President, he stressed against the skeptics that 
August 15 really is important to get the constitution done. You 
have barely got some of the Sunnis around the table. You just 
appointed a few the other day. What is being written? How in 
the world can you cobble together a constitution by the 15th?
    Some have even suggested a little fudging, that it might go 
on until September 15 even if the August 15 deadline was sort 
of kept there. But in any event, there is going to be a 
constitution and a referendum, apparently. But the referendum 
has some tough qualifications. As I recall, there must be a 
two-thirds majority in each of the 18 governmental provinces 
now, which means a lot of people will need to be on board to 
get those kinds of pluralities.
    But even then, Prime Minister Jafari was optimistic that 
this is going to happen. They proceed on to the elections, 
which will then lead to the legitimacy of this elected 
government that we are talking about, that will have the 
support of everybody. There will be some sense as you suggest, 
I think, Dr. Cordesman, that power is recognized there and is 
accepted, that the oil revenues situation has been worked out, 
and that even regionalism, the sense of the Kurds, some sense 
of autonomy there, has been worked out. They want to be Iraqis 
as opposed to Kurds and a greater Kurdistan. That is the reason 
Jafari was saying we have got to proceed right along with these 
deadlines; these are not to be debated, despite the practical 
considerations.
    What is your judgment, Dr. Pollack, on how likely it is 
that the August 15 deadline, or some reasonable deadline soon 
thereafter, will be met with a constitution? Will this 
referendum in 18 districts, a two-thirds vote, happen with good 
participation by Iraqis, with maybe more Sunnis coming out this 
time? Likewise, will the officers that are selected under this 
constitution in December or January or whenever that event 
occurs, be accepted? Are they going to be the kind of people 
who say, we are Iraqis now?
    Dr. Pollack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I think there is a reasonable expectation that August 15 
will happen with--will come to pass and there will be a 
constitution agreed upon. I do not think it is a certainty and 
I would not want to assign a probability. On the one hand, we 
have seen the members of this government squabble over almost 
everything imaginable and the delays that we saw in the 
formation of this government suggest that we could just as 
easily see them unable to come to an agreement.
    The TAL was very much a compromise document. It was 
something that very few Iraqis really liked. Repeatedly they 
have looked at the TAL, they have taken runs at the TAL, and 
they have basically decided to leave the TAL intact because 
they have not yet wanted to have the kind of all-out fight they 
seem to believe that opening up the TAL again will require.
    Now, that is not necessarily bad. As we know from our own 
experience, constitutions are compromise documents. No one gets 
everything that they want from a constitution. And I suspect 
that there were any number of people who walked away from our 
constitutional convention very unhappy, bitterly disappointed 
by the compromises that were reached there. But ultimately it 
was good enough to make it work.
    What, of course, is critical in all of this is whether the 
Iraqis see those compromises as good enough to respect it and 
to live with it.
    I think it is conceivable that we could get to August 15 
and have a constitution, and it is also conceivable to me that 
those compromises, which while unpalatable to a greater or 
lesser degree by a whole range of Iraqis, could ultimately be 
accepted.
    Let me say, Senator, that my greater concern is that this 
will all be seen as ultimately irrelevant to the great many 
Iraqis. I think that if we have a--if we do get a good 
constitution on August 15 you probably will see a lot of Iraqis 
come forward to vote and to approve it in the referendum. For 
me this is very much like the January 30 elections, which were 
as much expressions by Iraqis of a determination to make 
reconstruction work as it was actual approval of the candidates 
who were being elected.
    Now, the UIA, the United Iraqi, list was very popular--
sorry, the Inter-Iraqi Alliance--was very popular because Grand 
Ayatollah Sistani told people that this was the group that he 
wanted in place and because Jafari himself was popular and 
Hakim has a following, other members of the coalition were 
themselves somewhat popular.
    But I think it is very important to keep in mind that for a 
great many Iraqis they voted and they voted for the United 
Iraqi Alliance in expectation that this was going to be the 
group who finally did bring them security and basic services, 
and that same group is becoming increasingly frustrated with 
this government because they are not providing those security 
and basic services that they seek.
    My fear is we could have a constitution, we could have a 
referendum, we could have an election in December, and we may 
find ourselves in exactly the same spot a year from now because 
that new government is just as unable to provide the Iraqis 
with the basic necessities that they demand and are entitled to 
as this one and all of the past ones have.
    The Chairman. I thank you for that.
    Let me just conclude my portion by saying our focus today 
was on Iraqi security, but in the course of that you have all 
made comments that I think are important about United States 
armed force structure and our security, as we face a whole list 
of potential challenges throughout the world. We are trying to 
think conscientiously about how we can allocate the resources 
that are required in terms of manpower and money and what have 
you to Iraq, recognizing that there is a rest of the world out 
there.
    So this is, hopefully, a wakeup call for all of us about 
the ambitions of our foreign policy. Whether we have ambitions 
or not, the needs of our national defense as well, require that 
we take a look at vital security issues.
    Senator Hagel, please.

   STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

    Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    Gentlemen, thank you for your efforts and honest, realistic 
analysis of our current position in Iraq. I am grateful, as I 
believe all who have had the opportunity to listen to you for 
the last 2\1/2\ hours, for your wise counsel based on 
significant experience, and certainly that includes recent 
experience, recent, I would put it, within the timeframe of the 
last 3 years, because each of you has been involved in framing 
up the challenges even prior to our invasion of Iraq and have 
been very steadfast in your continued honest analysis of the 
realities of what we are up against.
    I would want to comment on a point that the chairman just 
made. General McCaffrey, you have alluded to it in your summary 
remarks, and that is the magnificent conduct of our troops in 
Iraq. I know you have just been there and have briefed some of 
us personally, as you have done here today, and I assume you 
have had an opportunity to brief senior members of the 
Pentagon.
    I do not believe it is a matter of whether our troops have 
performed as magnificently as they have or not. In fact they 
have. In fact, we have loaded on our military so much burden 
and so much responsibility that I think it is part of the 
reason, as each of you have alluded to, some more than others, 
that we are in danger of destroying our National Guard and our 
Reserves as well as our Active-Duty Force.
    General McCaffrey, you are one of those young officers that 
came out of Vietnam after a couple of tours, as well as Norm 
Schwartzkopf and Colin Powell and another dozen or two dozen, 
who stayed in the military and said we are going to rebuild it, 
we are going to make it the kind of military that is worthy of 
our country and our people, and you did.
    I, too, am very concerned about what is happening to our 
military and our force structure. You, General, have 
articulated that point rather well, as Dr. Cordesman has 
referred to it as well as Dr. Pollack. I think we have to be a 
little careful that we do not connect this magnificent conduct 
and the kind of responsibility we have loaded on our military 
and the job they are doing with the policy.
    As a matter of fact, the issue was in Vietnam and Korea, 
every time we have asked our young men and women to make the 
ultimate sacrifice and serve this country, in an unquestioned 
way--and I would even say--and General, you were there and I 
was there--I think our forces in Vietnam fought very valiantly. 
They were not near as well trained as the forces in Iraq, nor 
probably as well led, certainly not as well equipped.
    But what we must assure our military and their families is 
that we have a policy worthy of their service and their 
sacrifices. That is the issue here. The issue is not whether 
our troops have performed admirably, and they have. Also, 
whether we are loading so much on them that they cannot 
perform, in fact, can never be successful at what we are asking 
them to do.
    The three of you have made it very clear, and I happen to 
agree. This is an issue, this war, this area of conflict, that 
will be determined by a successful political outcome. It will 
not be as a result of the military. The military is a very 
significant piece of that, as you all three have noted--
security, stability, allowing Iraqis an opportunity to develop. 
But in the end, it will be the Iraqi people who will decide.
    I would say, in light of that, when the three of you make 
some clear points of corruption, endemic corruption, which I 
hear from all sources in and out of our government, in and out 
of the military side of our government, the civilian side--that 
is an issue that we are going to have to deal with and, as you 
have noted, Dr. Cordesman, in your summary comments, hopefully 
we will get into some of the specifics of that this week at our 
next set of hearings.
    But if there is so much rot so deep down in that 
institution over there, then we do a great disservice to our 
service men and women asking them to give their lives for 
something that is not quite as noble as we like to portray it, 
or as our leaders like to portray it to the American people.
    The honesty of this effort is key in my opinion, and that 
is why the three of you and others we will hear from this week, 
your input is so important.
    Let me ask just an aside. General McCaffrey, I suspect you 
have had an opportunity to brief senior members of the 
Pentagon, I do not know, National Security Council people, 
others. I do not know who you have briefed. Let me ask Doctors 
Pollack and Cordesman: Have you been called in by any senior 
members of the administration to get your take recently on 
Iraq? Dr. Cordesman.
    Dr. Cordesman. I have talked to some of the officials who 
are designated for Iraq, but I have not talked to people in the 
administration.
    Senator Hagel. Thank you.
    Dr. Pollack.
    Dr. Pollack. Certainly no one senior in the administration 
on the issue of Iraq, certainly lower level, working-level 
people have consulted with me on a regular basis.
    Senator Hagel. Well, I will talk to Mr. Hadley, the 
National Security Adviser, and I suggested to him, as well as 
others in the administration at the highest levels of this 
administration, to reach out to people like the three of you 
and listen to the three of you and others. We are bubbled up to 
a point I think where we are disconnected from some very basic 
and dangerous dynamics of reality over there.
    Anyone who has heard the three of you this morning, and 
discount half of what you have said, it is still damn 
disturbing. I am not surprised with what we heard. But the 
administration would do well to reach into another universe of 
thinking and experience like the three of you.
    Thank you very much.
    Now, question. I would like to get the three of your 
thoughts on the Iran-Iraq relationship. As we know, the Prime 
Minister of Iraq, a number of his Cabinet Ministers are in 
Iran, have just completed talks there. How deep, how wide is 
that relationship? Should it develop? What kind of challenges 
does it present? Is it helpful? Does this lead to a wider sense 
of a United States-Iranian opportunity for a relationship?
    Any way you would like to take this, the three of you, I 
would appreciate hearing from you, but specifically focus on 
Iraq's challenges over the next couple of years. Can Iran play 
a role there? Should they? How close should that relationship 
develop? Dr. Cordesman.
    Dr. Cordesman. Senator, it is inevitable that there will be 
a relationship, that it will be strategically critical to Iraq, 
as it will be to Iran, and that whether we like it or not it is 
going to be a relationship which Iraq has to focus on and focus 
on visibly. Just as the Saudis, with much less incentive, had 
to reach out to Iran and reach a modus vivendi with Iran, Iraq 
absolutely has to. It has to deal with the border issue. It has 
to convince in many ways Iran that there is as little incentive 
to interfere as possible.
    There is the problem of reparations. There is the problem 
of religious traffic across the border. You can go through a 
whole list of issues where they have to work things out. 
Fortunately, the issue of oil and transportation has somewhat 
been eased. The Shatt-
al-Arab is essentially obsolete. Basically, modern shipping and 
oil traffic will not be moving through there.
    But even in terms of border incidents and waterway issues, 
one of the things that Iraq is going to have to deal with 
sooner or later is expanding its shipments out through the 
gulf, and if you look at the hydrology of the gulf to get 
efficient oil shipments it is going to have to change its 
current mooring positions. These are just a few of the cases.
    I do not know how Iran will play this out. I think it could 
be very dangerous. If Iran sees anything approaching a civil 
war buildup in Iraq, it is going to obviously back the Shiite 
side. If anything approaching an American power vacuum exists 
in Iraq, Iran is going to attempt to deal with that. If Iran 
comes into confrontation with us, I am not sure it can resist 
trying to play the Iraqi card in a negative way.
    But my impression at this point in time is that Iraq knows 
where to stop. The current leadership is not going to take 
risks that have Iraq seriously involved in training or security 
or advisory presences that would somehow threaten Iraqi control 
of Iraq; that Iran sees the situation at least for this moment 
as to its own advantage. We are effectively fighting a set of 
threats in their interest.
    But if you ask me what this Iranian Government will be 2 
years from now or the moment it comes under pressure or the 
moment it sees the political structure in Iraq fail, then I 
think the current status could change very rapidly and very 
unpredictably and almost inevitably for the worse.
    Senator Hagel. General McCaffrey.
    General McCaffrey. I agree with Dr. Cordesman's comments. I 
think there are--I listed one of the vulnerabilities of CENTCOM 
of our current Iraqi policy being the possibility of Iranian 
intervention, most likely in a covert form, active intelligence 
agents, money, cross-border operations, but potentially if the 
thing started to spin out of control late next year, with 
active military support to protect the Shi'a from being 
slaughtered by the Sunnis again. I do not think they will 
tolerate it.
    There are two other background factors, one of which is 
widely known, but I would argue is underappreciated. It seems 
to me that our vital ally on the ground which is at great 
jeopardy is Saudi Arabia. Now, if you wanted to ask me who I am 
worried about, it is Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait, perhaps, the two of them kluged together. They have 
an enormous fear, as we all know, of a Shi'a domination of the 
oil-producing regions of the gulf. The Saudi eastern oil fields 
are largely Saudi Shi'a population. If you look at Iraq, the 
layout of their oil reserves, much of them, particularly if 
Kirkuk goes back to the Kurds, end up in non-Sunni hands.
    So I think there is a political animosity that will unite 
much of the Sunni leadership in the Middle East against 
Iranian-Iraqi cooperation.
    Finally, it is nuclear weapons. The Iranians are going 
nuclear. They are going to achieve, in the next 5 years, some 
modest capability, 10 to 20 weapons. It will change 
dramatically the military balance of power in the Persian Gulf. 
The U.S. Navy will no longer go into the gulf without 
understanding they are literally placing 10 to 15,000 sailors' 
lives at risk. I do not see us currently having either the 
military power or the political will to deal with the several 
completely unpalatable options to deal with that.
    So flash forward 3 to 5 years. Iran is a nuclear power and 
with a huge capability to influence events in Iraq; a situation 
from which we will be withdrawing.
    Senator Hagel. Thank you.
    Dr. Pollack.
    Dr. Pollack. Thank you, Senator. I also completely agree 
with Dr. Cordesman's comments. I think they are right on the 
money. Let me just amplify a couple of them because I think 
they are important.
    Iran-Iraq relations are going to--are deep and will 
continue to deepen. There is no way that we can stop them and 
it would be foolish of us to try to do so. One of my fears is 
that there are elements within this government who see the 
Iranian bug bear around every corner, believe that any Iranian 
influence is inherently evil, and are fighting that influence 
with everything they can, not recognizing that they are doing 
tremendous damage to our relations with the new Iraqi 
Government and to the new Iraqi Government's ability to 
function. Iran will have a major influence in Iraq. We need to 
recognize that and accept it.
    By the same token, we should not see that influence as 
necessarily pernicious. As Tony has pointed out, and I think he 
is absolutely right, the Iranians are most afraid of chaos in 
Iraq. They hear the same things that we do, they see the same 
information we do. They, too, know that civil war is a very 
real possibility in Iraq and that is their greatest concern.
    As a result, I think we need to recognize that we have had 
tremendous tacit cooperation from the Iranians over the last 2 
years. The Iranians have been telling their various allies 
inside of Iraq to participate in the process, the political 
process that we have established. They have been restraining 
various hotheads in Iraq who have wanted to act unilaterally, 
to fight other groups, to engage in assassinations and 
terrorist campaigns of their own, and that has been extremely 
helpful to us.
    The Iranians have not done it out of any goodwill for us. 
They have done it, as Tony pointed out, purely because it is in 
their interest to do so. My guess is that that will continue to 
be the case, again as Tony points out, until one of three 
things happens: We succeed; we fail and the place starts to 
come apart; or we decide to try to mount military operations 
against Iran. Under any of those circumstances, then I think 
you could see Iran's perspective on Iraq changing.
    If we succeed, you know what? That is a problem I would 
very much like to have. If we succeed in Iraq and our problem 
is what do we do about the Iranian competition over a 
successful Iraq. If we fail, I think Tony is absolutely right. 
The Iranians will get into Iraq as quickly as they can, and 
they have set up a massive intelligence network inside Iraq to 
be able to move--to allow them to move very quickly to arm 
proxies, to set up safe havens, to create buffer zones, and to 
go to war with various groups that are going to be allied 
against them.
    One point I would make, just a tweak to Tony's comments, is 
that I suspect that a civil war on Iraq may not see Shi'a 
versus Sunni; it may see fragmentation and different Shi'a 
groups against different Shi'a groups and against different 
Sunni groups. Under those circumstances, the Iranians will be 
looking, and I think they already are looking, to identify 
their allies and their adversaries in Iraq and move very 
quickly to help their allies and hurt their adversaries as best 
they can.
    Obviously, the big unknown out there is--actually there are 
two, and Tony alluded to at least one of them. One is what are 
the Iranians going to do. They do have a new President. It is 
unclear if that new President will have any impact whatsoever 
on Iranian foreign policy. Their foreign policy so far has 
been, in the last 5 years, pretty consistent and arguably quite 
pragmatic, if not terribly pro-American. That is fine. We can 
live with it.
    If they change their policy, then things could start to be 
different inside of Iraq. But by the same token, I think we 
need to recognize that American policy toward Iran is very much 
up for grabs, and some of the more aggressive policies we have 
heard outlined toward Iran could have very serious 
repercussions for us in Iraq.
    As I said, we have greatly benefited from Iran's tacit 
cooperation in Iraq. If we go to war with Iran, then we will 
have very little incentive to continue to maintain that 
cooperation over Iraq.
    Senator Hagel. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hagel.
    Senator Biden.
    Senator Biden. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for a really 
useful morning. I hope they had the television on in other 
buildings downtown.
    As usual, my friend from Nebraska asks the $64 question: Is 
our policy worthy of our military? The answer is a flat ``No; 
it is not.'' In my view we have no discernible regional policy. 
I have not been able to divine it.
    We talk about Iran--and I had not planned on mentioning 
this, but Iran has certain interests as well. They do not want 
any permanent U.S. bases. They want a quick exit but leaving 
stability behind.
    Everybody forgets--you guys do not because you are so used 
to it. But you know, Persians have a bare majority in Iran. The 
idea of the consequence of a civil war, a sectarian war, in 
Iraq goes a lot further than just what the consequences are on 
other countries in the region, what the consequences are 
internally in Iran.
    Our policy thus far has been a disaster. General, I think 
there is a reason why--I will not bore you with; I have bored 
you already privately with my views about my conversations over 
the last 3 years with foreign leaders who could have helped and 
offered to help, and I believe they offered to help, and the 
way we dealt with it.
    There is an old bad joke about George playing center field. 
You basically said it. George plays center field; in the first 
two innings he has five errors. The coach pulls George out and 
says: Tony, you are in, and he puts Cordesman into center 
field.
    The first pitch, a routine fly ball to Cordesman hits his 
glove; he drops it, error. The coach goes nuts, calls time out, 
and says: Tony, you are out of there. As Tony Cordesman is 
crossing the third base line the coach grabs him by the number 
and says: What is the matter with you, Cordesman? Cordesman 
looks at the coach and says: Coach, George screwed up center 
field so badly no one can play it.
    Well, the truth of the matter is that is part of our 
problem. We have screwed up center field so badly, 
economically, politically, and I would argue in terms of 
military strategy from the suits, not the uniforms, that 
anybody who tells me--if I go one more time and someone tells 
me that we have given the military everything they want--that 
is simply not true, not true, not true, not true.
    In five trips to Iraq, I find an ascending willingness on 
the part of flag officers to say out loud: Hey, I do not have 
what I need. Because they figured out they are going to wear 
the jacket, they are going to be the ones blamed, they are 
going to be the ones blamed for a bad policy.
    Well, enough of my talking about that. Let me point out, 
this notion of U.S. interests and intentions, we have a big 
problem. I asked the question of this administration why we 
will not say we do not want any more bases there, just flat 
out: We will not have a permanent base there. Guess what? They 
have not resolved that issue internally. That is one of the 
reasons why we do not have a good public diplomacy, General. 
They do not know what to say. They do not know what to say as 
to what our policy is.
    The reconstruction policy, to quote a great chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, it is incompetent, incompetent, 
incompetent. The corruption, as you point out, it is not just 
Iraqi corruption. It really is incredible to me. It is 
incredible to me the way in which every time we have been 
there, from the first time the three of us showed up together 
to the last three times. It seems to me like--Webster seems to 
me like a guy who can shoot straight and knows what he is 
doing, head of the 3rd ID.
    He shows me, just like his predecessor Chiarelli did of the 
First Cav: Give me PCV pipe, let me run it from the back of the 
homes into the Tigris River so there is not 3 feet of water or 
2 feet of sewage sitting in the front yard and, guess what, my 
troops do not get shot at as much. And he showed me these big 
overlays only you guys can do, the Powerpoint deals. Take away 
the garbage, turn on the air conditioning a little bit, a 
couple more hours a day.
    Our commander of the Third ID calls it, he refers to ``the 
greening of Iraq.'' He does not mean it in a positive way. You 
can see from a helicopter, the one you flew in, the same ones I 
flew last time. We wonder why foreign policy guys do not sign 
up, foreign service guys. Guess what, they do not get the 
Blackhawk I get. They do not get to travel at 100 feet off the 
ground at 150 miles an hour so there is no problem if I were to 
be shot at, with four guards with me.
    That is the reason they are not volunteering. They do not 
get to go outside. They do not get the protection you got, 
General. They do not get the protection I got. Go to Fallujah? 
Give me a break, go to Fallujah. Get your rear end shot off 
going to Fallujah.
    So what I have a problem with is figuring out how do we do 
more of the same. This is a race against the clock. Let me 
understand what I glean from you guys, and with the 
disagreements there seems to be pretty much a consensus. One, 
you have got to train the Iraqis. Ultimately they have got to 
do the job. They cannot be trained sufficiently to be able to 
take over major responsibility, big chunks, in less than a 
year.
    Tony, you and I may argue about how well they are trained 
and I can go back and read your statement from February and 
read mine from the same. We really have no difference. You know 
the reason they worked in the election, our military shut down 
the country. No one was allowed to drive a car. No one was 
allowed to move. They were able then to man a checkpoint. That 
made sense.
    But if we did not shut down the country, lock it down, they 
could not do it. But we all agree that they are on their way. I 
think Petraeus is first-rate. I have been a fan of his since he 
was up in the north, and I hope to God they do not take him out 
of there. He is the single best thing we have got going on the 
ground, in my view, and he is making real progress.
    But number one, everyone agrees it is going to take some 
time, in the year-plus category, to train up these guys. To 
create the political conditions to win, we have to do two 
things. We have to have elections, participation. But we found 
out when Sunnis get shot at they do not show up. What makes 
anybody think the Sunnis in the second round are going to show 
up, even if they helped write the constitution, if, in fact, 
the circumstance in the triangle is physically no different for 
them? Maybe, maybe, maybe.
    Second, you know, every poll I have seen and every Iraqi I 
have spoken to says to me, in my five trips: I cannot walk out 
my front door. You name me a city in America that would support 
George Washington reincarnated as President if they could not 
walk out the front door, were afraid to walk down the street, 
to send their kids down to the local store to pick up a 
grocery.
    So every one of them rates crime in the street higher than 
anything else. So I do not know how we avoid your position, Dr. 
Pollack, about we have got to do something to change the 
condition on the ground. I guess the thing we do is we train 
more Iraqis, but we need more time to train more Iraqis.
    Now, we have 6 to 18 months and that will tell the story. 
Iraqi troops, what happens outside Baghdad, and whether or not 
people can move around. Yet we are going to be asking the 
American people in the meantime, who are leaving us in droves--
because one thing I think the five of us all agree on, we 
cannot afford to lose here.
    So I end up back to the position that I think Iraqi 
attitudes do relate in part to their safety. I do think that 
the strategy, if you talk to our folks on the ground, as you 
guys have, all of you, they say: Look, they're trying to figure 
out if you get the Sunnis in on the deal, then you can isolate 
the jihadists. And the Sunnis are still the biggest problem in 
the insurgency, but if you get them in on the deal--we need a 
political solution. It is not going to lend itself to a 
military solution.
    But the one thing I disagree with you, General, is I think 
that the jihadists play a larger role here.
    Now, what are the Sunnis outside doing? I sit--and I agree 
with all of you. The one thing every place I go, I spend a lot 
of time, after the first of the year 4\1/2\ hours alone with 
Mubarak at his request. I spent a lot of time with the King. I 
spent a lot of time in the region. All I hear from all these 
guys is one thing, Dr. Cordesman. We cannot have a Shi'a state, 
we cannot have a Shi'a state, we cannot have a Shi'a state.
    Everybody who is Sunni looks first to Shi'a. It is amazing 
to me. Then when we say--when they offer to train or do more, 
we say to them: We cannot have them train or doing more because 
they are Sunni, our folks are saying.
    As I look at the security--and I will end, Mr. Chairman. I 
look at the security my last trip--and you guys have all done 
the same thing--I met with the Prime Minister, the Defense 
Minister, the Speaker of the Parliament. We have got a Badr 
Brigade and we have a Pesh Merga. We all agree it would be 
ridiculous for either of them to agree to disband. We do not 
have enough American forces. Whether we should or should not 
have had them, they are not enough. And we do not have an Iraqi 
Army trained up yet.
    Every Sunni I spoke with said: Senator, do not send anybody 
into my neighborhood that ain't Sunni. The Sunnis are not 
joining that military. So send the Badr Brigade into the Sunni 
Triangle, send the Pesh Merga by any other name into the 
triangle, I think you really do have a civil war, you really do 
have a civil war.
    So what I keep coming back to is, as much as we say our 
presence is one that is rejected, every single person I spoke 
to this time, including the most reactionary Shi'a, who I will 
not name but I will tell you privately said: You got to stay, 
you got to stay.
    So it leads me to this conclusion and I will stop, and if 
you would want to comment I would appreciate it, but I fully 
understand if you do not because the hour is late. One, I do 
not know how we move further without following up on some of 
Dr. Cordesman's ideas, and I think they are good because I also 
have suggested similar things, so you might think I would think 
they are good.
    One is we need benchmarks here. How can we measure success 
or failure if the administration does not state what their 
intention is? The idea we are now sitting down and doing an 
assessment of oil? What are the benchmarks? What is the goal? 
What are we setting out? What is the thing we measure success 
or failure against, except sit back there and say, I am going 
to trust these guys for another 2 years, these same brilliant 
guys who brought us this strategy?
    The second thing I do not understand is--and I think our 
new Ambassador--I fully concur with you, General, he is first-
rate. I think you are going to see him do, I pray, that he is 
going to take all this stuff out of the hands of Brown and Root 
and the rest. And let us say they are all good guys, honest, 
wonderful people. As one person said to me--and I will not name 
his name, a flag officer: Do not build me a tertiary sewer 
treatment plant; give me the PCV pipe. Do not tell me you are 
going to change the whole water supply system; give me 
generators that I can use right here, right now.
    The only guys--the 2,000 projects you talked about are all 
military. They are the only guys who know how to do it. But 
that is not where most of the money is going; 90 percent of it 
is not. Now, they just made an adjustment and they are going to 
put a little bit more after--what are those funds called? 
Commander's Emergency Response Funds. We should give it all to 
them, figuratively speaking.
    The third thing is we need foreign help. We need more 
people in on the deal. Not only do we need a contact group that 
is, I would argue, broader, Dr. Pollack, broader than you 
suggested. I am just a plain old politician and let me point 
out to you that if in my State we had been invaded by--the 
southern part of the State had massacred the northern part of 
the State, we had to write a new Delaware Constitution, we are 
going to bring the State together, we want to keep it within 
its existing borders, and I am from the northern part of the 
State and I say, by the way, you know what we could do, we have 
got to include more of those southerners in this government--
walking into that constituency that just lost their brother, 
mother, sister, aunt, uncle, father, I would get my head ripped 
off.
    But if I walked in and said, you know what, everybody in 
the United States of America, the other 49 States, are giving 
us aid; they are insisting we have to include them. If we do 
not, we get no help. That is the reason why.
    These Sunni leaders know they have to get in on the deal 
and the Shi'a leaders know they have to let them in. But it is 
that second, third, and fourth strata. So I would suggest we 
kind of missed something without understanding the political 
dynamic of what it takes for a political leadership to stand 
before its constituency, and it is a constituency of sorts--it 
is tribal, but it is a constituency--and make these cases.
    So I really think we have to, and I hope you can weigh in 
with the administration. We need a contact group. We need some 
benchmarks. We need some means of measuring what we are about 
to do and not lay it all on Petraeus, who is doing a heck of a 
job.
    So those are my comments. Anybody that wants to respond to 
them, I would appreciate it. If you do not, I fully understand.
    General McCaffrey. Senator Lugar, I apologize. I must get 
on a plane to Los Angeles or I will be beaten by the supper 
group that is waiting for me. I thank you for the honor of 
being here. I have great respect for your leadership and thank 
you for allowing me to participate.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir.
    Senator Biden. Again, there is no need to respond, but I 
would invite it if either one would like to.
    Dr. Cordesman. Senator, let me just make one very brief 
response. I think what bothers me a lot is the sheer complexity 
of this. You mentioned benchmarks. A lot of this is also very 
local and very regional now, and necessarily in our hearings we 
focus more on gross national trends. Whatever we do out there, 
we need to have a much better picture of what is going on in 
given cities, in given provinces. We need to make clear 
distinctions in tribal groupings and so on.
    What strikes me as strange, in addition to the lack of any 
meaningful articulated grand strategy, is the inability we have 
outside the military, where we do tend to map areas of risk, to 
truly say what is it we are doing, what we are trying to pull 
together, how we are supporting the Iraqis.
    I hope as you go through the hearings to follow you are 
going to ask people to deal with the complexity of these 
issues, to go beyond the sort of sweeping strategic 
generalizations which far too often are used in the politics or 
these strange nationwide measurements of where the aid goes 
without any indication of what is happening economically in 
those areas, how it interacts with the politics and how that 
interacts with the security situation, because frankly it seems 
that we have forgotten every lesson we learned in Vietnam about 
trying to figure out what is happening and what we are really 
doing and what the effects are, or we have managed to classify 
it to the point where none of the people involved seem to know.
    Senator Biden. That is exactly what I mean by benchmarks. I 
am not talking about one grand strategic plan. I want to know 
whether or not in each of the cities there is another 20 
minutes of electrical power going on. I want to know whether or 
not their intention is to provide in city A, B, C, or D 
additional generating capacity. I want to know whether or not 
they intended on having a county council or a city council 
elected and whether or not they got it elected. I want to know, 
but I have not been able to, except when I go to Iraq and sit 
down and almost always, notable exceptions, with a man or woman 
in uniform.
    Short of that, I do not know where to go to get it, and, 
therefore, the ability to measure this is almost impossible.
    Dr. Pollack. Sir, let me just add on. It is interesting, I 
think, that Tony and I fixed on the same point that you made in 
your remarks, which I think are so important. Your point about 
giving most or even all of the money directly over to the 
CERFs, to the Commanders Emergency Relief Funds, strikes me as 
being in the same vein. I think that there is a role for these 
kind of macrolevel questions that we have been discussing 
today, in part because I think we have some of the macrolevel 
approaches wrong. But as Tony is pointing out, we also really 
need to take a microlevel approach and that is because, in 
large part, if reconstruction is going to succeed in Iraq it is 
much more likely to succeed from the bottom up than the top 
down.
    We have mostly been taking over the last year and a half, 
maybe even 2 years, a mostly top-down approach, in part because 
we panicked because we did not have a plan to do it bottom up 
and it was easier to reach out to the top down, in part because 
I think the security situation is such that it is much easier 
to sit in a room with Ibrahim Jafari and 20 other Ministers 
than it is to send people out into the field, exactly as you 
have suggested. It is dangerous out there and our people get 
killed because it is dangerous out there.
    But I am very, very nervous about that approach. It has not 
worked well in the past in other places and it is not working 
terribly well in Iraq, and it is creating many of the different 
problems--political, economic, and military--that we have been 
talking about. So it is absolutely critical.
    I will make a broad generalization about making broad 
generalizations, which is that it is critical, as Tony 
suggested, to get down to the microlevel to find out what is 
going on in every city and every province and every 
neighborhood of Iraq, because that is where reconstruction is 
going to work. It is, of course, also where we have had a 
number of success stories. We have all heard any number of 
anecdotal reports about the local foreign service officer or 
the local military-civil affairs person or some other group who 
has been able to do something at the village level and have 
really been able to connect with the Iraqi people, and, of 
course, that is critically important.
    But, of course, we do not have enough people and we do not 
have enough resources to be doing that broadly across the 
country. We also have these macrolevel problems that are 
hindering these microlevel solutions and preventing these 
microlevel solutions from either being sustained or catching on 
and spreading or becoming part of a larger trend.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Just out of curiosity, either at CSIS or 
Brookings Institution do you have graphics of Iraq that show 
province by province, maybe as national news magazines in our 
country would have, coloring--some are red, some are orange, 
some are yellow, depending upon a scale of 10, security is 9-
plus here, 7.0 here, or thereabouts? Or maps that indicate per 
capita income, if that is an appropriate figure, or 
unemployment?
    I am curious because I share Senator Biden's thought about 
benchmarks. But I am just wondering who in the world anywhere 
has such a critical aid when we are trying to gauge success, 
not just success militarily. The American people look at all 
this in terms of political support and economic support and so 
forth for all this. This is a critical time in terms of our own 
internal country dialog.
    I am just curious what sort of resources there are out 
there that we may be missing.
    Dr. Cordesman. Well, Senator, I cannot speak for Brookings. 
The truth is an awful lot of the data that is being provided on 
Iraq is national. A lot of it will not survive engagement with 
any kind of investigation as to where it came from. Often the 
data come from an Iraqi ministry and some of the Iraqi 
ministries measure some things quite well. We do not do a 
particularly good job of reviewing that data or transmitting 
it. Often when we do it does not come in with the 
qualifications or the limitations involved.
    There has been some survey work done by the UNDP. It has 
some significant statistical problems with it, but it does get 
into some of these areas. It goes outside the ministries. But I 
think one answer to this is that we really do not take a 
significant account of what the Iraqi governments are saying. A 
lot of the time local governments or provincial governments 
also gather this data. We cannot go into the field and get it, 
and frankly it does not come forward. If it is being gathered 
in the Embassy, I do not know whether it is there. I think it 
is in some of our Embassy teams present.
    So it is not that the data are not there potentially. It is 
that they are not really being tied together. As for what the 
Pentagon has in its Situation Room, that is a mystery to me, 
but I think it is in some ways a more reassuring view of the 
data that is generated and provided in Baghdad, and it does not 
get into a lot of these issues.
    As Ken pointed out, we really do need to know, because, 
otherwise, to me the classic example is Basra. We have there a 
Shiite Islamist government which is not part of the mainstream 
alliance, running its own police force. Ken pointed out it has 
some of its own economic goals. And if it was not for press 
reporting, I do not think any of us, or listening to the 
British, any of us would be aware that there is a major problem 
in Basra from anything that is being said in reporting in the 
United States.
    Senator Biden. Can I interrupt on that one point? You know, 
there are surveys that have been done and we, the United States 
Government, presented to us as of July 6 an assessment of the 
goals on bridge and road construction, education, judicial, 
civil society, transportation, and how close we have come to 
meeting our targets.
    But we can do household surveys in each of these 
provinces--they are a sophisticated group of folks--to 
determine everything from whether or not the trash is being 
picked up to whether they have potable water to whether they 
have any health care. It is not absolute, but it is a better 
means by which--and to the best of my knowledge we are not 
doing that. We are not doing that on a detailed basis to get a 
read as to where the needs are.
    I just raise that as an example of what I mean by 
benchmarks. I am just trying to figure out how we begin to 
assess any of this. Your point, doctor, is correct. But for the 
fact--I mean, where would we read some of that stuff?
    Dr. Cordesman. Senator, let me just give you one example. 
The ministry dealing with municipalities did a water survey, 
indicated that something like 30 percent of the Iraqis now have 
a reliable source of potable water. They did break it down. 
Now, I suspect those results were not that accurate in the 
west. But it is not as if some of this is not being done.
    As for outside telephone surveys or the other kinds of 
surveys which are being used, let me say that most of us have 
forgotten more statistics than we ever knew and that seems to 
apply to many of those pollsters. The samples are simply 
ridiculous and the results are ridiculous and the lack of 
control questions are ridiculous. So I would much rather see if 
we cannot fix the Iraqi process of governance, which has got to 
work anyway, than rely on more surveys, many of which seem to 
have four or five pressworthy questions without controls.
    Senator Biden. I guess what I am saying, I would like to 
know what our administration's policy is as to how to fix the 
Iraqi Government. I would just like to know what it is.
    The Chairman. Let me just add another question that comes 
from things that both of you have written. Dr. Pollack, your 
book on Iraq was tremendously influential to many of us as we 
came up to that situation. Now your book on Iran is very 
helpful. Dr. Cordesman's work is legion. We all clip that and 
put it in our files.
    One of the background things that you touched upon, and 
that I really was struck by, at a recent Aspen Institute 
congressional event on Islam regarding borders. I deliberately 
brought that up in our questions. But a good many people in the 
region do not see the borders that were arbitrarily put in by 
Great Britain or France or what have you after World War I as 
especially relevant to their lives. They are still thinking in 
terms of the Saudi Peninsula or the Ottoman Empire or various 
other configurations of people, and as we have heard today, as 
Shiites or as Sunnis or as differentiations of these groups.
    This whole business of trying to get people to think about 
being Iraqis, of actually seeing a nation state that would have 
the cohesion we are talking about as being successful, is still 
viewed by some as a bridge too far. Now, others would say, 
well, 50 years have passed and there are a lot of people who 
have a sense of being Iraqi, including many Kurds, and so 
forth. And we all hope that that is so, so that a nation state 
is conceivable, as opposed to either civil war or a 
fractionalization, even without war, in which people simply go 
off on their own way with their militias and have their own 
situations.
    My hope is that, since you both are influential, you will 
continue to discuss the history of the situation and the 
expectations of people, so that all of us will have that kind 
of a background, of what a very large achievement that would be 
if, in fact, this group of people find themselves as Iraqis, if 
they are able to support a constitution for whom they have some 
allegiance, to share oil revenues, whether they be in Kirkuk or 
wherever ultimately.
    This is why it is important again for us all to understand 
how big the place is in terms of differentiation of localities 
and provinces. Otherwise we may be discovering, not separate 
nations and states, but strange alliances with other countries 
that are around. We are going to take that up as a part of our 
hearing. We will explore how people get together with the 
Iranians. We will focus not on the relationship of Iraq and 
Iran, but on specific parts of the countries that come together 
on some other basis than arbitrary borderlines that we may have 
had before.
    I just make this as an observation. You all talked about 
it, but I think it was simply important to add.
    Finally, let me just say that I appreciate the fact that, 
as Senator Biden said earlier, at least those of us who were 
sitting there at that point--the Senator, myself, and I am 
certain Senator Hagel would share that view, and all of you--we 
are discussing this today from the premise that we must 
succeed. That was the purpose of this hearing and of the full 
series of hearings. This is not to be a forum in which somehow 
we discuss why we fail and why inevitably we must go downhill 
from here.
    We understand the lay of the land, I think. We know, 
realistically, how daunting the challenges are. But the purpose 
of this is to try to illuminate the facts and ways of 
collecting data or arguments that are beyond this, and 
conveying this information to other policymakers. I would just 
say, for whatever reassurance it is, we intend to share broadly 
with members of the administration the papers that you have 
written, the record of the series of hearings. We are hopeful 
that they will find them as profitable as the members have 
today.
    I thank both of you very much, and General McCaffrey as 
well, for remarkable testimony and the contribution you have 
made. So saying, the hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]


                 ADVANCING IRAQI POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, JULY 19, 2005

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in 
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Lugar 
(chairman) presiding.
    Present: Senators Lugar, Biden, and Dodd.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                            INDIANA

    The Chairman. This meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee is called to order.
    Today the Committee on Foreign Relations again meets to 
discuss Iraq, specifically how our Government can help advance 
Iraqi political development.
    Last January we witnessed the strong desire of Iraqis to 
achieve a working democracy when 8 million Iraqi citizens 
risked their lives to exercise their new freedom to vote.
    The resulting Iraqi leadership is working under difficult 
circumstances to include Iraqis, Shi'as, Kurds, and Sunnis, 
something never before achieved in an Iraqi Government. The 
cooperation among Iraqi groups has occurred despite the efforts 
of the insurgents to provoke a civil war or undermine the 
fledgling government institutions by perpetuating deadly 
attacks.
    But the political situation is fragile, and success will 
require much compromise, as well as progress in the security 
and the economic spheres. Even as we discuss options for 
enhancing the development of Iraqi political institutions, we 
are mindful that relevant deadlines are fast approaching.
    The Iraqi Government must draft a constitution by August 
15, and organize a referendum on it that is planned for October 
15. National elections for a permanent government would follow 
by December 15, 2005.
    These political milestones have come to be seen as integral 
to the overall goals of solidifying Iraqi political stability, 
overcoming the insurgency, and, ultimately, withdrawing United 
States forces from Iraq.
    In the last several weeks Iraqis on the Constitution 
Drafting Commission have indicated that significant progress 
has been made on the constitution, and this is encouraging 
news. But polling data indicates that there is still a great 
deal of uncertainty among Iraqis about exactly what is ahead in 
this process.
    Recognizing the importance of the aggressive constitutional 
and electoral time lines to our own interests, we'll be asking 
our experts today whether the time line is achievable, and what 
ramifications might occur if deadlines are changed or missed. 
We'll examine whether the current timetable remains the best 
option for advancing political development. We will also focus 
on whether it's possible to change the political climate 
through a public education campaign, how we can forestall a 
Sunni-Shi'a conflict, and how we can help cultivate Iraqi 
leaders who will tolerate inclusive political interaction 
without resorting to violence or other exclusionary tactics.
    Yesterday the committee examined options for improving the 
security climate in Iraq. Today we will proceed with the same 
format that yielded an excellent discussion in Monday's 
hearing.
    Our discussion will be organized around four policy options 
for improving the political situation in Iraq. Accordingly, 
after Senator Biden and I offer opening comments--and Senator 
Biden will be recognized when he comes to the hearing--instead 
of hearing comprehensive statements from the witnesses, at that 
point we will put the first policy option and associated 
questions before our expert panel. Each witness in turn will 
provide his or her views on the option being presented.
    Then we will put the second option before them, and then 
the third and fourth.
    Finally, recognizing that options exist beyond our 
published hearing plan, we will ask our witnesses if they would 
like to offer any additional ideas for improving political 
development in Iraq that have not been discussed.
    After this sequence, committee members will be recognized 
in turn to address questions to any member of the panel. My 
hope is that through the expertise of the witnesses, and the 
questions of the members, we may achieve a systematic 
evaluation of the options present for improving the Iraqi 
political situation.
    We are very pleased to welcome a distinguished panel of 
experts to help us with this inquiry today. Dr. Phebe Marr is a 
senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. She has 
been a valuable advisor to our committee on matters pertaining 
to Iraq, and she has testified before us on many occasions.
    Ms. Judy Van Rest is the executive vice president for the 
International Republican Institute. From April 2003 to July 
2004, she served as senior advisor for Governance and director 
of Democratic Initiatives for the Coalition Provisional 
Authority.
    Dr. Noah Feldman has also testified before us previously. 
He is a professor of law at New York University, and in 
addition to his academic work, he has advised the Coalition 
Provisional Authority on constitutional law issues.
    These experts have spent a great deal of time analyzing the 
Iraqi political situation, and we're grateful that we can draw 
upon their experiences and insights today.
    As I mentioned at the outset, we'll commence our hearing 
with the first set of questions, and I will ask--after I've 
read this material--for Dr. Marr to respond, then Ms. Van Rest, 
and then Dr. Feldman, in that order. And we'll rotate. The 
first responder for the second question will be Ms. Van Rest. 
You'll have an opportunity to lead off then, and Dr. Feldman on 
the third, and then back to you, Dr. Marr, on the fourth.
    Option number one: Should the coalition encourage Iraqis to 
forgo writing a full constitution at this time; or should we 
encourage a strict adherence to the current deadlines for 
finishing a constitution?
    Does the current compressed timetable for drafting and 
approving the constitution aggravate the destablizing 
differences among the parties?
    Delay would involve setting aside thorny issues that could 
undermine national cohesion like regional autonomy, the status 
of Kirkuk, the role of Islam, and others.
    Instead, should we be encouraging Iraqis to promulgate a 
miniconstitution covering electoral law, and other items on 
which agreement can be reached? Would agreements on limited 
subjects build momentum toward cooperation on more difficult 
items; or should we stick to the current schedule by pressing 
for a completed constitution by the deadlines that have already 
been established?
    What pressures, if any, can or should the coalition exert 
on the Iraqi Government to adopt either of these courses?
    Dr. Marr, would you lead off? And we welcome you again to 
the committee today.

 STATEMENT OF DR. PHEBE MARR, SENIOR FELLOW, U.S. INSTITUTE OF 
                     PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Dr. Marr. Thank you very much, and I'd like to thank the 
members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, especially 
yourself, Mr. Chairman, for addressing these issues and for the 
opportunity to testify.
    I must add that my views here are my own, and not 
necessarily those of the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does 
not advocate specific policy positions.
    In my view the coalition should take its lead from the 
Iraqis and should not be seen to be intervening directly in the 
constitutional process, although it can certainly offer help 
and encouragement behind the scenes.
    The Iraqis, as you say, are intensely engaged, at the 
moment, in negotiations on the constitution and have indicated 
that they think that they can complete most of the necessary 
compromises and the drafting process by the deadline.
    If that is actually the case, it would seem presumptuous of 
us to urge them to take more time. However, as seems more 
likely, particularly with the news yesterday and today that the 
drafting proves more difficult, or Iraqis, themselves, indicate 
that they need more time, we should be encouraging them to take 
it, not forcing a deadline. In short, pressure for the deadline 
should not be coming from us.
    Rather, our message should be the achievement by Iraqis of 
a better instrument, one that satisfies Iraqi needs rather than 
a symbolic achievement of meeting a deadline.
    There are several incentives behind the drive to meet the 
deadline. One is the United States agenda, the need to prove to 
the United States public that progress is being made in Iraq.
    A second is the Iraqi election schedule and the desire by 
the current government to prove itself by meeting the deadline 
and by moving to another more permanent election.
    Third is the oft cited need to keep people's feet to the 
fire. Without a deadline the process could drag on indefinitely 
postponing the hard work of compromise, rather than facing the 
issues.
    Lastly, there's the symbolic fallout of missing the 
deadline, which could be seized on by the insurgents for 
propaganda.
    But these arguments, especially the last, in my view, do 
not outweigh the argument for taking more time, if needed, to 
produce a better constitution. Additional time should be 
evaluated on the basis of what can be achieved with it.
    For example, in the short term, there could, perhaps, be 
better public education and outreach on the constitution; a 
second benefit might be a greater inclusion of the Sunni 
community.
    But it must be admitted that several issues will be just as 
difficult to resolve in 6 months as on August 15. One is the 
thorny issue of Iraqi identity. The constitution will be 
expected to lay down a few principles on this subject. What 
will it say about nationalities? And will that satisfy the 
Kurdish need for a distinct identity? What about Iraq as part 
of the Arab world? And if Iraq is declared an Islamic State 
will that formulation provide space for secularists, non-
Muslims, women?
    But the second issue is, perhaps, the most difficult; that 
is the issue of federalism and the distribution of power 
between the central government and various provincial and local 
units.
    This involves, as you know, defining the provincial and 
local units. This solution must deal with the Kurdish regional 
government, whether Kirkuk and other territories are included 
in it, and the powers of the local units, especially the KRG 
and the central government, particularly, with respect to 
collection and distribution of revenue.
    Connected with this is the issue of ownership and 
management of Iraq's resources, especially oil. Will this be 
vested in the central government, or Iraq citizens, or will 
some of these resources accrue to local and regional 
governments?
    There will have to be a compromise and an understanding on 
these issues before the broad outlines of a constitution and 
stability in Iraq can take shape. If compromise cannot be 
reached, or at least, some broad principles laid down by August 
15, then Iraqis should be allowed to extend the deadline as 
provided in the TAL.
    It's not clear that simply putting out a miniconstitution 
with agreement on what they can achieve in the short term and 
postponing these critical issues is a solution. Neither the 
identity issue, nor the federal issue, are likely to be solved 
with any finality in a few weeks or even a few months. But by 
putting them off indefinitely it may make them more difficult 
to solve later as special interests become entrenched.
    Rather, Iraqis should be encouraged to think of this 
constitution as the first of many steps in the process of 
knitting their society and their country together and in 
democratizing it.
    Whether by August 15 or January 15 they should be 
encouraged to achieve a flexible formula for sharing power 
among communities and achieving a balance of power between the 
center and the periphery. They will need to come out with a 
constitutional framework firm enough and broad enough to 
provide for a stable, effective, government with enough 
sovereignty and legitimacy to instill confidence in Iraq's 
future at home and abroad.
    This is particularly important for foreign investors who 
will not want to sink money into a country whose government 
does not appear to be stable. But this instrument must also be 
flexible, able to be modified by some acceptable public 
process, over time, to allow for growth and development on the 
ground.
    What can and should the coalition do to advance this aim?
    First, stop pressure and public policy statements on the 
need to meet the August 15 deadline. Let the Iraqis take the 
lead, but let them know privately and publicly that if they 
need more time they should take it.
    Second, make equally clear, however, that the time is not 
limitless, that the TAL provisions do need to be met and that 
the time extension for some reasonable draft should be met, 
certainly, by January 15, if not before.
    Thus the momentum, which is already underway on the 
constitution, will be maintained.
    Third, encourage all concerned to view the constitution as 
a framework, an initial step in Iraq's constitutional life 
which can be adjusted, over time, in a public process to 
accommodate change. The constitution itself, of course, should 
provide for such a process.
    And fourth, encourage a more realistic attitude, especially 
in the United States, over what to expect of the constitution. 
Too much weight has been placed on the constitution as a 
turning point, and a means of curtailing the insurgency.
    Like the election, the draft constitution will be a 
positive step, but, in itself, is not likely to have more than 
a marginal effect on the insurgency. Tying the two together is 
a political mistake.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Marr follows:]

  Prepared Statement of Phebe Marr, Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of 
                         Peace, Washington, DC

    I would like to thank the members of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, particularly Chairman Lugar and Ranking Member Biden, for 
holding this hearing today, and for the opportunity, once again, to 
offer my views on the political situation in Iraq and to suggest some 
ideas for increasing the chances for success in Iraq. I want to add 
that the views expressed here are my own and not necessarily those of 
the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy 
positions.
    The committee has posed a number of penetrating questions and 
options and asked for our analysis and suggestions. They have not been 
easy to answer because they touch on issues which go to the heart of 
the difficulties confronting Iraqis and the coalition forces. But I 
will do my best to address them.

    1. Should the coalition encourage Iraqis to forgo writing a full 
constitution now, or encourage strict adherence to current deadlines 
for finishing the constitution?

    The coalition should take its lead from the Iraqis and should not 
be seen to be intervening in the constitutional process, although it 
can offer help and encouragement behind the scenes. The Iraqis are 
intensely engaged at the moment in negotiations on the constitution, 
and have indicated that they think they can complete most of the 
necessary compromises and the drafting process by the deadline. If that 
is actually the case, it would seem presumptuous of us to urge them to 
take more time. However, if, as seems likely, the drafting proves more 
difficult or Iraqis themselves indicate they need more time, we should 
be encouraging them to take it--not forcing a deadline. In short, 
pressure for a deadline should not be coming from us. Rather, our 
message should be the achievement by Iraqis of a ``better'' instrument, 
one that satisfies Iraqi needs, rather than the symbolic achievement of 
meeting a deadline.
    There are several incentives behind the drive to meet the deadline. 
One is the U.S. agenda--the need to prove to the U.S. public that 
Iraq's political process is moving ahead, that progress is being made, 
and that the U.S. commitment has some measurable achievements--sorely 
needed in the face of insurgent attacks. A second is the Iraqi election 
schedule and a desire by the current Iraqi Government to prove itself 
by meeting the deadline and consolidating power by moving to another, 
more permanent election, as soon as possible. Third is the oft-cited 
need to keep people's ``feet to the fire.'' Without a deadline, the 
process could drag on indefinitely, postponing the hard work of 
compromise, rather than facing the issues. Lastly, there is the 
symbolic fallout of missing the deadline which could be seized on by 
insurgents for propaganda value. But these arguments--especially the 
last--do not outweigh the arguments for taking more time, if needed, to 
produce a better constitution.
    Additional time should be evaluated on the basis of what can be 
achieved with it. Here one must make a distinction between what could 
be achieved if the deadline were advanced a few more months, and what 
may take years or decades to achieve. In the short term, one thing that 
could be better achieved would be public education on the constitution 
and feedback from the public in time for consideration in the draft. 
Some effort has been made in this direction; but not enough. If the 
drafting committee could indicate, at the end, that they had considered 
public opinion, it might make a difference in public acceptance and the 
feeling the public had a stake in the process. A second beneficial 
outcome might be greater inclusion of the Sunni community. Sunnis have 
been included in the drafting process but more time might allow greater 
consultation and mobilization of support. Third, perhaps most 
important, more time could help in crafting a new electoral law that 
was more inclusive, if the constitutional committee were so inclined. 
Many Iraqis are suggesting that the law put more emphasis on districts 
and provinces, but this would require a census and other measures, 
which are time consuming. Time should not dictate something as 
important as the electoral law.
    But several issues will be difficult to resolve on August 15--and 
probably just as difficult on January 15. One is the issue of Iraqi 
identity. Is there an Iraqi identity and if so what is its nature? The 
constitution will be expected to lay down a few principles on this 
subject that various communities inside--and outside--Iraq will be 
watching carefully as a pointer to Iraq's future. What will the 
constitution say about ``nationalities'' inside Iraq and will it 
satisfy the Kurdish need for a distinct identity? What about Iraq as 
part of the Arab world? A statement that satisfies Arab nationalists, 
especially among the Sunnis, may not sit well with Kurds and some 
Shi'a. And if Iraq is declared an Islamic State, will the formulation 
provide space for secularists and non-Muslims? Even the Iraqi flag, as 
a symbol of Iraqi identity, will be contentious.
    Second is the issue of federalism and the distribution of power 
between the central government and various provincial and local units. 
This is undoubtedly one of the most contentious issues. First, it 
involves defining provincial and local units and their territorial 
boundaries. This solution must deal with the Kurdish Regional 
Government (KRG) and whether Kirkuk and other territories are included 
in it. It could also involve creating larger regional units, for 
example, in the region around Basra. Will the current 18 provinces 
continue to exist? Will provinces be defined on a territorial basis or 
will there be an ethnic or sectarian component? And what will be the 
powers of the local units (especially the KRG) and the central 
government, especially with respect to the collection and distribution 
of revenue?
    Third is the issue of ownership and management of Iraq's resources, 
especially oil. Will this be vested in the central government, or in 
Iraq's citizens as a whole. Or will some or all of these resources 
accrue to local and regional governments? Lastly is the issue of 
national security, the formation of a national army and the role of the 
various militias with respect to the central government.
    There will have to be a compromise and an understanding on these 
issues before the broad outlines of a constitution--and stability in 
Iraq--can take shape. If they cannot be reached, or, at least, some 
broad principles laid down--by August 15, then the Iraqis should be 
allowed to extend the deadline as provided for in the TAL. It is not 
clear that simply putting out a miniconstitution, with agreement on 
what they can achieve in the short term and postponing these critical 
issues, is a solution. Neither the identity issue--which involves 
relationships among Iraq's ethnic and sectarian communities--nor the 
federalism issue, which involves power sharing among communities and 
territorial units, are likely to be solved with any finality in a few 
weeks or even months. But putting them off indefinitely may well make 
them more difficult to solve later as special interests become 
entrenched. Rather Iraqis should be encouraged to think of this 
constitution as the first of many steps in the process of knitting 
their society and their country together and in democratizing it.
    Whether by August 15 or January 15 they should be encouraged to 
achieve a flexible formula for sharing power among communities and for 
achieving a balance of power between the center and the periphery. They 
will need to come out with a constitutional framework firm enough and 
broad enough to provide for stable, effective government, with enough 
sovereignty and legitimacy to instill confidence in Iraq's future at 
home and abroad. This will be particularly important for foreign 
investors who will not want to sink money into a country whose 
government does not appear to be stable. But this instrument must also 
be flexible, able to be modified by some acceptable public process over 
time, to allow for growth and development on the ground. Iraq's new 
identity; the relationship between the center and the provinces; and 
between its various communities will take decades to grow. The 
instrument that is written now should provide a framework for that 
growth, including the possibility of future discussions and 
modification. Any thought that a product achieved on August 15--or 
January 15--will be ``final'' is folly. But simply putting off 
difficult questions indefinitely is not an acceptable solution either.
    What can/should the coalition do to advance this aim?

  <bullet> Stop pressure and public policy statements on the need to 
        meet the August 15 deadline. Let the Iraqis take the lead, but 
        let them know, privately and publicly, that if they need more 
        time, they should take it.
  <bullet> Make it equally clear, however, that the time is not 
        limitless; that the TAL provisions do need to be met, and that 
        the time extension for some reasonable draft should be met by 
        January 15. Thus the momentum already underway will be 
        maintained.
  <bullet> Encourage all concerned to view the constitution as a 
        framework, an initial step in Iraq's constitutional life, which 
        can be adjusted, over time, in a public process to accommodate 
        changes. The constitution, itself, should provide for such a 
        process.
  <bullet> Encourage a more realistic attitude, especially in the 
        United States, over what to expect of the constitution. Too 
        much weight has been placed on the constitution as a ``turning 
        point'' and a means of curtailing the insurgency. Like the 
        election, the draft constitution will be a positive step, but, 
        in itself, is not likely to have more than a marginal effect on 
        the insurgency. Tying the two together is a political mistake.

    2. Should the coalition conduct a public education campaign 
designed to stimulate interest in the constitution and discussion of 
the insurgency?

    This is much easier to answer. The Iraqi Government--not the 
coalition--should conduct a public education campaign on the 
constitution but this campaign should not include discussion of the 
insurgency. These are two separate--though related--issues, which 
should not be mixed. Doing so would tie the constitution and its 
content to the insurgency; divert attention from the main subject and 
fix the two together in the public mind. It could put the constitution 
at risk and provide a new target for insurgent attacks. Worse, it could 
make the constitution's success appear contingent on insurgent activity 
and tie the government's agenda to the insurgency. The agenda should be 
in the hands of the elected government. Discussion of the 
constitution--as the blue print for Iraq's future--should stand on its 
own. But the public discussion should make clear that the political 
process is open to all and is the appropriate vehicle to achieving 
political goals--not violence--in the new Iraq.
    Whether a ``massive'' campaign can be conducted under present 
conditions is questionable, but certainly considerable public activity 
can be undertaken on the constitution and its various provisions. 
Discussion of these issues is important to invest society in the 
political process and the government to follow. Certainly issues can be 
debated in the media--press, radio and TV; in university and school 
settings; and within limits, in townhall settings. These steps will 
have a number of virtues. This activity is mandated in the TAL and 
following TAL procedure will demonstrate adherence to the rule of law. 
Even more important, it will help build civil society. Various civic 
groups formed to educate the public will be the basis for future 
interest and ``watchdog'' groups. (Already a number of these have 
formed and are operating.) This will lay the basis for future political 
participation.
    Special effort should be made to persuade Sunnis to lead the 
process in Sunni areas and to encourage Sunni participation in the 
discussion. The opportunity to participate in and influence the 
constitutional process is essential to give Sunnis a feeling that they 
have a stake in the future.
    I have a problem with the timing of the process, however. A public 
education campaign needs to be undertaken both before and after the 
final draft is submitted, so that the public feels it has a say in its 
content. While some activity has been initiated in this area, the 
efforts have been little and late. As the deadline nears, it is 
unlikely that such efforts will bear much fruit; hence, Iraq may be 
missing a chance to help invest the public with a feeling that it has a 
stake in its outcome. This is another reason to extend the timeframe 
somewhat.
    There is still an opportunity for public education after the draft 
is submitted and before the referendum and this is essential, not only 
for the vote on the constitution, but for the political process to 
follow. It is assumed that the constitution will elaborate principles 
to be followed by legislation filling in specifics in many areas. The 
public campaign can educate various sectors of society on their rights 
and obligations as specified in the constitution and how it will affect 
them. The groups which undertake this campaign will be essential 
building blocks in furthering this legislation and bringing the public 
and its various sectors into the process.

    3. Should we take steps to forestall a Sunni-Shi'a conflict?

    In some ways the question may misdefine the issue. Rather than a 
Sunni-Shi'a conflict, the conflict is much broader, and involves all of 
Iraq's communities in a search for a new identity. In fact, there are 
two complex processes going on. The first is an increasing polarization 
of the Iraqi polity among both ethnic and sectarian communities--Kurds 
and Arabs as well as Shi'a and Sunnis--as Iraq searches for a new 
political identity and a new political center of gravity. As is well 
known, the elections in January of this year put into office a majority 
Shi'a ticket--the United Iraqi Alliance--which got 48 percent of the 
vote; 51 percent of the seats in the assembly; and a Kurdish ticket 
which polled 26 percent of the vote and got 27 percent of the seats. 
Parties, such as the Iraqi list, led by Ayad Allawi, and the Iraqiyyun, 
led by Ghazi al-Yawar, which ran on a more centrist, nonsectarian 
platform, together polled only a little more than 15 percent of the 
vote. Sunnis, many of whom boycotted the election or failed to vote for 
other reasons, gained only 17 seats in the assembly, 6 percent of the 
total. The elections reflected a reality that Iraqi politics now runs 
largely on the foundation of cultural identity, not on the basis of 
interests or party platforms. Helping to move Iraq away from this 
polarization and encouraging a sense of national identity. should be 
one of the coalition's long-term goals.
    But it is well to keep in mind that both the Shi'a and the Kurds 
have been disciplining their own communities and preventing retribution 
and retaliation--up to a point. This has been successful largely 
because these two groups have benefited by inheriting power in the new 
regime, although this discipline may be breaking down on the ground. A 
Shi'a rejectionist, Muqtafda al-Sadr has been temporarily silenced, in 
part by military action, but more importantly by being brought into the 
political process. While Sadr himself did not run for election, he 
allowed his supporters to do so. They did well in the southern 
provinces and, through their participation on the UIA ticket, got a 
substantial number of seats in the assembly, and even some in the 
Cabinet. The Kurdish leadership, which tends to be pragmatic, has 
skillfully managed a younger generation of more extreme nationalists, 
best represented in the referendum movement, again because Kurds have 
been included in power; indeed, a Kurd is President of the Republic.
    In the end, rather than a Shi'a-Sunni conflict what we see is that 
of rejectionists of a new government and a new political order. This is 
the second, more critical process, most virulently manifested in the 
insurgency. Most of the rejectionists are Sunnis; most of the 
government and those shaping the new order are Shi'a and Kurds. But the 
Sunni rejectionists need to be understood, not simply as a sectarian 
group but as a community whose leaders once occupied power, not as 
Sunnis but mainly as nationalists, and now find themselves to be an 
increasingly marginalized minority. They not only resent their loss of 
power and status, but fear discrimination and victimization by the new 
ruling groups. Many have also lost employment and economic benefits as 
well. Moreover, the Sunnis are fragmented and generally without a 
strong spokesman or spokesmen who can speak for a broad sector of the 
community, although some groups are coming forward.
    In general Sunni rejectionists can be divided into several 
different categories. Extremists, such as the Islamic salafists and 
jihadis, tied to al-Qaida, and former Saddam loyalists engaged in the 
general violent mayhem in Iraq, are generally beyond the pale and 
cannot, and should not, be propitiated. But a number of other Sunni 
oppositionists--army officers, former Ba'th Party members, nationalists 
opposed to ``occupation'' and unemployed youth riled by current 
conditions--can probably be brought into the fold of the new regime in 
time and with the proper incentives. Conversations with Sunni 
oppositionists indicate that their concerns are (a) occupation and the 
foreign presence; (b) loss of power and prestige; (c) lack of Sunni 
representation in the political process; (d) increased sectarianism; 
and (e) the lack of a rule of law and security, especially for their 
community.
    Attempts to alleviate this problem should focus on addressing these 
problems. Several suggestions can be made.
    First, encourage the government to bring Sunnis into the political 
process. Progress has already been made through Sunni representation on 
the constitutional committee. A media campaign to solicit opinions on 
the constitution would further this process. If more time is needed to 
provide security in Sunni areas and to make sure a level playing field 
emerges in preparation for elections--both the vote on the constitution 
and the next parliamentary election--encourage the government to 
provide it.
    Second, encourage a revision of the election law which moves from a 
single countrywide election list to a more district-based system, which 
assures Sunni areas seats in the assembly regardless of who votes, and 
allows local leaders to emerge in Sunni provinces.
    Third, encourage the current government to revisit the de-
Ba'thification program. Anecdotal evidence suggests that much of the 
educated middle class--especially academics and professionals like 
doctors and lawyers--who may have been party members but who have no 
criminal records, feel alienated and left out. This class is 
particularly turned off by increased sectarianism, and by de-
Ba'thification which discriminates against them. Many are leaving, thus 
depriving Iraq of much-needed expertise. A better vetting system, which 
focuses on individual behavior and records, rather than a blanket 
category such as party membership, would help. But it has to be borne 
in mind that this is still an extremely sensitive issue for the new 
Shi'a and Kurdish leaders, who will need encouragement to move in this 
direction.
    Fourth, many Sunnis complain of a lack of rule of law and security. 
Strengthening the court system, the prison system, and the police 
system would also help. While this is a long-term effort, it is 
particularly necessary in Sunni areas and in Baghdad. Much of the 
security threat is due to common crime, especially kidnappings. 
Focusing on developing local police in local areas, and getting 
international help for the effort, could allow coalition forces to pull 
out of difficult cities, alleviating some of the problems of the 
military presence in Sunni areas. Many Sunni professionals could also 
be employed in the legal justice system, if strict standards of 
meritocracy are employed.
    Lastly, outside mediation might have some benefit but it needs to 
be handled carefully, lest it be seen as interference, especially by 
the new Shi'a-dominated government. Many key members of the new 
government have long been in opposition to the Sunni-dominated Ba'th 
regime. They face persecution, imprisonment, killing of relatives and 
long exile at their hands and hence fear and often distrust them. This 
fear and distrust is reciprocated by Sunnis, particularly since many of 
the Sunnis who need to be brought into the process may, indeed, have 
had contact with those using violence against the regime or have been 
supporting it. Hence, involvement by key figures in neighboring Arab 
Sunni States may be regarded with suspicion. However, including some 
Arab leaders in an international delegation--particularly if the 
delegation also included Shi'a--might be a good idea.
    Any mediation effort involving neighboring states would need a 
clear definition of its mission and what it could do to influence and 
mitigate the ``Sunni'' problem. The current government would be 
interested in efforts to control the border; efforts to control 
finances flowing to insurgents; public support for the electoral 
process and the new constitution; and public rejection of violence. 
International and regional efforts along these lines, in return for 
Iraqi Government efforts to bring more recalcitrant Sunnis into 
government and local police forces, might be helpful.

    4. How can the coalition cultivate new leaders in Iraq and insure 
that they will interact politically, rather than using violence?

    I am currently involved, as a fellow at USIP, in a study of Iraq's 
emerging political leadership and their various visions for the future 
of Iraq. In conjunction with this project, I have made two trips to 
Iraq--one in December to northern Iraq to interview Kurdish leaders and 
one in May and June to Baghdad and Basra to talk to the newly elected 
members of the assembly and the government and others working at the 
provincial level. These interviews revealed a rich mix of political 
leaders emerging with considerable promise for the future, although 
that promise may take some time to mature.
    The problem of replacing Iraq's leadership once Saddam and the 
Ba'th had been removed has always been one of the most difficult facing 
Iraq and the coalition. After 35 years in power, Saddam loyalists and 
the Ba'th Party were deeply entrenched not only in the military and 
security services, but in the bureaucracy and the education 
establishment as well. If many had been left in power at lower levels, 
continuity might have been greater, but there would have been little 
change from the past and leaving them in would have alienated the 
opposition which was spearheading the change. Removing and disbanding 
the previous pillars of state--the option chosen by the coalition--has 
allowed for entirely new leadership to emerge, but it has deeply 
alienated the previous official class and created a large vacuum at the 
center of power. Filling this vacuum, has been difficult.
    New leadership can come essentially only from two or three sources. 
One is the reintroduction of elements of the previous regime, vetted 
for security purposes. The second is from exile opposition groups who 
have been operating outside of Iraq for decades; and the third is from 
the indigenous Iraqi population, most of whom have had little or no 
leadership experience. Essentially, the coalition opted for the second 
solution, disbanding the army and the party and essentially bringing in 
a large group of exile opposition leaders, mainly from the West. This 
group dominated the Iraq Governing Council (IGC) and its associated 
Cabinet formed in 2003.
    In this first attempt at government, the CPA attempted to balance 
all of Iraq's ethnic and sectarian groups and also brought in most 
political parties--other than the Ba'th--that had played a role in Iraq 
previously. But the dominant members of the IGC, at this stage, were 
Western-educated Iraqis with long residence in, and familiarity with, 
the West. Many, though not all, were relatively secular. The shift to 
an interim government in 2004 did not essentially change that pattern, 
but the election of January 2005 brought an expression of popular will 
and a shift to new leadership which probably better reflects future 
trends in Iraq, although it is too soon to make firm predictions on 
that score. Several points need to be made about this leadership to 
understand the leadership challenge facing Iraq.
    First, the current government, like its predecessors, is dominated, 
at its upper ranks, by exiles who have spent most of their formative 
years outside Iraq, or in the case of the Kurds, running their own 
government in the north. But there has been a change in these exiles. 
Whereas earlier regimes--the IGC and Interim government--were led 
mainly by Western-educated and Western-oriented oppositionists, the new 
government is not. Some of these earlier politicians are still present, 
but key positions are now in the hands of the Shi'a religio-political 
parties of the UIA and the Kurdish parties. The Shi'a members of the 
opposition have often spent time, not in the West, but in Iran, or Arab 
countries like Syria and Lebanon. They are Arab Iraqis but are 
interested in instilling more of an Islamic identity in Iraq. So in one 
sense, Iraq has exchanged one set of exiles for another. But for now, 
new political leadership from inside Iraq--though it is emerging--has 
still not made its way to the top leadership posts in any significant 
numbers.
    Second, turnover in posts at the top has been substantial, creating 
lots of opportunities for social mobility, but little to gain 
experience. The same phenomenon is true at local and provincial levels 
where discontinuity may be even greater. In the current government, 
over 60 percent of Cabinet Ministers are new to the job. And even those 
who are not new, have only held a post at that level for a year or so 
in a previous Cabinet. Even then, many have been shifted from one 
ministerial post to another, giving them little time to put down roots. 
While some of this change is to be expected in a situation of radical 
change, it means that most new leaders still have little experience in 
running a state. Even well-trained exiles, to say nothing of indigenous 
Iraqis, will need time and a learning process to acquire this 
experience.
    One exception to this rule is the Kurdish leadership occupying 
positions in the central government and in the KRG. They have acquired 
considerable experience and maturity, often through the school of hard 
knocks, from running government in the north; dealing with the failure 
of a civil war; holding (imperfect) elections; and in dealing in 
foreign affairs with neighbors and with Europe and the United States. 
It is not surprising that their area is quiet and gradually becoming 
more prosperous. The question with the Kurds, however, is how committed 
they are to building Iraqi institutions in the center, as opposed to 
those in the north and how to draw this experienced leadership further 
into the rebuilding of Iraq.
    Experience in government also exists among academics and former 
bureaucrats some of whom were ex-Ba'thists and affiliated with them. 
But are they flexible and open enough to deal with the new situation? 
Many are still alienated by the loss of their status and fearful of 
discrimination. The question here is how to bring them in and 
compensate for their loss of status and prestige. Distrust between new 
and old must be dispelled and ways found to get both groups working 
together. There is some progress here, but it needs to be excelerated.
    Lastly there is the problem of differing visions of the future Iraq 
and where the various leaders would like to take the country. Arab 
Sunnis, and certainly ex-Ba'thists, want a unified country, empty of 
foreign forces, with a strong central government and a rule of law and 
meritocracy--all of which would favor them. Kurds want a federation 
with a high degree of self-rule. They are largely secular and look for 
a separation of mosque and state; and they support the continued 
presence of U.S. troops for protection. The dominant Shi'a coalition 
wants to affirm the Islamic character of Iraq and strengthen the role 
of Islamic law; is wary of U.S. forces but needs them temporarily to 
assure continuation of its majority rule; and favors elections which it 
hopes will assure its continued political dominance. And indigenous 
leaders would like to ease out the exiles to make room for themselves. 
All of these differences will have to be reconciled and political space 
made for different groups to live, compete and thrive. This will take 
years, but the process is already underway with Iraq's first free 
election and the negotiations for a constitution. In fact, the ongoing 
political process is one of the bright spots in a sometimes bleak 
picture.
    How can this process be facilitated and how can the coalition help?
    First and foremost, every effort should be made to open Iraq to the 
outside world. While exiles have had some exposure to the outside, 
those inside have had little. Education at every level has deteriorated 
and Iraqis, especially professionals, are hungry for outside expertise 
and contact. Give it to them. Visitors programs, fellowships, and 
scholarships to study at United States and European universities and 
colleges, providing computers and library facilities to universities 
and centers, and similar programs need to be encouraged and funded. 
While these are already underway--and have been successful--much more 
needs to be done. The greater interpersonal contacts that ensue will 
establish networks that can be built on in the future. One of the most 
positive aspects of my trips was in finding young people, in their 
twenties and thirties, who wanted to come to the States to study 
political and social sciences--not engineering and computers science--
for the first time in decades. We should encourage that.
    Second, concentrate on the younger generation which is Iraq's 
future. While the vision of most of the 40- and 50-year-olds in 
leadership has already been formed--and often in divergent ways--those 
in their adolescence and early adulthood are still flexible. And we 
should avoid stereotypes. For example, among the most hopeful and 
promising experiences of my trip to Baghdad was in talking to this 
generation, including several young people from Sadr City, often 
thought of as a poverty ridden slum and a nest of radical Islamists 
following Muqtada-l-Sadr. One was a husband and wife team involved in 
local municipal government; both were graduates of universities and one 
was interested in pursuing a Ph.D. thesis on U.S. foreign policy, but 
he needs more training in English. He should get it. Another was a 
remarkable young woman in her early thirties, who had been encouraged 
by her family to get an education as a doctor. She had almost achieved 
her goal when Saddam was overthrown. She was appointed to her 
neighborhood council, and in a new enthusiasm for politics, she ran the 
gamut from neighborhood to district to city council member; then was 
appointed to the interim national council of 2004 and finally ran, as 
an independent, for the new National Assembly--and won, all in two 
short years. She has elected a political career and wants to come to 
the States to learn, first hand, how to engage in one. What better way 
to invest in future leadership than to provide her--and others like 
her--with this opportunity.
    Third, encourage and strengthen the many civil society groups that 
are already blossoming, despite dire security conditions. Help newly 
emerging think tanks with funding they may need to get started and 
support the interest groups that are emerging during the constitutional 
process. Encourage training and conferences that bring diverse groups 
together in an environment that allows hands-on discussion and 
potential resolution of conflicts. The institution, which is funding my 
research, USIP, is a good example, though not the only one, of the many 
ways in which these activities can be supported, through grants to 
local civic action groups; training exercises; support for the 
constitutional process, and the like. IRI and NDI are doing yeoman work 
as well. These activities often do not make the deadlines but they are 
critical for developing future leadership with the skills and attitudes 
necessary for compromise.
    Fourth, strengthen government capacity, both at the national and 
local levels. The political process is, justifiably, sucking up much of 
the time, energy, and resources of Iraq's elite. Meanwhile, the more 
mundane aspects of government--delivery of electricity, garbage 
collection, security--are neglected or given over to freelancers and 
contractors who may be corrupt or worse. Building government structures 
and an honest bureaucracy, which can carry this load and employ the 
population, especially at local levels, would greatly enhance Iraq's 
ability to carry on and to garner popular support, while it struggles 
to settle the difficult political problems at the national level. 
Encouraging a civil service administration based on meritocracy would 
be a good step in this direction.
    Lastly, economic development--by and for Iraqis--must take place, 
despite the security situation. All evidence suggests that this 
element--and the security that goes with it--is the number one priority 
of the population, not the political process. The constitutional 
process, while important, must be supplemented by growing prosperity 
and a strengthening of the middle class. Over time, nothing will better 
tamp down ethnic and sectarian tensions; help mitigate past feelings of 
victimization and fears of reprisal; and provide a new and better 
vision for Iraq's future and for its youth, than more economic growth. 
The public must be given new opportunities and alternative visions for 
Iraq's future which can only come from widening economic opportunities 
and real freedom of choice. A failure to couple economic development to 
the political progress being made may produce an Iraqi version of what 
has just occurred in Iran--the election of a religiously conservative 
President supported by the neglected working classes. The potential 
indigenous leadership in Iraq today is not hidden secularists and 
liberals, but the Sadrist movement, which gains support by its nativist 
claims (its leaders have not spent time outside of Iraq) and its 
championship of the poor, uneducated, and jobless. The best way to 
combat this combination is to make sure (a) that the political process 
continues to be open to these groups, and (b) that the younger 
generation of underprivileged, such as those Sadr City residents I met, 
are nurtured, encouraged, and given access to the outside world.
    The views above reflect the testimony at the hearing; they do not 
represent formal positions taken by the Institute, which does not 
advocate specific policies.

    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Ms. Van Rest.

     STATEMENT OF JUDY VAN REST, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, 
       INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Van Rest. Thank you very much for this opportunity to 
testify before this committee. I have lived in Washington and 
worked in the field for a long time, in the democracy field for 
almost 15 years, and this is my first opportunity to testify 
before the Senate. So I appreciate this chance, and hope that I 
do you proud.
    On this question of whether the coalition should encourage 
Iraqis to forgo writing a full constitution at this time, I 
believe that the coalition must continue to encourage adherence 
to the August 15 deadline for the Iraqi National Assembly's 
adoption of a complete constitution.
    The risks of a drawn-out process outweigh the potential 
benefits. This is an option that should be strongly resisted, 
and adopted only as absolute last resort. Several arguments 
support this view.
    First is that most Iraqis, according to a recent IRI 
National Opinion Poll, indicate that they do not favor an 
extension of the August 15 deadline for the Iraqi National 
Assembly to complete the writing of a draft constitution. And a 
majority of political leaders from across the ethnic and 
religious spectrum also remain committed to the August 15 and 
October 15 deadlines for adoption of the final constitutional 
text, and it's ratification, respectively.

    [Note.--The ``IRI National Opinion Poll'' mentioned 
throughout this hearing will not be printed due to length but 
will be retained in the permanent record of the hearing and can 
also be accessed on the IRI Web site: http://www.iri.org/pdfs/
NovemberSurvey Presentation.ppt.]

    Beginning with the June 28, 2004, hand over of power, and 
more recently, with the January 30, 2005, national elections, 
we have witnessed the Iraqi people's desire and determination 
to meet the objectives set out in the transitional 
administrative law for the full restoration of Iraq's national 
sovereignty, and the creation of constitutional democracy by 
the end of the year.
    We should support these intentions and the momentum they 
have generated.
    If the constitutional committee fails to present the 
assembly with a draft constitution for approval before August 
15, or if the assembly fails to meet the deadline for its final 
adoption of a draft, the coalition should seek to persuade 
Iraqi legislators to extend the deadline for approval of a 
complete constitution for a period of no longer than 30 days. A 
more extended prolongation of the process would allow political 
focus to shift away from this crucial task. It could also 
undermine what opinion research has consistently shown to be 
the public's stubborn and critically important phase in the 
country's forward momentum.
    Second, delinking the most contentious issues from the 
broader body of the constitutional text and dealing with them 
in a separate and less time-constrained negotiation could have 
serious negative consequences. The risk of further 
deterioration in relations between Iraq's three principal 
communities grows in proportion to the duration of the time it 
takes to resolve these issues. The longer these key issues 
remain unsolved the more likely it is that the positions of the 
major interested parties will harden. The continuing evolution 
of facts on the ground will increasingly threaten to overtake 
and complete negotiations. The longer the period of legal 
fluidity is allowed to exist the less likely it is that 
mutually satisfactory outcomes can be achieved with respect to 
these issues.
    We must also consider that absent inclusion of provisions 
on such key issues as federalism and the religious character of 
the state, how far Iraq's Government would be able to move 
ahead in building legal and institutional structures pursuant 
to elements of the constitution that do get adopted.
    For example, without the form and structure of Iraq's new 
federalism agreed upon and in place, efforts to establish a 
national budgeting process and develop and implement fiscal 
policy could be hampered or rendered impossible.
    Likewise, efforts to move ahead confidently with legal and 
judicial reforms will be retarded to the extent that issues 
pertaining to the relationship between religious and civil law, 
and the roles of civil and religious adjudicating institutions, 
are left unsolved.
    I believe we should continue to support the current 
deadlines for adoption and ratification of a complete 
constitution until such time as developments lead us to 
conclude, beyond a doubt, that one or both of these deadlines 
present an impossible target. If an extension of the August 15 
deadline, in particular, becomes absolutely necessary it should 
be measured in weeks and not months so as to avoid loss of 
momentum and political focus.
    And the constitution that the Iraqi public is finally asked 
to ratify should be a complete document that addresses all of 
the key issues. Opening the door to prolonged debate on these 
politically sensitive matters will only serve to more sharply 
contrast the differences between major ethnic and religious 
groups and contribute to further polarization.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Van Rest follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Judy Van Rest, Executive Vice President, 
           International Republican Institute, Washington, DC

    Option 1--Should the coalition encourage Iraqis to forego writing a 
full constitution at this time, or should we encourage a strict 
adherence to the current deadlines for finishing a constitution? Does 
the current compressed timetable for drafting and approving the 
constitution aggravate the destabilizing differences among the parties? 
Delay would involve setting aside thorny issues that could undermine 
national cohesion, like regional autonomy, the status of Kirkuk, the 
role of Islam, etc. Instead, should we be encouraging Iraqis to 
promulgate a miniconstitution covering electoral law and other items on 
which agreement can be reached? Would agreements on limited subjects 
build momentum toward cooperation on more difficult items? Or should we 
stick to the current schedule by pressing for a completed constitution 
by the deadlines that have already been established? What pressures, if 
any, can or should the coalition exert on the Iraqi Government to adopt 
either of these courses?

    Response. The coalition must continue to encourage adherence to the 
August 15 deadline for the Iraqi National Assembly's (INA) adoption of 
a complete constitution. The risks associated with a prolonged or 
multistage process, and with delinking the most contentious issues from 
the broader body of the document, would outweigh the potential 
benefits. This is an option that should be strongly resisted and 
adopted only as an absolute last resort. Several arguments, I believe, 
support this view.
    First, most Iraqis, according to a recent IRI national opinion 
poll, indicate that they do not favor an extension of the August 15 
deadline for the INA to complete the writing of a draft constitution. 
And a majority of political leaders from across the ethnic and 
religious spectrum also remain committed to the August 15 and October 
15 deadlines for adoption of a final constitutional text and its 
ratification, respectively. Beginning with the June 28, 2004, handover 
of power, and more recently with the January 30, 2005, national 
elections, we have witnessed the Iraqi people's desire and 
determination to meet the objectives set out in the Transitional 
Administrative Law for the full restoration of Iraq's national 
sovereignty and the creation of constitutional democracy by the end of 
this year. We should, unequivocally, support these intentions and the 
momentum they have generated.
    What should our position be if the INA's Constitutional Committee 
should fail to present the assembly with a draft constitution for 
approval before August 15, or if the assembly, having received the 
committee's draft, should fail to meet the deadline for its final 
adoption? The coalition should seek to persuade Iraqi legislators to 
extend the deadline for approval of a complete constitution for a 
period of no longer than 30 days. A more extended prolongation of the 
process would, in my view, allow political focus to shift away from 
this crucial task. It could also undermine what opinion research has 
consistently shown to be the public's stubborn and critically important 
faith in the country's forward momentum.
    Second, delinking the most contentious issues--including the nature 
of Iraq's new federalism, the status of Kirkuk, and the role of Islam 
in Iraqi law and State institutions--from the broader body of the 
constitutional text, and dealing with them in a separate and less time 
constrained negotiation, could have serious negative consequences.
    The risk of further deterioration in relations between Iraq's three 
principal communities grows, I believe, in proportion to the duration 
of the time it takes to resolve these issues. The longer these key 
issues remain unresolved, the more likely it is that the positions of 
the major interested parties will harden. The continuing evolution of 
``facts on the ground'' will increasingly threaten to overtake and 
complicate negotiations. We are already seeing evidence of this 
dynamic, for example, in Kurdish efforts to alter the demographic 
makeup of Kirkuk and strengthen the institutional legitimacy of Kurdish 
regional militias, and in the south of the country, where some 
religious groups are attempting to exert increasing influence within 
the university system. The longer the period of legal fluidity is 
allowed to exist, the less likely it is that mutually satisfactory 
outcomes can be achieved with respect to these issues.
    We must also consider, absent inclusion of provisions on such key 
issues as federalism and the religious character of the state, how far 
Iraq's Government would be able to move ahead in building legal and 
institutional structures pursuant to elements of the constitution that 
do get adopted. For example, without the form and structure of Iraq's 
new federalism agreed upon and in place, efforts to establish a 
national budgeting process, and develop and implement fiscal policy, 
could be hampered or rendered impossible. Likewise, efforts to move 
ahead confidently with legal and judicial reforms will be retarded to 
the extent that issues pertaining to the relationship between religious 
and civil law, and the roles of civil and religious adjudicating 
institutions, for example, are left unresolved.
    In sum, I believe that we should continue to support the current 
deadlines for adoption and ratification of a complete constitution 
until such time as developments lead us to conclude, beyond doubt, that 
one or both of these deadlines present an impossible target. If an 
extension of the August 15 deadline, in particular, becomes absolutely 
necessary, it should be measured in weeks and not months so as to avoid 
loss of momentum and political focus. And the constitution that the 
Iraqi public is finally asked to ratify should be a complete document 
that addresses all of the key issues. Opening the door to a prolonged 
debate on these politically sensitive matters will only serve to more 
sharply contrast the differences between major ethnic and religious 
groups and contribute to further polarization.

    Option 2--Should the coalition conduct a massive public education 
campaign designed to stimulate interest in the constitutional 
referendum and discussion of the insurgency? This would include holding 
townhall meetings carried on radio and television on the future of 
Iraq. Could such a campaign reach the Iraqi people and would Iraqis 
participate despite threats of retribution? Would unscripted townhall 
meetings enhance the credibility of the message, thereby building 
public disdain for the insurgency and support for Iraqi political 
development? Could security be provided to prevent terrorist attacks 
during the townhall events?

    Response. Let me start by saying that I believe we are now at a 
point in the process where the role of public education is most 
crucial.
    Unlike an election, where voters are asked to express a personal 
preference from among a list of options or candidates, the 
constitutional referendum will ask Iraqis to support the product of 
many compromises--some of them touching extremely sensitive cultural 
and political nerves. People will not have the option of choosing only 
that which suits them, as they can in an election. Iraqi voters will 
have to understand the compromises that went into writing the 
constitution and, despite the fact that there will be elements in it 
with which they personally disagree, conclude that it offers the best 
hope for moving the country forward and improving their lives. They 
will have to reach this conclusion, moreover, despite what will almost 
assuredly be opposition from more radical and hard-line elements within 
their respective communities.
    To succeed in encouraging and preparing voters to make this choice, 
a comprehensive, consistently visible and broad-based public education 
campaign is absolutely essential. We must, however, distinguish between 
a ``coalition campaign'' and an ``Iraqi campaign.'' What is crucial is 
to insure that Iraqis are provided with the support that they need to 
design, produce, and implement a campaign to educate the population 
about the process that is underway, the issues under discussion, the 
content of the constitution, and the importance of participation in the 
referendum scheduled for October 15.
    I am pleased to say that such a campaign has, in fact, been 
initiated and that it is gathering momentum with each day that passes. 
The International Republican Institute (IRI), whose programs in Iraq 
are being funded by American taxpayers through USAID and the National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED), has been a principal motivator and 
supporter of these programs. Other American organizations, first among 
them the National Democratic Institute (NDI), are also contributing to 
this effort through their own civic and political networks in regions 
across the country.
    Though not in the context of townhall meetings, as we know them in 
the United States, much is already being done at the grassroots level 
to inform Iraqis' about the constitution. IRI is supporting a broad 
array of civic groups that are involved in a coordinated nationwide 
voter education campaign to raise public awareness of constitutional 
democracy and the constitutional drafting and referendum process in 
Iraq. Led by Iraqi civic groups working under the banner of the Civic 
Coalition for Free Elections, the campaign, entitled ``A Constitution 
for Everyone,'' consists of direct voter contact through workshops 
based on an IRI-developed curriculum and printed materials. Using 
prepared flip charts and distributing some 600,000 copies of the 
``Constitution for Everyone'' pamphlet, 1,400 workshops are planned--
more than 100 have already taken place--and we hope to reach more than 
60,000 voters in all 18 of Iraq's governorates.
    It is also encouraging to note that the members and leadership of 
the INA's Constitution Committee are themselves becoming more active 
and engaged in public education efforts. IRI has been in close contact 
with the Constitutional Committee over the past several weeks to offer 
assistance to its outreach efforts. In addition to offering weekly 
focus group reports on questions important to the constitutional 
drafting, IRI has already produced four television interviews with 
Constitutional Committee leadership, in which they have discussed 
process and content issues and answered questions from the public about 
the constitution. One of the programs featured the committee's 
chairman, Sheik Hamudi. Another featured women members of the committee 
in an effort to focus discussion on issues of particular interest to 
women. These 30-minute programs, of which more are to follow, are each 
being aired several times on major Iraqi television networks and will 
reach an audience of millions.
    IRI is also producing the Constitution Committee's first public 
service announcements (PSAs) and helping it develop and eventually 
distribute printed material. Our public opinion and focus group 
research, I am pleased to say, is being actively utilized by the 
committee in the design and development of these products.
    Iraqi women, through organizations such as the Rafadine Women's 
Coalition and the Women's Leadership Institute, are also doing a great 
deal to advocate for women's rights in the constitution drafting 
process and to publicize key issues through outreach to women across 
the country. IRI's Constitutional Consulting Team, composed of six 
eminent legal and academic specialists, is providing counsel to the 
leadership of these and other organizations, and IRI is supporting the 
production of their public education materials and their television 
broadcasts. I am also very encouraged by the extent to which the 
Minister of Women's Affairs, Dr. Azhar Al Shakly, has taken a 
leadership role in the public education effort. Later this month, in 
fact, Minister Al Shakly will be hosting two national women's 
conferences in Baghdad on issues related to the constitution. These 
events will be highly visible and provide added focus and momentum to 
the public education effort on behalf of women's rights in the new 
constitution.

    Option 3--Should we take new steps to forestall a Sunni-Shi'a 
conflict? Is international and Arab intervention feasible? Could an 
international working group that includes participation by Sunni Arabs 
from outside Iraq--Jordanians, Egyptians, and others--help broker 
negotiations between the parties? Is there some other vehicle that 
could provide technical support and mediation services for Sunnis and 
Shi'as to come to a peaceful accommodation? Could credible Sunnis be 
enlisted to participate in this process? Should de-Ba'thification be 
revisited?

    Response. At every transition point on Iraq's path to democracy--
including the handover of sovereignty in June 2004 and the election of 
the Iraqi National Assembly in January 2005--some very bright people 
said it could not be done, the ethnic, sectarian, and geographic 
divides were too great, the risk of violence was too high, and that 
even civil war was imminent. Yet, time after time, Iraqis have proven 
them wrong.
    Now, the actions of determined insurgents have again raised fears 
that the situation is on the brink of collapsing into conflict because 
of Sunni-Shi'a divides. History has shown us that divisions between 
these two branches of Islam can lead to conflict. In Iraq, Saddam 
Hussein's 35 years of murderous rule, including widespread abuses 
against the Shi'a majority, only contributed to suspicions between the 
two sects.
    Yet, once again Iraqis have expressed confidence that the 
democratic institutions they are creating offer them the political 
framework for resolving these differences and moving toward greater 
cooperation and trust as they build a united Iraq together.
    No one should be surprised that Sunni-Shi'a issues are part of the 
debate surrounding the drafting of a new constitution and the new Iraq. 
Rather, the fact that this debate is taking place should be viewed as a 
major step forward. This view was expressed by one Iraqi leader during 
a meeting with IRI staff. While he and fellow Iraqis argued about what 
system of government should prevail, he paused to comment, ``Under 
Saddam I would not even debate such issues in my own head. Now we are 
free to debate them among ourselves.''
    This commitment to democratic debate and a confidence in the 
framework is found across Iraq and across various sectors of society. 
Notably, it is found among Sunnis. We have seen Sunni representatives 
brought into the constitution drafting process. We have heard Sunni 
leaders say they made a mistake by not participating in the January 
election, a mistake they are encouraging their followers not to make in 
the upcoming elections.
    The evidence is not only anecdotal. Support for, and confidence in, 
democratic solutions among Iraqis has been expressed time and again in 
the nationwide polling done by IRI (``Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion'' 
\1\) The latest survey revealed that nearly 73 percent of Iraqis 
believe that the new Iraqi transitional government is representative of 
the Iraqi people as a whole. Among self-identified Sunnis, the 
percentage is 67.4 percent. For Shi'a it is 78.3 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The survey can be accessed at: http://www.iri.org/pdfs/
NovemberSurveyPresentation.ppt.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Equally revealing is the strong support for coming elections; 75.6 
percent of Iraqis say they are very likely to vote in the upcoming 
constitutional referendum. Again, support is strong among both Sunni 
and Shi'a, at 63 percent and 83 percent, respectively.
    It is also worth noting that polling data reveals that the Sunni-
Shi'a divide is not that wide in comparison to self identification as 
Iraqis. Twice as many Sunni most strongly identify with their country 
in relation to the number who identify with their ethnic group. For 
Shi'a, four times as many identify with their country. When comparing 
strongly identifying with country to identification with religion, the 
ratio for Sunnis is 3:1 and for Shi'a it is 2:1. National identity is a 
necessary component in creating a willingness to make the compromises 
necessary to bridge the gaps that might otherwise be created by more 
divisive elements.
    These numbers are being reflected by action on the ground. Across 
the country, courageous Iraqis are standing up to those who would use 
violence to undermine the move toward a peaceful and democratic Iraq.
    IRI is working with numerous Sunni and Shi'a organizations, 
including clerics associations to educate Iraqis about the constitution 
drafting process and support for elections as a way of creating a more 
peaceful and prosperous Iraq today and for future generations.
    It is in this context that the response to what steps should be 
taken to avoid Sunni-Shi'a conflict should be found. The answer is to 
support the Iraqis in finding their own solutions, including that of 
de-Ba'thification, within the democratic political framework to which 
they have committed themselves. The Sunnis and Shi'as are already 
engaged in accommodation through political channels. Leadership is not 
advocating such violence for civil war. Such elements, while tragically 
conspicuous, are marginal forces. The United States and its coalition 
partners would do well to encourage, even pressure, neighboring 
governments and those of other Islamic States in the region that 
benefit from stability in Iraq to be more outspoken in their 
condemnation of terrorist violence in the name of Islam.

    Option 4--How can the United States cultivate emerging leaders 
among the various political actions in Iraq and ensure that they will 
interact politically, rather than using violence or exclusionary 
political tactics? Is such involvement feasible, or would it be 
counterproductive? How divergent are the views among the various new 
leaders on such issues as democracy, the appropriate political 
structure, the role of religion, or future relations with the West and 
Iraq's neighbors, and can the United States influence these views?

    Response. As outlined above, Iraqis are finding their own voice and 
leaders in support of political interaction rather than violence or 
exclusionary tactics.
    IRI and NDI have taken an active role in supporting this effort. 
Drawing on 20 years experience of assisting countries emerge from 
authoritarian rule to democracies, with technical training, we are 
helping Iraqis to build the political parties, civil society, 
government institutions, and other components necessary to have 
representative government. Encouraging this process is an important 
part of helping the majority in their fight for freedom against those 
whose agenda is hatred and violence.
    We do so keeping in mind that democracy is not an off-the-rack 
concept. One size does not fit all. Rather, democracy works best when 
it is tailor made. Basic elements are universal, but style and fit 
vary. By concentrating on providing training and support for the basic 
elements, we are helping the Iraqis to fashion a new free and 
democratic Iraq.
    One of the primary ways of doing this is by drawing on the 
experience of other countries. Central and Eastern Europe provides 
particularly helpful examples for the Iraqis to study. For example, 
trainers from Romania are well received because Iraqis can relate to 
someone who was imprisoned or had a family member killed by an 
oppressive dictator but who is now part of a successful transition away 
from authoritarian rule.
    Successful transitions in the Slovak Republic, Lithuania, and the 
Czech Republic as well as other regions in countries such as Indonesia, 
have all proved useful in providing Iraqis case studies for what has 
worked, and what hasn't, in making the move to a free and democratic 
society.
    These lessons are not only learned from trainings or exchanges. 
IRI's staff in Iraq includes those who helped to lead such transitions 
in their own home countries of Serbia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Part of 
their motivation is to bring others the support they received when they 
were activists for freedom. It is a lesson that has not been lost on 
Iraqis.
    As for opinion on issues of democracy and related topics, I would 
again cite a few results from the most recent national poll conducted 
by IRI:

  <bullet> I will now read to you a list of human rights that have been 
        recognized by the international community. On a scale of 1 to 
        5, how important do you think it is that they be part of Iraq's 
        new constitution? Those choosing very important:

    <all> 71.4%--select and change their government through peaceful, 
            fair elections
    <all>  70%--fair and public trials
    <all> 69.1%--no discrimination based on religion, race, sex or 
            ethnicity
    <all> 67.8%--no torture or degrading treatment/punishment
    <all> 65.9%--individual privacy, including the family, home and 
            correspondence
    <all> 65.7%--no arbitrary arrest or detention
    <all> 60%--freely practice religion
    <all> 55.8%--free speech and press
    <all> 51.9%--own and sell property
    <all> 41.8%--organize political, civic or labor organizations

  <bullet> Which do you think would be the most appropriate system for 
        a future Iraqi government?

    <all> 33.36%--mixed parliamentary/presidential
    <all> 30.3%--parliamentary
    <all> 22%--religious

  <bullet> Which of the three branches of government do you think 
        should exercise the most power or influence in Iraq's future 
        government?

    <all> 41%--executive
    <all> 27.9%--divided equally
    <all> 9.9%--legislative

  <bullet> Were Iraq to have a presidential system, which of the 
        following methods would you prefer to select the president?

    <all> 72%--direct election by the Iraqi people
    <all> 12.9%--appointed by national assembly
    <all> 5%--appointed by clerics or religious leaders

  <bullet> Which would be the best way to organize the structure of the 
        national and governorate levels of government?

    <all> 76.2%--maintain current system of 18 governorates
    <all> 12.1%--group governorates according to geographic regions
    <all> 5.1%--allow governorates to determine regional groupings

  <bullet> Some people say that religion has a special role to play in 
        the government while others believe that religion and the 
        government should respect one another but remain separate. Do 
        you believe that:

    <all> 48.1%--religion has a special role to play in the government
    <all> 45.9%--religion and government should respect one another by 
            not impeding on the rights roles and responsibilities of 
            the other

  <bullet> Which of the following statements most closely fits your 
        view of the role of Islam in the creation of laws and 
        legislation?

    <all> 39.8%--Islam should be the main source (among many) of 
            legislation and laws in Iraq
    <all> 34.7%--Islam should be the sole source of legislation and 
            laws in Iraq
    <all> 12.3%--Islam should be one source (among many) of legislation 
            and laws in Iraq

  <bullet> To what extent do you agree or disagree that people or 
        groups who could not (or did not) participate in the January 30 
        elections have the right to contribute to writing the 
        constitution?

    <all> 35.7%--strongly agree
    <all> 35.2%--agree
    <all> 8%--disagree

  <bullet> Do you think that the new TNA should keep the 25 percent 
        quota for women in the National Assembly in the new 
        constitution?

    <all> 51.6%--yes, it should remain the same
    <all> 25.5%--yes, but it should be higher
    <all> 10.1%--yes, but it should be lower
    <all> 3.1%--no

    The Chairman. Thank you very much Ms. Van Rest.
    Dr. Feldman.

   STATEMENT OF DR. NOAH FELDMAN, PROFESSOR OF LAW, NEW YORK 
                    UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK, NY

    Dr. Feldman. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, 
thank you so much for this opportunity.
    There are essentially three different factions on this 
constitutional committee, the elected Shi'a, the elected Kurds, 
and the unelected Sunnis. Each has a different perspective, I 
think, on the issue in front of us, and I think that should 
influence our policy decision.
    The Shi'a and the Kurds have a constituency because they 
were elected, and as a consequence of that they want to move 
forward relatively quickly because it's in their interests to 
satisfy a constituency that's very frustrated with what has, on 
the whole, been a relatively slow progress.
    That's understandable. They're also the two sides that have 
the most experience negotiating constitutional deals. They've 
been dealing with each other for the better part of 3 years 
now. Beginning before the war, they negotiated the transitional 
administrative law together. They're very well experienced in 
this kind of negotiating, and their positions are relatively 
clear, both to them and to many of their constituents, because 
they've done this deal once before.
    And the reason that there's been so much progress so far in 
drafting, on the part of this constitutional committee, is that 
the players are not operating on a blank slate. They understood 
the deal in the transitional law, they understood the deal that 
they cut privately before the selection of the Prime Minister 
and the President, and they've been in the process of putting 
that deal into place.
    The Kurds have a further interest, which is an interest in 
making things happen as quickly as possible because of their 
perception, accurate in my view, that they have greater 
influence the further we are from a big public political 
debate. The more influence we put on the process, the Kurds 
believe, the greater their influence. This is because they 
feel--and I'll return to this a bit later--that the ordinary 
Iraqi, the ordinary Arab Iraqi, will experience sticker shock 
on looking at the provisions of the federalism arrangements 
that are set out in the TAL.
    Now the Sunni members, the Sunni Arab members, of the 
constitutional committee are in a completely different position 
because they were not elected. And I think they're the ones 
whose view on whether we should go forward quickly or whether 
we should delay the process, or on whether we should come up 
with some sort of a compromise, which I'll mention, probably 
should weigh the most heavily with us. So let me say why they 
think this, and also why I think their view should weigh 
heavily for us.
    They are central, these Sunni Arabs are central to the 
process of bringing the Sunni community, which is--some of 
which, at least, is sympathetic to the insurgency, not all--
into the political process so as to marginalize the extremist 
jihadi wing of the insurgency, which will, of course, never 
compromise on its own.
    These relatively brave--and I'll say more about that in a 
moment, too--Sunni Arab members of the committee are putting 
themselves on the line and may need to be able to show their 
potential constituency, the people whom they want to represent 
when they run for office in the near future, that they actually 
got something done in these constitutional negotiations.
    If it looks to the Sunni population as though these Sunni 
members, 10 voting members and 15 nonvoting members, were named 
to the committee and then rubber stamped a deal that had 
already been privately done by the Shi'a and the Kurds, then 
they will be discredited with their own constituency. All of 
the work--the good work in my view--that the United States and 
other coalition partners have done to convince the Shi'a and 
the Kurds to bring Sunnis into the political process will be 
lost if it turns out that the Sunnis themselves, that is to say 
the ordinary Sunni Arab, sees the participation of his putative 
representatives as having been empty. That's a substantial 
danger.
    Now some of the members of this committee will probably 
want to move to elections relatively quickly because they want 
to get Sunnis into elected office, they understand the boycott 
was a huge mistake, and they want elections relatively quickly 
to begin the process of reversing that boycott.
    So they may want to move forward quickly, but they will be 
hampered by two things. One, the danger that they'll be seen as 
rubber stampers, which is bad for them; two, the distinct 
possibility that when their constituents get a look at the full 
degree of Kurdish autonomy that's envisioned by most of the 
people who are close to this process, that they will be 
unwilling to vote for the constitution because of what I 
described earlier as sticker shock. They may believe it over 
time, just as the Shi'a Arab community has come to accept a 
fair amount of autonomy for the Kurdish regions.
    Their constituents, too, might over time develop this view. 
That's how it happened among the Shi'a; it took some time. And 
if that is to be the case then they may judge that some delay 
is appropriate. I don't think they would want too much delay 
because of the realities of needing an election. If they wanted 
some delay on that, something short of the 6 months, I don't 
think that it would be the right policy to oppose their getting 
that delay because they would be doing it in the hopes of 
getting the Sunni constituency on board. If they think they 
won't get the constituency on board because of it, then they 
won't push for a delay, they'll just push for the elections 
relatively soon to get their jobs in office.
    Now the delicacy of the situation of these members of the 
committee is enormously significant here, and in written 
comments that I submitted last week, I said that their personal 
safety was in danger. And unfortunately, today, we saw a very 
tragic substantiation of just that, and I'm sure we all share 
the sorrow over the fact that one member of the committee, who 
was a voting member, and another member, who was a nonvoting 
member, were killed, and their driver was killed as well.
    This is the kind of thing that is preventable to the extent 
that we can provide security for them, and we ought to be doing 
that, at least if they're willing to accept it. It is the kind 
of thing that is terribly harmful and it's similar in kind to 
the attacks on the Ambassadors of non-Iraqi/Sunni Muslim 
countries who have been in the country recently.
    The reason that the jihadi wing of the insurgency is 
attacking these folks is, precisely, that they see them as the 
route to a negotiation between the government, as it stands, 
and the moderate wing of the insurgency, and I use the word 
``moderate'' in a very--in quotation marks if you will, because 
they are, of course, involved in a violent armed insurgency and 
so in that sense they're not moderate at all. What I mean by 
moderate is only those people who might be willing, 
pragmatically, to cut a deal with the government.
    Now the reason I bring this up is just to mention that the 
jihadi wing of the insurgency will do everything it can to 
discredit the constitutional process and discredit the people 
who are participating in it, and, obviously, to try to kill 
those people if they can't discredit them.
    We, therefore, need to encourage Shi'a and Kurdish 
politicians to make sure that the Sunni politicians involved in 
the constitutional process have something to show for the fact 
that they're risking their lives. We need that, not out of a 
pure sense of honor, although I suppose that might be part of 
the picture, we need it because we need the constitution not to 
make the insurgency worse. If what emerges is a constitution 
that's ratified by Shi'a and Kurds, and they could well ratify 
it, and is opposed by Sunnis, it will harden the divisions in 
the country.
    So while I agree with Dr. Marr that the constitution alone 
can't solve the insurgency--that would be asking too much of 
the constitution--it can make things worse if it's not seen as 
fully inclusive.
    So I believe that the U.S. policy, at this point in time, 
should be to follow the wishes of the members of the 
constitutional committee, and particularly the Sunni members, 
to make certain that they have something that they can deliver 
to their constituents, and can be seen to deliver to their 
constituents, that's also acceptable to the Shi'a and to the 
Kurds.
    A last word on deferral strategies. One thing these Sunni 
members of the committee might want, and this may be true of 
some of the Kurds and Shi'a on the committee as well, is that 
they may want a partial constitutional deal that reflects 
agreement where they can get it, and defers questions where 
they can't get it. Now this form of compromise is, as Ms. Van 
Rest says, risky. In the long run there's always--in fact, not 
just a possibility, there's almost a certainty that unresolved 
issues will come back and resurface as serious problems down 
the line.
    Nonetheless, deferral is a hallmark of successful 
constitution writing, because very often the only alternative 
to a deferral in a deal is no deal at all. Our constitutional 
history certainly reflects that, perhaps not in the most 
creditable way, because as we all know the true deal that had 
to be struck in Philadelphia in 1787 was the deal over slavery, 
and the Founding Fathers compromised on that question and we 
paid the price of the Civil War ultimately for it.
    But in the interim we did, in fact, have a functioning 
Republic, and I think it is relatively clear that we would not 
have had a Union and a ratified Constitution had that deal not 
been struck.
    Now, fortunately, the compromises that have to be made and 
the questions of deferral that will have to happen in Iraq are 
nowhere near as morally problematic as slavery was. They are 
questions of federalism and they are questions of religion to a 
lesser degree. But it basically amounts to leaving things like 
the Kirkuk question out of the equation at present, using just 
the most general principles.
    Similarly, perhaps even leaving the question of the 
allocation of resources by region, which will be a very 
contentious and difficult issue, out of the equation in any 
explicit way. So I'm not disagreeing with Ms. Van Rest when she 
says that these will be problems down the line, I'm sure she's 
right that there will be. I'm suggesting that the alternative 
might be having no constitution just now, or even in the next 6 
months. And so under those circumstances it may well be that 
deferral is a constitutional solution that we may not be very 
happy with, but it may be the best thing going, and I think 
probably the Iraqis on the committee are the ones best placed 
to determine that.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Feldman follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Noah Feldman, Professor of Law, New York 
                        University, New York, NY

                       TIMING OF THE CONSTITUTION

    Because of the addition of Sunni Arab Iraqis who were not elected 
members of the national assembly, the final composition of the 
constitutional committee charged with drafting a permanent Iraqi 
Constitution was not determined until the early days of July, 2005. 
This leaves the members of the committee with three choices: (1) Moving 
rapidly to release the constitutional draft for debate in the national 
assembly and eventual submission to a referendum on ratification; (2) 
delaying the formulation of a draft so as to encourage participation by 
the newly appointed Sunni members of the committee; or (3) offering a 
compromise between these two positions, producing a draft of a partial 
constitution now, and deferring some major constitutional questions 
until later.
    It is likely that the key decision among these options will be 
driven by the newly appointed Sunni members of the committee. These 
committee members face an extremely difficult and delicate challenge. 
On one hand, they understand that the Sunni boycott of Iraq's first 
post-war election was disastrous for their constituency. The sooner a 
new constitution is ratified, the sooner they can run for office in the 
hopes of giving Sunnis an elected voice in the government. A delay in 
ratification of the constitution would mean a delay for new national 
elections. This gives the Sunni committee members an incentive to 
encourage the rapid release of a constitutional draft. Furthermore, 
these members have now received a certain degree of national 
recognition, and most or all of them could be expected to stand as 
candidates in the new elections.
    On the other hand, the Sunni members of the constitutional 
committee must demonstrate to their potential constituency that Sunni 
participation on the committee has had a material impact on the 
substance of the new draft constitution. If it looks to the Sunni 
public as though the constitutional committee members chosen to 
represent them have merely rubber stamped a previously existing 
constitutional draft negotiated before their appointments by Shi'a and 
Kurdish members of the committee, the Sunnis on the committee could 
well be discredited, and the new constitutional draft with them. It is 
extremely important for the Sunni committee members to have an impact 
in the drafting process, and what is more, to be seen to have such an 
impact.
    The Sunnis on the constitutional committee are crucial participants 
in the nascent movement to get Sunni Arab Iraqis involved in Iraq's new 
political process, with the eventual goal of ending the insurgency by 
weakening support for it in predominantly Sunni areas. The outcome of 
this political process is by no means certain. The Sunnis on the 
constitutional committee need to be able to show results in order to 
advance the process. Violence is likely to continue while 
constitutional process proceeds, certainly perpetrated by the jihadi 
wing of the insurgency, but also by other insurgents when they think it 
will advance the Sunni cause.
    The more visible gains accomplished by Sunni leaders, the more 
ordinary Sunnis will come to see politics as preferable to violence as 
a means to accomplish their ends. In particular, the goal of those 
pursuing the political process must be to discredit the violent jihadi 
wing of the insurgency, which rejects political compromise altogether. 
It is no coincidence that the jihadi wing of the insurgency has been 
kidnapping and killing diplomats from Sunni Muslim countries in Iraq. 
Those diplomats have the potential to forge connections between a 
pragmatic Sunni leadership and the new Iraqi Government. The jihadis 
understand such connections as a major threat to their goal of keeping 
violent insurgency alive and resisting political compromise of the kind 
that more pragmatic insurgents--as well as much of the undecided Sunni 
Arab community--find potentially appealing. Killing these diplomats is 
aimed at the specific strategic goal of blocking political progress 
designed to bring the Sunni community into a pragmatic and nonviolent 
relationship with new Iraqi Government. The Sunni members of the 
constitutional committee are, therefore, also themselves at risk, both 
politically and in terms of their personal safety.
    Meanwhile, the Shi'a and Kurdish members of the constitutional 
committee would like to see a rapid move to the release of a 
constitutional draft. As elected officials, they share desire to end 
street progress to an increasingly frustrated public. On the Kurdish 
side, there is a lingering (and warranted) concern that an extended 
constitutional process might lead to the loss of some of the gains that 
Kurds have made in convincing, at least, the Shi'a political leadership 
to accept substantial de facto Kurdish regional autonomy under the 
rubric of federalism.
    The best posture for U.S. policy at this juncture is to express the 
view that, if the Sunnis appointed to the constitutional committee 
prefer some circumspection so as to consider the draft constitution and 
promote the interests of their constituents, the other members of the 
committee should show substantial concern for this desire. Having 
labored to bring these Sunni members to the committee, with the goal of 
developing Sunni politics and eventually marginalizing violent 
insurgents, the United States would not be well served by an approach 
that ran roughshod over Sunni interests in a way that rendered Sunni 
political participation useless.
    It may well be that the Sunni members of the constitutional 
committee would themselves prefer some sort of compromise option, with 
the deferral of many of the difficult constitutional decisions that are 
ahead. If so, such a compromise should be perfectly acceptable from the 
U.S. standpoint. Deferral is a standard strategy for constitution 
drafting under difficult circumstances. It does not work indefinitely, 
as the American Civil War demonstrates. But it can accomplish the 
short-term goal of shifting, at least, some underlying tension into the 
political realm and away from the use of force.

                        THE RATIFICATION PROCESS

    It is crucial that, unlike the Transitional Administrative Law, 
which by necessity was drafted privately and was not subject to 
national ratification, the final Iraqi Constitution be ratified through 
a process that involves substantial public involvement and discussion. 
Only such a public process can save the constitution from the 
inevitable criticism, which will be heard in Sunni areas of Iraq as 
well as elsewhere in the Muslim world, that it is the product of 
political elites sequestered in the green zone, who may have been 
elected, but who govern at the sufferance of the coalition.
    This said, the United States should be extremely cautious about 
designing or directing a public campaign, either to promote or discuss 
the constitution. Instead, the coalition should stand prepared to fund 
efforts in this direction designed by members of the national assembly 
and the constitutional committee. The Transitional Administrative Law 
provides for a popular referendum on the constitution, thus affording a 
formal measure of democratic legitimacy. Beyond this formal structure, 
the new Iraqi Government needs to develop its own, distinctively Iraqi 
process for discussing and analyzing the constitution. United States 
officials are poorly placed to determine the right format or forum for 
such debates.
    The town meeting is a particular form of political expression 
developed in a particular time and place and today not widely used even 
in the United States. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution designed a 
republican, representative form of government, not a direct democracy, 
and even the ratification conventions that took place in the 13 U.S. 
States were not open meetings, but involved representatives selected by 
localities and State legislatures. The ``town meeting'' as such does 
not have its roots in Iraqi political culture. Instead, Iraqis will 
probably develop some sort of model of consultative discussion more 
closely linked to the traditional Arab institution of the majlis.
    It is to be emphasized that when a new constitutional draft is made 
public, many ordinary Iraqis will experience a kind of ``sticker 
shock'' with respect to some of its more innovative aspects, especially 
those concerning federalism. An immediate, open, public discussion will 
generate some angry rejection of the degree of independence to be 
enjoyed by the Kurdish region. By the same token, religious radicals 
intent on destabilizing the constitutional process could well criticize 
the draft as insufficiently Islamic--a process which would be perfectly 
natural in public speeches or on television, but which would be 
potentially destabilizing if it were to take place in town meetings 
designed to debate the new constitution.
    The members of the constitutional committee have now had experience 
considering political realities and compromising on the basis of them. 
They must have the opportunity to explain the draft they have developed 
to their constituents in their own way. We must be vigilant about 
unwittingly undermining their efforts through a well-intentioned but 
ill-executed policy of encouraging town meetings.

                     AVOIDING SHI'A-SUNNI VIOLENCE

    The jihadi wing of the insurgency has continued to make great 
efforts to provoke all-out civil war between the Sunni and Shi'a 
communities in Iraq. In particular, attacks on Shi'a civilians, holy 
places, and prominent clerics are specifically aimed at causing Shi'as 
to break their restraint, Were it not for the steadying hand of 
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, it is entirely likely that violent 
retaliation would already have occurred on a significant scale. The 
great risk continues to be an attempt on the life of Sistani himself, 
which, if successful, would both provide enormous cause for retaliatory 
anger and remove the primaries barrier to its expression. It would be 
astonishing if such an attempt were not being planned at present. Many 
of the jihadis consider Shi'a Muslims to be heretics, and there is no 
reason to expect that they would show any respect at all for the person 
of Sistani.
    To avoid the outbreak of serious interdenominational violence, it 
is necessary to develop a network of contacts who can speak credibly on 
behalf of the Sunni community, and even, indirectly, on behalf of the 
pragmatic, largely ex-Ba'thist or ex-military wings of the insurgency. 
The Sunnis appointed to the constitutional committee may be considered 
the vanguard of such a group. Some Sunni clerics may also be useful for 
this purpose, especially if they would be willing to meet with Shi'a 
clerics on terms of equality. Diplomats from Sunni countries can play 
some constructive role in this process by identifying potential Sunni 
spokesmen. But ultimately, there is no substitute for elected Sunni 
officials serving in the same government bodies as their Shi'a 
counterparts. Developing a formalized mechanism outside of political 
institutions for communicating to Sunnis is likely to marginalize those 
political institutions, with serious long-term consequences.

                   THE EMERGING POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

    The highly fluid political situation in Iraq is generating a new 
group of political leaders who are acting as entrepreneurs filling a 
gap in the market. More such leaders will emerge in the coming years, 
both from within existing political parties and from without. The only 
generalization that is appropriate is that these leaders are quick to 
learn and shape the rules of the emerging political sphere. They have 
general ideological goals, but are typically willing to work with 
anybody to achieve them, and those goals are themselves open to rapid 
change and development.
    Muqtada al-Sadr is the model of these new political players. From 
challenging democracy as un-Islamic, he moved to participating in 
elections. From fighting the coalition through his militia, he moved to 
accepting coalition money for projects in neighborhoods he controls. He 
challenged Sistani directly, then acknowledged the latter's authority. 
None of these is a marker of any underlying moderation; each was a 
tactical decision taken in the light of circumstances.
    The chief failing of U.S. policy with regard to Sadr has been its 
uncertainty. The coalition needs to decide whether to co-opt and buy 
off potential militants or arrest and kill them. Fluctuations in policy 
are counterproductive given the general uncertainty and fluidity on the 
ground in Iraq.
    More broadly, given the U.S. force posture in Iraq, a policy of 
pragmatic accommodation with new political leaders is necessary. That 
means that even those who have in the past taken up arms against the 
coalition must be engaged where there is a chance of redirecting them 
to political, rather than military means. The key is to insist that any 
interlocutor must not simultaneously be involved in violence, and to 
demonstrate that giving up violence is rewarded with stature and money. 
This provides an incentive for mainstreaming that is crucial to 
encouraging politics in lieu of violence. Some contacts with violent 
insurgents will probably continue sub rosa, and that is not necessarily 
a bad thing if it encourages other insurgents to choose politics over 
violence on the ground of self-interest.
    Such interlocutors may be former Ba'thists, militia members, or 
others. (Two members of the constitutional committee are reported to 
have been members of the Ba'th Party.) If they will participate in 
peaceful politics, they should not be excluded on the basis of past 
membership alone. Of course criminals must be brought to justice--but 
in the short term, it is far more important to create political contact 
with all factions, especially those who presently threaten the future 
of the Iraqi political process.

    The Chairman. At this moment I'd like to recognize Senator 
Biden, the ranking member, for an opening comment.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR 
                         FROM DELAWARE

    Senator Biden. Thank you very much. I apologize for being 
late and I got to read your statement, Dr. Marr, which I always 
do, before you testified, and while you were testifying.
    I think you've all summarized this pretty clearly, and I 
think that we all acknowledge that unless we get the Sunnis 
into the deal, whatever the deal is, constitution or otherwise, 
there is no resolution in Iraq, and so it's a difficult call.
    But I just want to thank you all for taking the time to be 
here, your testimony, and you're about to answer questions for 
us, is really genuinely helpful where I think there are very 
few absolutely clear-cut answers here.
    And so I will ask that my statement be placed in the 
record, Mr. Chairman----
    The Chairman. It will be placed in the record.
    Senator Biden [continuing]. And yield to you for gaining 
whatever--there is.
    [The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

  Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator From 
                                Delaware

    I would like to second the chairman's welcome to our distinguished 
guests. The issues before us today are as important to our success in 
Iraq as they are complex.
    Our commanders on the ground have emphasized that military means 
alone are not sufficient to defeat the insurgency. Ultimately, true 
security and stability can only be achieved through a political 
accommodation among Iraq's major communities and factions.
    The constitutional debate in Iraq will play a significant role in 
determining whether there will be such an accommodation. I am hopeful 
the constitution can be drafted on time, though it will require 
consensus-building, compromise, and late nights.
    With less than 4 weeks to go, a number of contentious issues must 
be litigated, including: Federalism, the status of Kirkuk, the sharing 
of resources, and the role of Islam and women's rights, to name but a 
few.
    But even if all goes well, we shouldn't expect to see a perfect 
document on August 15. It's worth remembering that our own Constitution 
was 13 years in the making, and it remains a living document to this 
day.
    Assuming that the Iraqis succeed in putting together a draft 
constitution, there will remain several profound challenges.
    The first is getting the Sunni Arabs into the political process en 
masse, Iraq is scheduled to have two more elections this year--a 
constitutional referendum in October and another parliamentary election 
in December.
    Many Arab Sunnis boycotted January's parliamentary elections. I 
believe many others were kept away from polling stations by fear. It is 
absolutely essential to convince this silent Sunni majority to 
participate in the process and to claim a seat at the table in Iraq's 
first constitutionally elected government.
    Our second challenge is ensuring that the constitution is more than 
just words on a piece of paper. This requires accountability and 
transparency; security and judicial institutions that respect 
individual dignity, human rights, and the rule of law; and a government 
whose reach extends beyond the green zone.
    An equally profound challenge is sectarianism. On my first visit to 
Iraq 2 years ago, very few Iraqis would openly identify themselves as 
Sunni or Shi'a--it was considered inappropriate.
    Now, it is all too common--the result of a breakdown in Iraq's 
social and security order and the brutal agenda of a small group of 
religious extremists. We saw a horrific example of this agenda with 
last weekend's attack on a mosque south of Baghdad, which has claimed 
100 lives.
    Thus far, the Shi'a religious establishment has succeeded in 
keeping the desire for revenge after such attacks in check, but there 
is evidence of a growing number of reprisal killings against Sunnis.
    The tentative political progress in Iraq risks being washed away if 
this rising tide of sectarianism is not stemmed.
    I repeat what I said yesterday. I believe that we can still succeed 
in Iraq. By success, I mean leaving Iraq better than we found it--a 
country with a representative government in which all major communities 
believe they have a stake, and a country that is not a haven for terror 
nor a threat to us or its neighbors.
    I believe that there is an Iraqi nationalism that unites, at least, 
Iraqi Arabs. I believe that Iraq's Kurds, because they understand the 
realities of their neighborhood, recognize that autonomy in a federal 
Iraq is a much more realistic option than independence.
    I look forward to our witnesses' testimony.

    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    We'll proceed then through the remaining three sets, and 
then have questions from members of the committee.
    Now the second set. I'll ask you, Ms. Van Rest, to make the 
first comment on this occasion.
    Should the coalition conduct a massive public education 
campaign designed to stimulate interest in the constitutional 
referendum and discussion of the insurgency? This would include 
townhall meetings carried on radio and television on the future 
of Iraq. Could such a campaign reach the Iraqi people, and 
would Iraqis participate despite threats of retribution?
    Would unscripted townhall meetings enhance the credibility 
of the message, thereby building public disdain for the 
insurgency, and support for Iraqi political development? Could 
security be provided to prevent terrorist attacks during the 
townhall events?
    Would you please proceed?
    Ms. Van Rest. We are clearly at the point in this process 
where the role of public education is quite crucial. The 
constitutional referendum is complicated for Iraqis. When they 
go to the voting booth it will not be simply a matter of voting 
for a particular coalition or name of a person, but there are 
some complicated issues that they may not agree with, and they 
need to understand how the process went along so that they 
understand the compromises made and have a full and complete 
understanding that while they may not agree with in the 
constitution, nevertheless, this may be the best way forward 
for Iraq.
    Public education campaigns by Iraqis are essential. They 
need to be done not by the coalition but by Iraqis themselves. 
What is crucial is to ensure that Iraqis are provided with 
support, that they need to design and produce and implement a 
campaign to educate the population about the process that is 
underway, issues under discussion, the content of the 
constitution, and the importance of their participation in the 
referendum scheduled for October 15.
    I am pleased to say that we are very much involved in 
supporting a campaign by a variety of Iraqi organizations 
across the country. This is something that we have been doing 
along with our colleagues at the National Democratic Institute 
to help get the word out about what the process is. We did this 
prior to the January 30 election, and what we discovered is 
that there are no end of Iraqi individuals and groups willing 
to risk their lives to conduct public education.
    Let me give you some idea of what is going on now. The 
workshops that are going on are not in the context of the 
townhall meetings as we know them, but they are more like small 
gatherings across the country. We're supporting an array of 
civic groups that are involved in a coordinated nationwide 
voter education campaign to raise public awareness of 
constitutional democracy and constitutional drafting and the 
referendum process. Led by Iraqi civic groups working under the 
banner of the Civic Coalition for Free Elections of which there 
are about 80 organizations.
    The campaign, which is entitled ``A Constitution for 
Everyone,'' consists of direct voter contact through workshops 
based on IRI developed curriculum and printed materials. There 
are scheduled around 1,400 of these workshops across the 
country. They have begun in a very intensive way, and there 
have been more than 100 workshops that have been conducted to 
date.
    In addition, we have been working with the constitutional 
committee to help them become more active and engaged in 
outreach to the public. We have weekly focus groups that 
provide them with information on the important questions of the 
constitutional drafting, we have already produced four 
television interviews with the constitutional committee 
leadership in which they have discussed process and content and 
answered questions from the public about the constitution. One 
of the programs features a chairman, Sheik Hamudi; another, 
featured women members of the committee in an effort to focus 
discussion on issues of particular interest to women.
    There are more of these 30-minute programs to follow; they 
are being aired on the major Iraqi television network and will 
reach an audience of millions.
    In addition, we are helping the constitutional committee 
produce public service announcements. We're in the process of 
doing that. And we're also helping them distribute--or print 
and distribute--various things such as posters and pamphlets 
around the country.
    Finally, Iraqi women are so very active in civic education. 
We work with several women's coalitions to get out the word 
about what is going on with the process and how they can have 
some sort of input into the drafting. And their efforts are 
ongoing constantly. Today, for example, a group called the 
Women's Leadership Institute held a public meeting and then 
they met with members of the constitutional drafting committee 
to share their views on what they believe should be in the 
constitution with regards to human rights and women's rights.
    We also have on hand a constitutional consulting team and 
they are legal and academic specialists who are helping out 
with conducting different workshops and sessions with various 
Iraqi groups.
    And, finally, we are giving support to the Minister of 
State for Women's Affairs in her efforts to hold national 
conferences to discuss issues of human rights and women's 
rights.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Dr. Feldman.
    Dr. Feldman. It is crucially important that the members of 
the constitutional drafting committee have the opportunity to 
argue to the general public in Iraq their case, to explain why 
they've drafted what they have drafted.
    That said, I think there are some significant concerns that 
we should be aware of with respect to the United States 
directing, and being seen to direct, a public education 
campaign, especially one that focuses on the town meeting. And 
I think those concerns are really three.
    The first is that the town meeting forum, as we think of 
it, an open town meeting where anyone can get up and speak his 
mind if he or she--if the person is willing to stand in line 
behind a microphone, it's not an indigenous political forum to 
Iraq. It's not an indigenous political forum even in much of 
the United States, although it is used in some places like my 
native New England.
    But the truth is that under such circumstances where anyone 
can get up and speak, the odds are very high, I would almost 
guarantee that in many cases some of the strongest and most 
vocal opponents of the constitutional process will be the ones 
who dominate these meetings. And I'll say a word in a moment 
about what it is that they're likely to say. But I think that's 
the first concern.
    In Iraq a model for public engagement developed by the 
members of the constitutional drafting committee itself is much 
more likely to be effective, and it will probably follow--
speaking in very general terms here--something like the 
consultative majlis model that is more commonly used in the 
Middle East, it will be discursive and dialogic if you will, 
but it would not be an open mike sort of situation. And may I 
add that the ratification conventions in the United States, 
when we ratified our own constitution, were not open 
microphone--well, there were no microphones, but they were not 
open-access affairs. People were selected, or elected, to 
participate in those constitutional conventions, and I don't 
think that undercuts the fundamentally democratic nature of the 
process, especially given that here there's going to be a 
democratic referendum on the constitution.
    The second concern is what I referred to earlier as sticker 
shock. There's been a process for Shi'a Iraqis in particular, 
Arab Iraqis that has not yet been undergone by Sunni Iraqis, 
when they are informed of just how much autonomy the Kurdish 
region has requested and is likely to get in the final 
constitutional draft. Many, many Iraqis remain uncomfortable 
with what is, let's be honest, de facto autonomy for the 
Kurdish region under many, many particular circumstances under 
the rubric of federalism. And a states' rights position, much 
stronger than states' rights, not only now in the United States 
but at any point in our history.
    It is likely that many people first introduced to this 
concept, especially in the Sunni areas, are going to react very 
negatively, and they're going to react negatively in public, 
and such meetings would be a natural forum for them to do so.
    Now some public expression of their shock is perfectly 
appropriate, and I expect we'll see it in newspapers and on 
television and probably in some public rallies. Having that 
happen in these meetings is likely to be very destablizing to 
the process of constitutional ratification, and I do not think 
it's an exaggeration to say that it would raise, at least, some 
possibility of a public groundswell against the constitution, 
which I think would be a very serious matter indeed.
    I would add to this the role of Islam as a factor that is 
likely to become much intensified in open meeting style 
debates. The Islamists, both on the Shi'a and the Sunni side--
we haven't heard so much from the Sunni Islamists, yet, in 
Iraq, but I promise you we're going to, in this ratification 
process--are excellent at essentially taking over public 
meetings and insisting on the insufficiently Islamic nature of 
any public governmental decision. They will not be concerned 
about the fact that behind closed doors a negotiation has 
already occurred in which Islam has been delicately balanced 
against democracy in a very, very precise formulation which 
will require a constitutional scholar to make any sense of it, 
and even then will probably make very little sense.
    We are opening the door potentially to an Islamist 
countermovement against the constitution, and among the Sunni 
Islamists, who, as I said, we have not heard from very much 
politically, but who are most closely connected to the jihadi 
wing of the insurgency. You're talking about a constituency 
that could do real harm to the constitutional process, and is 
guaranteed to try to do so. So I have some concern about that 
constituency and its participation as well.
    The last point is the desire for people who participate in 
meetings that are designed as part of the ratification process 
to be participating in meetings that actually matter. In other 
words, just as at our constitutional ratifying conventions in 
the States many people got up and said we don't like this 
constitution without a bill of rights, we demand that a bill of 
rights be added, and we vote to ratify only on the condition 
that a bill of rights be added, many people in Iraq 
participating in such meetings will want there to be changes to 
the document. The idea that they are being asked to debate 
something the text of which is fixed, and the text of which 
cannot be changed prior to the referendum, is likely to be an 
extremely unpleasant one for many people. And I say this partly 
based on personal experience in Iraq. I think there is a grave 
likelihood, at this point, that people who are already 
skeptical of the democratic process will say, why are we being 
asked to talk about this if a decision has already been made? 
If we can't do anything about it, why are we being asked to get 
up and express our views?
    That, too, is a potential source of frustration. So since 
there is no contemplated mechanism for returning back to the 
drafting committee after the point at which the debate has 
occurred, you are going to get frustration in the general 
public, in this case, just at the whole constitutional process, 
a sense of frustration and perhaps of having tried to 
participate politically but not having been able to do so, with 
the only protest mechanism available being a no vote.
    I would just close my comments by mentioning that many, 
many rational observers thought--before the recent 
constitutional referenda in Holland, in the Netherlands, and in 
France--that no reasonable voter in either of these countries 
could potentially vote against the constitution because the 
consequences were much too serious. Now admittedly they're not 
quite as dire in Europe as they would be in Iraq, but it is the 
case that many Iraqis would be prepared to vote against the 
constitution if they were sufficiently frustrated with the 
process. We must be very careful to avoid a situation in which 
we unwittingly, but in a well-intentioned way, facilitate a 
process that actually leads people to be dissatisfied with 
their constitution rather than happy with it.
    The Chairman. Dr. Marr.
    Dr. Marr. Well, I find myself in agreement on at least two 
points with my colleagues, and perhaps some caveats on the 
others.
    I found this question much easier to answer. Like others, I 
feel that it's the Iraqi Government, not the coalition, which 
should be conducting any public education campaign on the 
constitution. I also feel that this campaign should not include 
a discussion of the insurgency.
    I do want to elaborate a little on that because I feel that 
these are two separate, though related, issues which should not 
be mixed. Doing so is going to tie the constitution and its 
contents to the insurgency, divert attention from the main 
subject, and fix the two together in the public mind. Worse, it 
could make the constitution's success appear contingent on 
insurgent activity and tie the government's agenda to the 
insurgency.
    So the discussion of the constitution, as a blueprint for 
Iraq's future, should stand on its own, although, of course, 
the public discussion should make clear that the political 
process is open to all, and it's the appropriate vehicle to 
effect political goals, not violence.
    I believe that there should be a campaign conducted to set 
the constitution before the public. The way the question is 
phrased--whether it should be massive, whether it should be a 
townhall forum--I think is less important. I think, as Judy has 
said, there are certain ways in which this can be done in the 
Iraqi context which won't necessarily invite a lot of 
propagandistic speeches. Certainly, as she has said, campaign 
can be conducted through the media, through the press, perhaps 
in university and school settings, perhaps in the more 
traditional settings and so on.
    There are two virtues to doing this. One is that it helps 
build civil society which is very important. Various civic 
groups formed to educate the public will be the basis for 
future interest and watchdog groups, and, as has been 
indicated, a number of these have already been formed and are 
operating. And I want to add that special effort should be made 
to persuade the Sunnis in their area to lead this process, to 
encourage Sunni participation. It's very important that they 
get invested in the process, and develop a feeling that they 
have a stake in the future.
    Now, along with Dr. Feldman, I, too, have a problem with 
the timing of this process. I believe that a public education 
campaign needs to be undertaken, both before and after the 
draft is submitted, so that the public feels it has some say in 
the content. I agree that if you just spread the constitution 
before them and indicate they simply have an up or down vote, 
there's going to be frustration. And you might get a down 
rather than an up vote. This is one reason why I think a small 
extension in the time might be helpful.
    You can't write a constitution in a townhall, that's 
perfectly clear. But there are instances where the public, 
through interest groups such as those formed by women and 
others mentioned in the bill of rights, can have some input. 
They will feel that they're being listened to and taken account 
of. They will have a more vested interest in the outcome.
    So I would like to make sure that this public education 
process has some feedback into the constitution committee 
before the draft is finalized. Needless to say, I also feel 
that there needs to be some kind of opportunity for public 
education once the draft is completed, for several reasons. 
First, people do need to understand what their rights and 
obligations are under the constitution. Second, I think various 
interest groups and other civic societies involved in this 
process will be the building blocks for the legislation that 
will fill in the details on this constitution. Third, they will 
bring the public and its various sectors into the process; 
that's very important, too.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much for those responses.
    Now let us proceed to a third set of questions. Should we 
take new steps to forestall a Sunni-Shi'a conflict?
    Is international and Arab intervention feasible in that 
process?
    Could an international working group that includes 
participation by Sunni Arabs from outside Iraq, namely 
Jordanians, Egyptians, and others, help broker negotiations 
between the parties? Is there some other vehicle that could 
provide technical support and mediation and services for Sunnis 
and Shi'as to come to peaceful accommodation?
    Could credible Sunnis be enlisted to participate in this 
process?
    And finally, should de-Ba'thification be revisited?
    I call upon you, Dr. Feldman, to initiate the responses.
    Dr. Feldman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The jihadi wing of the insurgency is engaged in an all-out 
effort to create a true civil war in Iraq, and the reason we 
don't have a civil war is just that, although, there are 
massive killings of Shi'a civilians by some Sunnis there have 
not been substantial retaliations in killings of Sunni 
civilians by the Shi'a. There's really just one reason that 
that hasn't happened so far, and that reason is Ayatollah Ali 
al-Sistani, who has the kind of moral credibility in the 
country to call on his constituency to act with restraint.
    It is certain that an attempt on the life of Ayatollah 
Sistani is being planned. It would be unimaginable that no one 
was trying to kill him. An attempt will be made and one can 
only hope and pray that it will be unsuccessful.
    Nonetheless, we need to be well aware that that is not a 
far flung or unlikely scenario. Already several of his senior 
aides have been successfully assassinated, and again it's taken 
tremendous restraint on his part to be able to advise the Shi'a 
community, which is aided by a traditional political 
quiescence, but which will not hold on to that forever, that 
they ought to hold back and preserve the peace.
    So we definitely need some mechanisms that might be able to 
restrain, especially in a crisis situation like that one, and 
that would function under ordinary conditions as well.
    Now some participation of Sunni diplomats from outside of 
Iraq is certainly helpful, and we can deduce that it is 
potentially helpful from the fact that the jihadi wing of the 
insurgency thinks it might be helpful, which is why they're 
trying to assassinate those diplomats.
    It will now be much more difficult than it was the first 
time, and it was not easy the first time, to draw those other 
Sunni Arab countries into the process of negotiation by sending 
fresh diplomats. They, themselves, have security concerns, 
understandably, and it's a tremendous blow to their national 
prestige, and to their national interests, when they lose an 
ambassador. That's a serious business for obvious reasons that 
I don't need to explain to the committee.
    So I think we probably have, to some degree, exhausted, at 
least, the public version of that kind of diplomacy, and we may 
have to rely more on private versions of diplomacy of other 
Sunni-Arab countries going forward. It doesn't mean it can't be 
done privately in an effective way.
    There are essentially two groups of interlocutors that we 
could use in the Sunni-Arab community to try to make this 
happen. The first are Sunni clerics. These are very often not 
the people whom one would choose as interlocutors because to 
make them interlocutors is to empower them, and they're not 
people that have been elected, and they often have views and 
values deeply opposed to those of both the coalition and also 
held by the Iraqis.
    On the other hand, before elections happen, they are often 
the only people who are capable of speaking in an indirect way 
on behalf of those who were participating in the insurgency. 
They could be encouraged to meet on equal terms with Shi'a 
clerics, in cleric-cleric meetings that would be informal sorts 
of contacts, nongovernmental, but which might, in the long run, 
be a first step in the direction of having some line of 
communication that would be available in a crisis situation. 
It's not going to be an easy thing to do. Many of them lived 
happily alongside Shi'a for many years but if you push them, 
theologically, as the jihadis are doing, it's difficult for 
them to avoid the conclusion that, in fact, the Shi'a are, at 
best, heterodox and, at worst, heretics. That's a serious 
concern on their part. But some sort of clergy-clergy contacts, 
I think, should be encouraged and could be encouraged.
    The second group one could speak to on the Sunni-Arab side 
are essentially ex-Ba'thist or ex-military or both, members of 
the--what I described earlier again with apologies, is it a 
moderate or the pragmatic wing of the insurgency, that is 
people who don't see the end game as a permanent jihad but 
instead see the end game as some sort of a negotiated solution 
with the other side.
    We are already talking in some limited ways to those 
people. Some of them are participating in politics, and indeed, 
at least two of the members of this constitutional committee 
who are Sunnis are reputed to have been former Ba'thists at 
some stage of their careers. That's a good thing because this 
situation, although these are not people whom one would like to 
deal with, we have very little other choice if we want to stave 
off the possibility of more extensive violence.
    The background for all of this is just to keep in mind that 
the insurgency itself needs to be split, and that the jihadi 
wing is never going to negotiate, is never going to enter into 
reasonable deals, and that anyone who belongs to that line of 
the insurgency, or claims to belong to it, or is even openly 
allied with it, should be excluded from these sorts of 
contacts, but that there are others in the insurgency who do 
not feel this way and who can be won over--and to be blunt 
about it, bought out through this process. And I think we need 
to be open to dealing with those folks as we have already 
slowly begun to do.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Doctor.
    Dr. Phebe Marr.
    Dr. Marr. I think in some ways this question may misdefine 
the issue a little. Rather than simply a Shi'a-Sunni conflict, 
I think the conflict is broader, and as I said before, involves 
all of Iraq's communities as they search for new identity.
    In fact, I think there are two processes going on; one is 
an increased polarization of the Iraqi polity along both ethnic 
and sectarian lines--Kurds and Arabs as well as Shi'a and 
Sunnis as Iraq searches for this identify and a new political 
center of gravity. The elections in January revealed this 
polarity, putting into power an essentially Shi'a ticket with a 
majority and a very strong Kurdish ticket in the second place. 
Those with centrist or nonsectarian views either lost the 
election, or got very few votes.
    In any event, helping to move Iraq away from this 
polarization and encouraging a sense of national identity, 
particularly in speeches, messages and so on, should be one of 
the coalition's long-term goals. But I agree with Noah Feldman, 
it's well to keep in mind that both the Shi'a and the Kurds 
have been disciplining their own communities and preventing 
retribution and retaliation, up to a point, where they can. 
This has been largely successful because both of these groups 
have benefited by attaining power in the new regime.
    In the end, however, rather than a Shi'a-Sunni conflict, 
what I see is rejectionist resisting the new government and a 
new political order. This is most virulently manifested in the 
insurgency. Most of the rejection comes from Sunnis; most of 
those in the government and those shaping the new order are 
Shi'a and Kurds. But the Sunni rejectionists need to be 
understood, not simply as a sectarian group but as a community 
whose leaders once occupied power, not as Sunnis but mainly as 
nationalists. Now they find themselves to be an increasingly 
marginalized minority that not only resent their loss of power 
and status, but fear discrimination and victimization by the 
new ruling groups. And many have lost employment and economic 
benefits as well.
    As Dr. Feldman has said, they can be divided into several 
different categories. Like him, I would put the jihadists and 
the ``Salafists,'' who are extremist, beyond the pale. I would 
also put beyond the pale, Saddam loyalists engaged in violent 
mayhem. But I agree that a number of the other Sunni 
oppositionists--army officers, former Ba'th party members, 
nationalists opposed to occupation, and unemployed youth riled 
by current conditions--probably can be brought into the fold of 
the new regime in time, and with the proper incentives.
    Conversation with these oppositionists indicate they have 
roughly four or five concerns. They are, first, the issue of 
occupation and the foreign presence; second, the loss of power 
and prestige; third, the lack of Sunni representation in the 
political process; fourth, increased sectarianism; and fifth, 
the lack of a rule of law and security, especially for their 
community.
    Attempts to alleviate this problem should focus on 
addressing these problems. I would make several suggestions. 
First, as everyone has said, encourage the government to bring 
Sunnis into the political process.
    Progress has already been made on this--considerable 
progress--and if more time is needed on the constitutional 
process to do that, I would urge that we provide it.
    Second, encourage revision of the electoral law to move the 
process away from a single countrywide election list to a more 
district-based system, which I'm going to say more about later. 
This would ensure Sunni seats in the assembly regardless of how 
many voted and would certainly go down well in Sunni areas.
    Third, encourage the current government to revisit the de-
Ba'thification program. Anecdotal evidence suggests that much 
of the educated middle class, especially academics and 
professionals like doctors and lawyers, who may have been party 
members but have no criminal records, feel alienated and left 
out. Many are leaving Iraq. A better vetting system, which 
focuses on individual behavior and records rather than a 
blanket category such as party membership, would help. But it 
has to be borne in mind that this is an extremely sensitive 
issue for the new Shi'a and Kurdish leaders. This was brought 
out in many conversations I had with them in Baghdad.
    Fourth, Sunnis complain of a lack of rule of law and 
security. They're not alone in this, of course. Over the long 
term, strengthening the court system, the prison system, the 
police system, would help. I mention this because I think it's 
important to remember that not all of this violence is due to 
insurgency. A lot is due to common crime. If you could separate 
the police problem from the insurgency problem, strengthen the 
local police, especially Sunni police in Sunni areas, it would 
allow the coalition to take its forces out of cities and 
alleviate some of that problem.
    Lastly, outright mediation might have some benefit. But, 
frankly, I think it has to be handled carefully lest it be seen 
as interference, especially by the new Shi'a-dominated 
government. As for including key figures in neighboring Arab-
Sunni States we have to be careful here, too. That would be 
helpful, but many of them may be regarded with suspicion by 
this government. However, including some Arab leaders in some 
kind of an international delegation might be a good idea. But 
any mediation effort involving neighboring states would need a 
clear definition of its mission, what it would be expected to 
do to influence and mitigate the Sunni problem.
    The current government is interested in efforts to control 
the border, to control the finances flowing to insurgents, to 
get public support for the electoral process and the new 
constitution, and to encourage public rejection of violence. 
International and regional efforts along these lines, in return 
for Iraqi Government efforts to bring more recalcitrant Sunnis 
into the government and into local police forces, might be 
helpful.
    I would like to just add two points to what Dr. Feldman has 
said about who might mediate for the Sunni community. Religious 
leaders are one group, but let us not forget tribal leaders, 
who are often very pragmatic, who have local constituencies, 
and who certainly ought to be brought in, at least in the short 
term, as negotiating partners.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Marr.
    Ms. Van Rest.
    Ms. Van Rest. Thank you. To follow up on my colleagues 
remarks, what I want to describe is what we're seeing from our 
working in Iraq through these various groups. We are witnessing 
a determination among all the groups, Sunni, Shi'a, Kurds, even 
the smaller groups, to work together toward the goal of a 
united Iraq.
    One thing that we have been seeing is that there is no end 
of debate among the Sunni and the Shi'a about what type of 
government they should have, and indeed they are taking some 
joy in embracing the opportunity to have the debate because as 
we have heard from several of them, including one recently, 
that ``under Saddam I would not even debate such issues in my 
own head and now we are free to debate them among ourselves.''
    There is a commitment to democratic debate and confidence 
in the framework across Iraq and across various sectors of 
society. It is found among Sunnis. We have seen Sunni 
representatives brought into the constitutional drafting 
process, we have heard Sunni leaders say they made a mistake by 
not participating in the January elections, and a mistake that 
they are encouraging their followers not to make in upcoming 
elections.
    There is wide support for democratic solutions by Iraqis as 
shown in our polls. Support for, and confidence in, democratic 
solutions among Iraqis has been expressed time and time again 
in nationwide polling, which we have attached to the testimony 
in greater detail.
    The latest survey has revealed that nearly 73 percent of 
Iraqis believe that the new Iraqi transitional government is 
representative of the Iraqi people as a whole, among self-
identified Sunnis the percentage is 67.4 percent, and for the 
Shi'a it is 78.3.
    Equally revealing is the strong support for coming 
elections; 75.6 percent of Iraqis say they are very likely to 
vote in the upcoming constitutional referendum. Again, support 
is strong among both Sunni and Shi'a at 63 percent and 83 
percent, respectively.
    It is also worth noting that the polling data reveals that 
the Sunni-Shi'a divide is not that wide in comparison to self-
identification as Iraqis. Twice as many Sunni most strongly 
identify with their country in relation to the number who 
identify with their ethnic group; for Shi'a four times as many 
identify with their county. When comparing strongly identifying 
with country to identification with religion the ratio for 
Sunnis is three to one, and for Shi'a two to one.
    National identity is a necessary component in creating a 
willingness to make the compromises necessary to bridge the 
gaps that might otherwise be created by more divisive elements.
    These numbers are being reflected by action on the ground. 
Across the country courageous Iraqis are standing up to those 
who would use violence to undermine the move toward a peaceful 
and democratic Iraq. IRI is working with numerous Sunni and 
Shi'a organizations, and as my colleague Noah suggests, we're 
also including cleric organizations, and as Phebe mentioned, we 
have tribal organizations working to educate Iraqis about the 
constitutional drafting process and support for elections as a 
way of creating a more peaceful and prosperous Iraq.
    It is in this context that the response to what steps 
should be taken to avoid Sunni-Shi'a conflict should be found. 
The answer is to support the Iraqis in finding their own 
solutions, including that of de-Ba'thification within the 
democratic political framework to which they have committed 
themselves. Sunnis and Shi'as are already engaged in 
accommodations through political channels, leadership is not 
advocating violence for civil war, such elements while 
tragically conspicuous are marginal forces.
    The United States and its coalition partners would do well 
to encourage, even pressure, neighboring governments and those 
of other Islamic States in the region that benefit from 
stability in Iraq to be more outspoken in their condemnation of 
terrorist violence in the name if Islam.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    We'll proceed now to the fourth option. We'll start with 
Dr. Marr in the response.
    How can the United States cultivate emerging leaders among 
the various political factions in Iraq, and ensure that they 
will interact politically rather than using violence or 
exclusionary political tactics? Is such involvement feasible, 
or would it be counterproductive? How divergent are the views 
among the various new leaders on such issues as democracy, the 
appropriate political structure, the role of religion, future 
relations with the West and Iraq's neighbors? Can the United 
States influence these views, or should we attempt to influence 
those views?
    Dr. Marr.
    Dr. Marr. Thank you. I'm currently involved, as a fellow at 
USIP, in a study of Iraq's emerging political leadership and 
their various visions for the future of Iraq. In conjunction 
with this I've made two trips to Iraq; one in December to talk 
to the Kurdish leadership and one in May and June to Basra and 
Baghdad to talk to the newly elected members of the government.
    These interviews reveal a rich mix of political leaders 
emerging with considerable promise for the future, but that 
promise is going to take time to mature. The problem of 
replacing Iraq's leadership, once Saddam and the Ba'th regime 
was removed, has, in my opinion, always been one of the most 
difficult problems facing Iraq and the coalition. Removing and 
disbanding the previous pillars of state has allowed for a new 
leadership to emerge, but has also created a large vacuum at 
the center of power. Filling this vacuum has been difficult.
    New leadership can come essentially from three sources. One 
is a reintroduction of elements of the previous regime vetted 
for security purposes; the second is from exile, opposition 
politicians who've been outside of Iraq for decades; and the 
third is from the indigenous Iraqi population, most of whom 
have had little or no leadership experience.
    Essentially the coalition opted for the second solution; 
bringing in a group of exile opposition leaders mainly from the 
West. This group dominated the early governments under the CPA 
and the interim government, but the election now has produced 
an essential change in that pattern and brought the expression 
of popular will and a shift to new leadership, which probably 
reflects future trends in Iraq.
    Several points need to be made to understand this 
leadership and the challenges it poses.
    First, the current government, like it's predecessors, is 
dominated in its upper ranks by exiles who have spent most of 
their formative years outside of Iraq, or in the case of the 
Kurds, running their own government in the north. Whereas 
earlier regimes were led mainly by Western-educated and 
Western-oriented oppositionists, the new government is not. Key 
positions are now in the hands of the Shi'a religio-political 
parties and the Kurdish parties. The members of this opposition 
have often spent time not in the West but in Iran or in 
neighboring Arab countries like Syria or Lebanon.
    The Shi'a are Arab-Iraqis but they are more interested in 
instilling an Islamic identity in Iraq. In one sense, Iraq has 
exchanged one set of exiles for another. The indigenous 
leadership from inside Iraq, though it's emerging, has still 
not made its way to the top of the leadership group.
    Second, turnover in posts at the top has been substantial, 
creating lots of opportunity for mobility but the need to gain 
experience. The same is true at local and provincial levels 
where discontinuity may be even greater. Something like 60 
percent of the current Cabinet Ministers are new to the job. 
Some of this change is to be expected in an era of radical 
change, but it means that the new leaders must gain more 
experience in running a state. This will take time.
    The one exception to this rule is the Kurdish leadership. 
They have acquired considerable experience and maturity, often 
through the school of hard knocks, in running a government in 
the north. And it's not surprising that their area is quiet and 
gradually becoming more prosperous. The question with the 
Kurds, however, is how committed they are to building Iraqi 
institutions in the center as opposed to those in the north, 
and how to draw this experienced leadership further into the 
rebuilding of Iraq.
    Lastly, there's the problem of differing visions of the 
future of Iraq and where the various leaders would like to take 
the country. In my initial interviews I have found a certain 
amount of overlap, but there are also differences. Arab-Sunnis, 
Kurds, and the dominant Shi'a coalition have different views 
that need to be reconciled. That process is being dealt with 
through the constitutional process and elections. Of course, 
it's going to take time, but in my view the ongoing political 
process is one of the bright spots in a sometimes bleak 
picture.
    How can this process of accommodation be facilitated? How 
can the coalition help?
    First and foremost, every effort must be made to open Iraq 
to the outside world. While exiles have had some exposure to 
the outside, those inside have had little. Education at every 
level has deteriorated and Iraqis, especially professionals, 
are hungry for outside expertise and contacts. Let's give it to 
them. Visitors programs, fellowships and scholarships to study 
in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere, computers and 
library facilities in universities and centers, need to be 
encouraged and funded. This is being done--I think these 
programs are successful--but I'd rather see more money 
appropriated for those things and less to some others.
    One of the most positive aspects of my trip was in 
discovering young people in their twenties and thirties who 
wanted to come to the States to study political and social 
sciences, not engineering and computer science, for the first 
time in decades. We should encourage that.
    Second, let's concentrate on the younger generation which 
is Iraq's future. While the vision of most of the 40- and 50-
year-olds has already been formed, often in divergent ways, 
those in their adolescence and early adulthood are still 
flexible. And we should avoid stereotypes.
    For example, among the most hopeful and promising 
experiences of my trip to Baghdad was in talking to this 
generation, including several young people from Sadr City. We 
often think of Sadr City as a poverty-ridden slum, a nest of 
Islamic radicals, but these young people dispelled some of that 
impression, as far as I was concerned. One was a husband and 
wife team involved in local municipal government. Both were 
advanced graduates of universities and one was interested in 
pursuing a Ph.D thesis on U.S. foreign policy, but he needs 
more training in English. He should get it.
    Another was a remarkable young woman in her early thirties 
who had been encouraged by her family to get an education as a 
doctor. She was just about to take her board exams when Saddam 
was overthrown. She was appointed to her neighborhood council, 
and then in the space of 2 years she went from the neighborhood 
council to the district council to the municipal council. She 
was appointed to the national interim council in 2004, she ran 
as an independent for the national assembly and she's just been 
elected. She wants to have a political career and to come to 
the States to learn firsthand how to engage in one.
    What better way to invest in the future than to provide her 
and others like her with this opportunity.
    Third, encourage and strengthen the many civil society 
groups that are already blossoming, despite dire security 
conditions. Help think tanks get funded, support interest 
groups that are emerging, encourage training and conferences 
that bring diverse groups together in an environment that 
allows hands-on discussions and potential resolution of 
conflicts.
    The institution, which is funding my research, USIP, is a 
good example of this activity, though not the only one. IRI and 
NDI are doing yeoman work as well. These activities do not make 
the headlines but they're critical to developing future 
leadership and the skills and attitudes necessary for 
compromise.
    Fourth, strengthen government capacity, both at national 
and local levels. The political process is justifiably sucking 
up much of the time, energy, and resources of Iraq's elite. 
Meanwhile, the more mundane aspects of government--delivery of 
electricity, garbage collection, security--are neglected or 
given over to free lancers and contractors who may be corrupt 
or worse. Building government structures and an honest 
bureaucracy would greatly enhance Iraq's ability to carry on 
and to garner popular support while it struggles to settle 
these difficult political problems at the national level.
    Encouraging a civil service administration based on 
meritocracy would be a good step in this direction.
    And lastly, economic development by, and for, Iraqis must 
take place despite the security situation. All evidence 
including the polls from IRI suggests that this element, along 
with security, is the number one priority of the population. 
The constitutional process must be supplemented by growing 
prosperity and the strengthening of the middle class. Over 
time, nothing will better tamp down ethnic and sectarian 
tensions, help mitigate past feelings of victimization and 
fears of reprisal, and provide a new and better vision for 
Iraq's future and its youth.
    A failure to complete economic development--to couple 
economic development to the political progress being made--may 
produce an Iraqi version of what has just occurred in Iran; the 
election of a conservative, religiously oriented, President 
supported by a neglected working class. The potential 
indigenous leadership in Iraq today is not hidden secularists 
and liberals, but the Sadrist movement, which is gaining 
support by its nativist claims. Its leaders have not spent time 
outside of Iraq, and it is championing the poor, uneducated, 
and jobless.
    The best way to combat this situation is to make sure, 
first, that the political process continues to be open to these 
groups, and second, that the younger generation of 
underprivileged, such as those Sadr City residents that I met, 
are nurtured, encouraged, and given access to the outside 
world.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Marr.
    Ms. Van Rest.
    Ms. Van Rest. I agree with Phebe on all the things she said 
about the importance of exchange programs bringing youth to the 
universities and the like. In addition to that, IRI and NDI, 
through various grants to indigenous organizations, have been 
doing work on the ground helping emerging leaders and emerging 
groups begin to learn the process of how to work in a 
democracy.
    As you all know the institutes have been doing this for a 
long time. We have more than 20 years experience in assisting 
countries to emerge from authoritarian rule to democracies, and 
with our technical training ongoing, we are helping Iraqis 
build political parties, civil societies, government 
institutions, and other components necessary to have 
representative government.
    We do this--keeping in mind that democracy is just not an 
off-the-rack concept, one size does not fit all, but what we do 
know from our experience is that there are basic elements that 
are universal in a democracy and as we have with many other 
countries around the world we are continuing to assist them in 
fashioning their own new and free democratic Iraq.
    I would also like to point out that it is a long-term 
process as well. We have in the most recent example--well, we 
have had several experiences, but Ukraine is an example that I 
like to point out, we have been working there for more than 10 
years and as we saw last fall that the Ukrainian people finally 
took the bull by the horns and decided that they, indeed, 
wanted to have their own democracy.
    In addition to helping Iraqis with training in their public 
education, civic organizations, we're also drawing on the 
experience of countries in Central and Eastern Europe. We have 
a good many on our staff who are from Serbia and Ukraine. We 
also have trainers--we've had trainers come in from Romania, 
for example, and these trainers are very well received because 
Iraqis can relate to someone who was imprisoned or had a family 
member killed by an oppressive dictator but who is now working 
in successful transition away from authoritarian rule.
    Successful transitions in the Slovak Republic, Lithuania, 
and the Czech Republic as well as other regions in countries 
such as Indonesia, have all proved useful in providing Iraqis 
with case studies. For example, we took a group of Iraqi 
election officials to observe elections in Indonesia and other 
countries prior to the January 30 election.
    IRI staff in Iraq are folks who have helped to lead 
transitions in their own countries and this is something that 
is very much appreciated by Iraqis we work with.
    With regard to the opinion on issues of democracy and 
related topics I would like to refer to our polls. We conduct 
them on a regular basis, we have a poll currently in the field. 
The most recent poll is attached and, as you can see, there is 
information that we hope will inform the committee and others. 
For example, one question is: ``Were Iraq to have a 
Presidential system which of the following methods would you 
prefer?'' and the majority of people want direct elections. 
That continues, no question about it. Yet, there are also 
differing opinions on what role religion should play.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Dr. Feldman.
    Dr. Feldman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with much of 
what my colleagues say on this question. I would just emphasize 
that in the tremendously uncertain circumstances of present-day 
Iraq, the fluidity of the political situation is such as to 
encourage the emergence of a new generation of leaders, who are 
themselves extremely open to rapid changes both in their 
techniques and also in what appear to be their illogical 
commitments.
    Let me take as an example the most notorious, but also the 
most influential, young leader, that's Muqtada al-Sadr. Sadr 
began by challenging democracy as un-Islamic. One of his first 
big public speeches was a statement that Islam and democracy 
could not work together. He then moved on to participating in 
the elections. He began fighting the coalition violently 
through his Mahdi army, and indeed engaged in some very brutal 
fighting with U.S. forces, and yet he moved from that point to 
accepting coalition money for projects in neighborhoods that he 
and his political parties control.
    Sadr also challenged Ayatollah Sistani directly, in an 
extremely overt way, rather shocking to the Shi'a community, 
but he ended up acknowledging Sistani's authority when push 
came to shove.
    Now none of these is a marker of a moderate, this is not a 
moderate we're talking about. These are markers of someone who 
is learning as he goes, and who is ultimately willing to be 
extremely pragmatic, politically, in order to accomplish his 
goals. He still has general ideological preferences for 
something like an Iranian-style model of governance, but he's 
willing to work within the circumstances that he finds, which 
are circumstances that are rapidly changing. And one reason 
that he has survived thus far--there are two reasons he's 
survived. The first reason he survived is that the United 
States was not firm in its initial determination to get rid of 
him. If our decision had been to arrest him early on we could 
have done so at an early stage. That's the first reason he 
wasn't--he succeeded.
    The second reason, though, is precisely that he's been 
extremely flexible. I think the new generation of political 
leaders that are emerging in Iraq now share, not necessarily 
his particular ideological preferences, but they share this 
feature of tremendous flexibility, willingness to adapt to 
rapidly changing circumstances.
    Now what does that mean in a practical way for the United 
States? It certainly means that, at the grassroots level, we 
should be interested in educating people because if they are 
flexible, educating them in U.S. approaches and ideas can 
actually be effective.
    But it also means that we need to be realistic about what 
they will do when they go back to their country. It is not 
realistic to think that exposure to a Western-style education 
will make Western-style Democrats out of them. It's equally 
likely, or probably more likely, that such exposure will make 
them more sophisticated in dealing with us, a value to them----
    Senator Biden. It depends on their professor.
    Dr. Feldman. Everything does, as we'd like to believe in 
my, otherwise, largely irrelevant profession.
    So the truth is that we need to expect that we're going to 
be forced to deal with lots of extremely practically minded 
young politicians who will be willing, essentially, to say or 
do whatever is necessary for them to get ahead politically. And 
we have to be prepared to deal with them if we are adopting a 
strategy of dealing with them. What's problematic is if we 
adopt an equivocation strategy. What doesn't work is to say on 
day one, we're going to arrest you or kill you, and on day two, 
you are our ally in this democratizing process. Either one will 
work, often under lots of circumstances, but you've got to 
choose one and then stick with it, and I think that may be a 
general principle in life, but in this case it seems 
particularly true.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Now let me mention that at the beginning we said each of 
you would have an opportunity, at this stage, to add a final 
comment, something that has come to your mind, questions that 
have not been raised.
    Dr. Marr, have you had such inspirations at this point?
    Dr. Marr. Well, I've certainly been inspired by my 
colleagues here, but I did come with a suggestion that I think 
is worth looking at. Again, the lead has to be taken by the 
Iraqis, but after looking at polarization, looking at the 
election, and talking to many leaders, I'm seized with the idea 
that one of the things that would be most beneficial in Iraq in 
damping down this ethnic and sectarian polarization, would be a 
revision of the electoral law. The fact that it was a single-
list system seems to have contributed to the polarization. If, 
in fact, you could mix and match these provisions--it doesn't 
have to be all or nothing--but if a new electoral law could be 
drafted which shifts more in the direction of districts or 
provinces, a law that assures provincial representation in 
Parliament, this would shift the balance in the election to 
local and regional leaders who have constituencies. We can't be 
entirely sure--elections are always a question--but I think 
that would help. And there are many people in Iraq who 
suggested such a revision to me.
    For example, let's take many tribal leaders. I'm not a big 
fan of tribalism, but many of these leaders are educated, 
they're relatively sophisticated and they're practical and they 
have constituents. This would shift the system in the direction 
of constituents with interests and leaders with a need to 
``bring home the bacon'' rather than political parties with 
ideological frameworks. It would even help on the Kurdish 
issue.
    If we have any opportunity to suggest something, I propose 
this. We may not even need to suggest it because I think 
there's a contingent--quite a contingent--in the Iraqi 
political spectrum that would like that. Revising the election 
law may take more time, and may involve some kind of a census, 
but if this issue comes up we can give some good advice to 
Iraqis; that's my suggestion. That's worth taking a look at.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ms. Van Rest.
    Ms. Van Rest. As I alluded to, in my last remarks, I think 
from our point of view, it's very important to understand how 
long it takes to help people in other countries realize their 
own democracy, and so, therefore, I'm just--and I know that 
there is a great understanding on this committee of this, is 
that we need to be in there with other groups, not only NED and 
IRI and NDI, but other organizations who can continue to help 
Iraqis as they develop in setting up their institutions, in 
learning how to operate within a democracy. It doesn't happen 
overnight, which I know is a very simplistic thing to say, but 
it is something that we know takes a very long period of time, 
and so that is what I would like to offer as something we need 
to keep our eye on with regards to democracy-building programs.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Dr. Feldman.
    Dr. Feldman. I would just very briefly emphasize that 
there's an intimate connection between the progress on 
security, or a lack of progress on security, and the 
constitutional progress. I sometimes think that Iraq is like 
watching a split screen. On one side of the screen is this 
constitutional process that all in all has gone pretty well. 
It's had steps backward and it's had steps forward, but it's 
made reasonable progress, and even though Sunnis did not 
participate in the election there are now Sunnis involved in 
the political process, and they will be involved to some degree 
in the final constitution.
    On the other side of the screen, meanwhile, is the 
continued violence that we do see, literally, on our television 
screens every day, which is deeply destablizing to the 
political process in that it makes it look like a show. It 
makes it look as though the political process is disconnected 
from reality, and that's deeply harmful not just to our 
interests in Iraq--because it makes it much more difficult to 
achieve a political balance there which would enable us to 
begin to drawdown forces--it's also terribly damaging to our 
broader efforts in the region to encourage political processes 
that look a bit more like democracy than those that presently 
exist. Because opponents of democratization in all of the 
countries in the region regularly say--now this is a new 
argument, they didn't have this argument before Iraq, but their 
new antidemocracy argument is, look how destablizing democracy 
is. Open up political processes and suddenly you'll have 
suicide bombers, you'll have people all over the streets, 
you'll be in a very, very risky situation. And that is, in the 
long run, just as harmful to our interests in the region as it 
is to our particular and very immediate problems in Iraq 
itself.
    So I would just emphasize that inasmuch as we care a lot 
about the political process, and today we've been emphasizing 
those aspects of the political process that are good, or that 
can be improved, but we recall that as you've had even other 
panels thinking about this issue to realize that there's a 
close and central link between these, and that we could very 
easily end up with the best constitution ever ratified in an 
Arab country--and, in fact, I'm relatively confident that we 
will end up with such a constitution, at least measured by that 
metric--and that it will possibly mean very little in practical 
terms if we don't have the security to enable it to actually 
operate in practice.
    The Chairman. Well, thank you very much. I appreciate, 
likewise, my colleagues' patience. Nevertheless, you have set 
the stage magnificently. We'll begin our questioning with 10-
minute rounds, and I'll start my 10 minutes by making comments.
    First of all, I compliment to you, Ms. Van Rest, for giving 
us this poll from the International Republican Institute. Now, 
the poll we have in front of us is April 11 through April 20, 
so this is 3 months ago. You're in the field now----
    Ms. Van Rest. Yes.
    The Chairman. You polled the whole country. People said 47 
percent most identified with their country, 18 percent with 
their religion, 16 percent with their ethnic group, 11 with 
tribe, and 4 with city and town.
    So this is almost half who identify with the country, that 
is, being Iraqi is the most important thing, as opposed to 
being a Shiite. On the other hand, if you break this down, as 
you have, by the major groups, Kurds don't see it quite that 
way. They would identify with their ethnic group. At least 37 
percent think that's the most important thing, as opposed to 
Arabs, of whom only 12 percent think that's the most important.
    But if you're talking about ``my country,'' Arabs, by 50 
percent, identify with the country, and 28 percent of Kurds are 
in this situation. So, as is often the case, in aggregating 
statistics, why, we have very different views in terms of prime 
loyalty. And then you get to perhaps the most important issue 
requiring a governmental solution--we heard this yesterday from 
our panel--security remains a distinct challenge. Not the 
insurgency sort, but walk out the door in the morning to go 
safely to school, things of this kind.
    In this poll, interesting enough, inadequate electricity 
was the winner, unemployment second. Well, that's 
understandable. National security came in third, and high 
prices, and far down the line came crime, terrorists, and 
health care, for example. Maybe these are situations for more 
affluent organized societies, when lights go on, for example. 
And there is some sense that you can make some money and have a 
job if there's 50 percent unemployment.
    We're going to discuss the economy tomorrow because we've 
all discovered--maybe aside from security concern walking out 
the door--after you walk out the door, you hopefully walk to a 
job, or some destination. And if there is not a society to 
enforce those opportunities--well, to say the least, this is 
destablizing to whatever is going on downtown in the 
constitution building.
    Having said all that, my thoughts come down to, first of 
all, this basic question that I raised with respect to the poll 
that the Republican Institute did. I'm still wrestling with 
what sense do Iraqis have of wanting to be Iraqis. I don't say 
this in a divisive way, but clearly one of the most horrible 
outcomes of all this will be civil war. Or even some degree of 
disintegration, that is, parts of the population, as we know 
it, affiliating with somebody else on the basis of tribe or 
religion. Dr. Marr, in guiding us in our studies of Iraq, 
didn't describe it as an artificial country, but some have told 
of people drawing a line around the land mass we today call 
Iraq, maybe the British, the French, others after World War I, 
encompassing some disporate people, putting a tyrant over them, 
Saddam being, maybe, the last iteration of this, but suddenly 
the tyrant is gone and now we have to face, well, there you 
are.
    In the midst of this, the Kurds, as we've discovered, given 
some protection by our aircraft and their location, did develop 
a certain degree of self-government. Not surprisingly, they are 
demanding a pretty high degree of autonomy in this, a federal 
principle. Furthermore, they have very strong bargaining 
positions. Kurd leaders, who have come to visit with members of 
our committee, individually or collectively, are saying that 
Kirkuk is extremely meaningful to us. And the oil that is 
involved in this is equally so.
    So we could say, well, now listen, Iraq has got to be Iraq, 
you're all Iraqis, and there needs to be a sharing of the oil 
wells, and, likewise, some recognition of whom Kurds might be 
pushing out of Kirkuk, or who's coming and going from this 
situation.
    And they said, well, that's all well and good, but, 
nevertheless, this is our bottom line. As we are negotiating 
here, it's not just simply how many members of the assembly we 
have, or whether it's a two-thirds majority, or so forth, it's 
more fundamental. Where do we stand in all this?
    And, of course, we'll get into our fourth hearing, during 
which some of the other countries around will be discussed, but 
the Turks have indicated very visibly and publicly that they 
want the Kurds to be thinking about being Iraqis, clearly 
incorporated in Iraq, not flirting with desires for greater 
Kurdistan again involving Syrians, Iranians, and Turks, because 
if so, then we have a whole set of new conflicts even as we're 
trying to settle one that is fundamental here.
    And I will conclude with this broad question. The thing 
about being Iraqi is, there is this problem that you've 
discussed. We have some very sophisticated people in that 
assembly dealing with this. As you said, Dr. Feldman, we have 
maybe one of the best constitutions we could have hoped to come 
from such a situation.
    But it appears the United States displaced Saddam Hussein. 
By and large we rejoiced, the Iraqi people rejoiced, and the 
world I think, by and large, even if they didn't want to 
participate in it, rejoiced that he's gone.
    And we made some assumptions then about democracy. We felt 
that this is the shining moment for democracy arising in this 
particular country, in this very difficult neighborhood. And 
now there are some who would say fair enough, but on a scale of 
10 it doesn't have to be a 9-plus. Maybe if we come out with a 
6-plus or something we may claim that headway was made.
    Well, maybe so, but as some of you have said, and others 
who are looking at this example around there may say, well, 
what's the tradeoff--stability versus a democracy rated as a 6-
plus on a scale of 10 that is somewhat unstable.
    If the Chinese statesman was comparing what we have today 
in Iraq with his own situation, he might say, ``We're getting 9 
percent real growth in China. We have an authoritarian regime, 
and as a control, it works for us. Let the business people make 
their money, but stay out of city hall. Our way ensures 
security and crime fighting, whereas you idealistic people who 
are all hankering about democracy are looking at an economy in 
Iraq where people are unemployed, there's not much real growth, 
there's insecurity and you don't know where the oil money is 
going.''--we'll talk about that tomorrow during our hearing on 
the economy--but you understand, what's the world to think as 
they look at all this?
    Fundamentally, is there going to be a way out of this, in 
your judgment? Will the sense of being Iraqi be sufficient? At 
the end of the day, will the basic elements finally compromise, 
however they get to that point, and, likewise, will they have 
enough pride in the situation that they actually cut 
corruption? Will they manage to get the outside investment that 
will be required to get the kind of employment levels or the 
economy that they want? Will they work with other countries so 
that their security remains sufficient, and they're not invaded 
by somebody else either surreptitiously or overtly while they 
are getting their fledgling democracy going? Is there enough 
stability here, enough sense that this is likely to work, 
leaving aside the timetables of how long we stay, anybody 
stays, and so forth? Is there something here that is 
sufficiently Iraqi to assure that?
    Dr. Marr, I think you've thought about this issue for a 
bit, and will you give your judgment?
    Dr. Marr. Yes, thank you very much.
    On balance it's going to be difficult but my answer to you 
is ``Yes.'' Over the long term, probably. Iraq could fail, it 
could break down into Lebanon. However, I don't think a civil 
war between the communities will ensue or the kind of war we 
see now--the rejectionists versus something new--will continue.
    I'm actually investigating this very issue of identity. I'm 
relying on IRI polls and others for the opinion of general 
population but I'm trying to determine through intensive 
interviews with leaders of various kinds--provincial and 
national, younger and older--how they view this issue. My 
conclusion, in general, is that the real difficulty lies with 
the Kurds and whether they feel ``Iraqi.'' This problem has 
grown tremendously in the last couple of decades.
    I do want to say something about your characterization of a 
new state and a dictator. Iraq had a lot of history before 
Saddam. Governance is a long-standing problem, but the British 
came in with much the same problem. Over a long period of time 
they did institute an imperfect parliamentary system, and we do 
have to remember that Kurds participated, to a great extent, in 
that. We had Kurdish Prime Ministers, Kurdish Ministers of 
Interior, Kurdish members of Parliament, and so on.
    Then the polity began to fragment and there was disruption 
especially after 1958. But the fact that the Kurds have been 
governing themselves for the last--what is it now--13, 14 
years, and that education has been in Kurdish for that time--
has created a younger generation for whom there has been no 
interaction with Iraq, and who don't know Arabic. The older 
generation is more pragmatic, they speak Arabic, they have a 
memory of having interacted with the rest of Iraq. But 
integration is going to be more difficult for the Kurds than 
others.
    There certainly is a sense of Iraqi identity among the Arab 
population, but in my view this has weakened over time--
certainly in Saddam's time, and recently. Why? Because many of 
the new leaders are not secular nationalists, they're people 
for whom religion and Islamic identity is increasingly 
important. This doesn't mean they're not Iraqi; they are Arab, 
and Iraqi, but the Islamic identity has become increasingly 
important.
    And we're now going to have some problems with the Sunnis 
who feel separate, which they didn't before. We have this issue 
in the constitution right now--whether Iraq is part of the Arab 
world. That's a rubric for whether identity is more Arab or 
Iraqi, but I think this is a less serious issue among the Shi'a 
and Sunni Arab population than it is with the Kurds.
    Just one more word about the Kurds. I believe that the 
Kurdish identity issue will improve in time, if things go 
better, we get some kind of constitution which the parties can 
agree on, and we get economic development. I keep emphasizing 
the economics because I think that's equally important to the 
political process.
    Economic opportunities are going to create different 
visions; something else to think about, something else to work 
for. The insurgency has succeeded in accomplishing two things 
in my view. It has succeeded in cutting Baghdad off from the 
rest of the country. I suspect all of you who have been to 
Baghdad know what I mean. If you're in the green zone in 
Baghdad you don't travel north, you don't travel south. And, of 
course, the insurgency has cut the country off from outsiders 
wishing to come inside. This is not helping integration. I 
believe integration will take place on the ground when people 
in the north come down to Baghdad to do business, when they go 
to Baghdad University, or Mosel University, when they have to 
interact on a personal level. That is going to knit people 
together and provide some lessening of this intense feeling of 
separation, among communities but for that we're going to have 
to get security.
    One last thing I keep mentioning to the Kurds; over time, 
they're going to have to make a decision on whether it's worth 
it to try to get independence. It is going to be terribly 
difficult to get recognized, by us, by the neighbors, and, of 
course, the cost of independence is going to be huge. They 
cannot protect their borders. They haven't been able to do so 
before, they can't do so now. If they don't get independence 
they'll be able to undertake some economic development, but 
they will not be able to develop those oil resources in the 
north and there will be constant limit on what they can 
achieve.
    One of the things I keep reminding them of, is that in 
their worst case scenario they could end up like northern 
Cyprus, part of a country which is not independent, but which 
has opted for ethnic separatism. They may be left behind as, 
hopefully, the rest of Iraq picks up and develops.
    So they have a problem as well, and it really is worth 
their effort to create a better Iraq, a neighborhood in which 
Kurds feel safer.
    The Chairman. I'll leave it at that. I'd like to ask the 
other panelists the same question, but we've run well over my 
time, and I want to recognize my colleague, Senator Biden.
    Senator Biden. Thank you very much. I've always been 
impressed by Dr. Marr, and had a chance to hear from her in my 
office here and I appreciate it. But I've been generally 
impressed by both of your testimony.
    I'd like to start with you, Ms. Van Rest. I must tell you 
this may not be fair but I think your outfit is doing something 
very, very important along with your Democratic counterpart, 
and I'm going to go to the floor and try to make sure you get 
another $28 million because I understand you're going to be 
ratcheted down. You're going to have to start to pull back, you 
and the whole NDI, and I think that would be a disaster, and we 
got an $18 billion bill for Iraq up there, and I'm going to try 
very hard to earmark $60 million for both operations.
    And second, Senator Dodd, I hope I'm not stealing his 
thunder, pointed out to me--this is pretty impressive, the 
methodology of this poll, face-to-face interviews of 2,705 when 
85 percent of our diplomatic corps never is able to walk 
outside the green zone, when there's very little intercourse at 
all out there. Impressive.
    And I have one very quick and may seem like an unrelated 
question, why Dahouk. Why was that excluded, was it security 
reasons up there?
    Ms. Van Rest. Yes, there are some security reasons up 
there.
    Senator Biden. Because you don't hear much--at least I 
don't hear much about that. You hear about Mosel and you hear 
about Ramadi, but I didn't realize that that was----
    Ms. Van Rest. There are some security issues there.
    Senator Biden. Let me--in the short time I have left I'd 
like to raise--I'm going to try to talk about it, and maybe if 
we get a chance to come back, Sunni participation, a little bit 
more about the Kurds, the insurgents, splitting the insurgency, 
the political process and how it's impacted by the issue of 
lack of security, and the timing of the constitution.
    But let me start off with Sunni participation, and if you 
can give me brief answers, understanding that we'll have to, 
maybe, expand on another round.
    Everybody acknowledges that the Sunnis have to be in on the 
deal, the Shi'a acknowledge it, the Kurds acknowledge it, they 
know the way that law that we know, but the law that the 
Americans know is the one guiding them now, says if any three 
provinces opt out it's out, so they know they got to get them 
in the deal.
    But Dr. Feldman, you talk about splitting the insurgency, 
and we all understand what you mean, they're not moderates, but 
in a relative sense it's moderate. It seems to me that the one 
way, the most likely way for that to occur is for us to get to 
the point where there's another election, not a referendum on 
the constitution, but an actual election for Sunni 
participation. And in my discussions with the Speaker of the 
Parliament, and with my discussions with the Secretary of 
Defense, they were emphatic about the need to--because they're 
all hanging out there. I mean very individually hanging out 
there, they're among the group you're talking about taking real 
courage to, you know, get in the deal here, that they need 
elections.
    I'm attracted by the prospect, and mainly because I 
suggested it, but you articulated it much better, Dr. Feldman, 
about the possibility of deferral. I agree that if we can have 
the election on time it's the best way to go. But that's 
problematic.
    I want to make sure I understand what you mean by deferral. 
The way I've been talking about it is the possibility that you 
actually defer the process of the written constitution that 
requires a referendum vote until there is a general election. 
Not preferable way, but I worry about you can't write the 
constitution, or you write it and it effectively excludes 
Sunnis even though they participate. It ends up the 
constitution fails under the existing criteria for acceptance, 
or it somehow gets jammed and you end up with the Sunnis 
fundamentally opposed to what's been agreed upon, highly 
unlikely one or the other would happen; maybe both.
    And so talk to me a little bit more about the notion of, as 
a fall-back position, the deferral idea.
    Dr. Feldman. Well, Senator Biden, I think there are two 
ways to think about the deferral question, and let me try to 
deal with each of them.
    Obviously, the reason we're in this situation is that 
Sunnis didn't participate in the elections the first time, they 
made a total miscalculation and now----
    Senator Biden. Or I would argue the miscalculation, which 
Dr. Marr said as well, we should have organized this not on a 
nationwide basis, we should have organized this on a provincial 
basis so that you get a certain number of delegates even if 
only two people vote.
    Dr. Feldman. I entirely agree.
    Senator Biden. In my view.
    Dr. Feldman. I think you're both absolutely right about 
that. In any case once we were in a situation where that wasn't 
the case, we faced a second problem of the fact that that way 
the transitional law is set up, we're expected to have the 
ratification vote prior to the election. Then the question is 
how could we change this?
    One option would be--and I think this is closer to the 
deferral that you were speaking of--literally, to say that we 
don't need to finish the constitution now, let's just hold the 
elections first to give the Sunnis a second try as it were, a 
second bite at the apple on the elections.
    Now if that were doable, and perhaps it is still doable, I 
would be strongly in favor of that. I think it would be a good 
solution. Some of the Shi'a and the Kurds would say, well, my 
goodness, this is unfair, they should have voted the last time, 
and the answer would have to be something like, you're right, 
and we know you're right, but better this than the alternative.
    In practical terms, though, I suspect that it will not be 
possible to convince either the Shi'a, the Kurds, or perhaps 
even the present administration to adopt that radical a change 
in the TAL framework.
    The leads to a second form of deferral which you might call 
soft deferral, and this begins with your idea, Senator, and 
then offers the following twist on it to meet circumstances.
    This view would, essentially, say that the present parties 
will sign something that they will call the constitution for 
purposes of the TAL.
    Senator Biden. Yeah, okay.
    Dr. Feldman. It will, however, be limited in its scope and 
many crucial issues will be deferred by its own terms until 
after there have been elections and we have Sunnis involved.
    That is imperfect from the standpoint of permanence, of 
course, but I think would be--it's a way of preserving the 
essence of your idea even if it turns out to be the case that 
we can't get people to agree to it informally.
    Senator Biden. Again, not my idea in the sense that it's 
preferable, but it was chilling to me the meetings I had with 
the present elected and appointed representative in the Iraqi 
Government over Memorial Day. Chilling the way in which they--
and I'm just going to speak generically--spoke of one another. 
It was chilling, it was anything but a coherent government, and 
they all had their own--understandably--axe to grind.
    For example, I was told by one Senator if you think the 
Peshmerga the Badr Brigade integrated or not into a Iraqi Army 
where Shi'as--Sunnis aren't joining is going to be able to be 
the vehicle to bring peace in the Sunni areas, give me a break. 
I mean, you know, we view them as more invaders than you, which 
leads me to my second question.
    How--and I'd ask any and all of you if there's time, and 
then I'll wait until the second round, there's a significant 
discussion among the military side of the equation here. You 
talk to the former generals, the security types who approach 
this from purely a security point of view, there's a debate 
about how much our presence is the cause of the insurgency, and 
how much our absence would impact on the insurgency. And you 
get both answers. You get one it is not the major reason for 
the insurgency, it's larger than that, and if we did leave it 
would get worse; and you get the other point of view which is, 
hey, it's a big deal if we got out of there at a smaller 
footprint then, in fact, things would get better.
    And so, as it relates to the Sunnis, again I did not--this 
time I didn't even get to Fallujah, Ramadyh, or anywhere else, 
I was just in Baghdad.
    And by the way, it was a lot worse than the first time I 
got there. I mean it gets worse and worse every time I've gone. 
And so I don't mean to suggest--in a sense I feel like when I 
go there I'm in a cocoon, that you know, my inability to get 
out--
    The chairman and I were able to walk around, literally, the 
first time we were there downtown. And it's just fundamentally 
changed.
    Anyway, having said that, my impression from the Sunnis 
with whom I got to meet inside the green zone, most of whom 
were related to the government, some were not, including 
military personnel, were that they would rather have us there 
now. The last thing they want to do is ask us to leave now, 
Sunnis. Sunnis. Yet there's an overwhelming sense that no, no, 
no--the Sunnis, if right now there is a secret ballot they'd 
all say get out of here, all go home. All coalition forces.
    What is the read? First of all, what is the public opinion 
beyond what it says here? Do you have a sense what that is? And 
both you doctors tell me what you think about the impact of 
U.S. presence as it relates to Sunni attitudes of 
participation, toward their participation in this outfit.
    Ms. Van Rest. I'll just try to address it from our 
viewpoint. We work--we don't have offices in the green zone, we 
work in the red zone. Because of security issues for staff, out 
of necessity, we really do rely on the Iraqi groups we work 
with, we spend a lot of time doing more training, ``training-
the-trainer'' kinds of programs so that they can branch out.
    It's one of those things where, while Iraqis, number one, 
are grateful for our assistance, they really want to be on 
their own. I'm not sure how they feel about, if our presence 
there militarily is the reason for the insurgency; on the other 
hand, they're very clear that they want us to leave, but not 
now.
    And they--I think it's just one of those things where we're 
constantly going to have to take stock of--continue to talk to 
them, it's a little bit of a, maybe, schizophrenic situation 
for them because they want their independence, they need our 
assistance, and so I think that that's what we're just going to 
have to continue to address.
    Senator Biden. My time is up, but a short answer from 
either one of your colleagues?
    Dr. Marr. I've looked at this and actually we've done some 
thinking about it among my colleagues at USIP. We gave 
something to the new Ambassador to think about.
    We all know you can't generalize about the Sunnis. We have 
to peel them back from insurgency like the onion.
    Those folks, the pale, we're all in agreement on, but there 
are different layers of opposition, and it's already breaking. 
The National Dialogue Council includes Sunnis. The IIP, the 
Iraqi Islamic Party has indicated its willingness to 
participate. The Council of Vlama has not yet done so. How 
about ex-Ba'th officers? There are a whole lot of people who 
fit in this category--academics, for example, who have shadowy 
parties. These people can be brought in to the process. I don't 
want to use the word co-opt, but they need to be constantly 
brought in, split off. This process is already taking place, 
and we ought to do everything we can to encourage that.
    I don't know about deferral, or having an election first, 
but this is a process which is happening. There are Sunni 
possibilities there. We have names. Frankly, these are the 
people whom we have to rely on. There are some tribal leaders, 
as well, who have to be identified province by province and 
area by area. They have constituencies. There's no sense in 
dealing with people who can't bring some other people in.
    Dr. Feldman. Very briefly. I think it's not schizophrenic 
for people both to deeply wish we would leave and recognize 
that the risks of that are enormous at the moment.
    I do think that in most of the Sunni areas the sense is, 
broadly, that we are on the side of the Shi'a and the Kurds, 
which to a certain extent is true. And as a consequence many 
people in those areas think that if we would leave that would 
strengthen their position. Some in the insurgency, actually, 
would want to retake the country. Others think that's 
unrealistic, but think they would be better off vis-a-vis the 
Shi'a and the Kurds if they were fighting on their own without 
us on the other side.
    And so there's probably a range of views about that. The 
people in the green zone that you met I would suspect, who are 
Sunnis, are in serious trouble if we leave, and I'm not 
surprised to hear that they would like us to stay put.
    Senator Biden. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. And thank you, Senator Biden.
    Senator Dodd.
    Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me begin by 
apologizing to the chairman for not being present yesterday 
during the first round of these hearings. For weather reasons I 
couldn't get a plane out of Connecticut to get down here in 
time, so I want to apologize for missing yesterday.
    But thank you immensely for having these hearings, these 
are tremendously valuable and I know colleagues are busy with 
so many other things here, but it's so, and the way you've 
orchestrated it as well, Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for the 
way you've laid this out, and asking some basic questions and 
giving the panel an opportunity to go through all of that has 
been tremendously helpful.
    I gather my colleague from Delaware made note of the fact 
that he regretted, yesterday, the administration has not been 
present in all of this, and I know that's not the fault of the 
chairman at all, but I want to second his concerns about it. 
It's--the President started the dialog a week or two ago in 
talking about this issue. He needs to do more of it. Exactly 
the point that Senator Biden has made, and I think you've made 
as well, Mr. Chairman, that it's one thing to be concerned 
about public opinion in Iraq and how things are moving there, 
but I happen to subscribe to the notion that if the President 
continues to have eroding support here on this policy that the 
question will be answered even before the Iraqis may have 
answered the question.
    So his engagement and the administration's engagement, in 
this conversation, is extremely important, in my view, and I 
regret that they're not here to participate.
    A couple of questions, and I thank all three of you, it's 
been very, very interesting, and very, very helpful. I, too, 
was struck with this survey and rather impressed that 200 
interviewers can get out all across the country and conduct 
these interviews, and I want to raise a couple of questions, if 
I can.
    First of all, I want to get to the notion of how you 
communicate what's going on, and I thought about some of your 
points about holding town meetings are precarious. Even in New 
England I might point out they're precarious. I think the last 
one I had some years ago, when I finally decided I'd do student 
forums rather than open public forums, someone showed up 
dressed as Abraham Lincoln and he got into a fist fight with a 
world federalist, and that was the end of the town meeting, and 
they were the story the next day and I decided I wasn't going 
to provide a forum any longer for that kind of activity.
    Senator Biden. If the Senator would yield for a second----
    Senator Dodd. Yes.
    Senator Biden. I have a similar experience. I held 2 years 
ago, in a Boys Club in a place called Bear, Delaware, a town 
meeting, and 13 members of the Ku Klux Klan showed up.
    Senator Dodd. So to make your point, you know, who shows up 
at these town meetings, and how they use them for their own 
benefits, can be contrary to your stated goals of what you'd 
like to have occur at these things.
    But what I was thinking, as you were talking, you know, the 
founding of this Republic, it was a Federalist papers, that was 
the pamphleteer was the way of communicating, and the public 
was there making the argument as to why those provisions of the 
Constitution, and there's got to be some equivalent in this day 
of the Internet, and, of course, the ability with wireless 
communication skills to be able to allow the Iraqi people to be 
a witness to debate and discussion. I don't know if there's 
something comparable to a C-Span, but if there is I would hope 
that in the time that remains, we'd be looking at means by 
which the Iraqi people, through radio or television, could sort 
of listen in to this debate that's going on. And I presume it's 
a good heated debate between the various factions so that while 
they're not participating themselves in a real way they're 
conscious of the fact that their points of view are being 
articulated during those discussions.
    I think that has a lot to do with confidence building about 
whether or not my voice, my point of view, is being heard as 
they develop these points of view.
    So, again, I'm going to go through a couple of questions 
here and then give you a chance to respond to all of them. And 
maybe that's not realistic but it seems to me that's one sort 
of answer here.
    Second, I don't know if any of you--and I'm just curious--
this Sy Hersh article. I don't know if you had a chance to read 
it in the New Yorker and so forth, and wondered if you got a 
chance to make any conclusions about the correctness or 
incorrectness of his conclusions about--and to the extent then 
that this would have an adverse impact on the present process.
    The point being for those who may not have seen the article 
is that we were so deeply involved in influencing the outcome 
of that election in terms of even doctoring numbers and 
funneling money to preferred candidates, revealing the 
itinerary of election observers, voter intimidation, ballot 
stuffing, it's a pretty extreme set of conclusions, but Sy 
Hersh has not been wrong every time he's written an article, 
and, in fact, he's been right on a number of occasions.
    And I'm curious as to whether or not you have any 
observations about it?
    Then, I'd like to raise the issue, Mr. Feldman, that you 
talked about, and others did as well. But I was too struck with 
some of these numbers that the chairman raised in the survey 
done by IRI. And the conclusion on page nine of the survey, 
it's right direction/wrong direction. Ms. Van Rest, I'm 
interested in your survey done, why do you think Iraq is 
heading in the right or wrong direction? In the wrong direction 
column why is it going in the wrong direction? Security is the 
number one answer. The lack of it, I presume, almost 34 
percent. And yet when you go down the list terrorism shows up 
at 6 percent. And I'm just curious as to why there seems to be 
a disconnect between the lack of security and terrorism. What 
is going on in the minds of a respondent when there's so much 
of a difference where you've given the fact that--now granted 
this survey was done in April and we're in July, and there's 
been a spiked increase, so maybe in the April setting--I can't 
recall specific events, it may have been relatively flat, but, 
nonetheless, it's Iraqis who are dying. We're losing our 
soldiers, from time to time, in numbers none of us like at all, 
but compared to the Iraqis who are losing their lives on a 
daily basis I'm struck by the fact that they would not consider 
that. And maybe they are in the answer to the security 
question, but why they don't relate terrorism, or do they not 
see it as terrorism? Maybe that's part of the answer.
    And I'd like you to try to shed some light for me on that 
particular point as to why those numbers are different.
    And lastly, I wonder if you might--I've been very curious 
as to why we haven't taken advantage of our new found 
relationship with Libya. Khadafi has foresworn his accumulation 
of nuclear weapons, Senator Biden had a unique opportunity to 
actually address the Libyan legislature. The administration 
lists it as a major accomplishment, and I agree with them, I 
think this was a phenomenal result. Libya is a 97 percent Sunni 
country. I've been told that they are supportive of what we're 
doing, at least generally speaking, and curious if you might 
calibrate among those countries in the region who was in a 
better position to help us influence broader Sunni 
participation in the Iraqi process of the neighboring states.
    We all talk about Jordan and Egypt, but I never hear anyone 
mention Libya, and I'd be curious as to whether or not you 
think there's an opportunity there that we may not be taking an 
advantage of to the extent that there is a new found 
relationship here.
    Those are a lot of questions but I wonder if you might 
respond to them.
    Dr. Marr. I'd like to take on the terrorism question 
because I think I understand that.
    Terrorism broadly means what you and I read in our 
newspaper every day. The suicide bomber who undertakes massive 
killings in a marketplace or a mosque, something that people 
can't be sure of, that's uncertain. And targeting American 
forces which affects us, but not them.
    But I want to go back to something I mentioned in passing. 
Frankly, for the ordinary Iraqi, crime that we recognize as 
crime is a greater threat. For example, the kidnappings that 
are taking place in Baghdad, particularly among the middle and 
upper class people; assassinations of people who work for the 
government, of many university professors, doctors, and so on. 
Middle and upper class Iraqis--particularly people of substance 
are leaving Iraq because of this crime.
    That's one of the reasons why I think we should focus 
analytically and politically on that particular issue. This is 
more a policing issue. Getting more police would free up 
resources and forces to deal with the insurgents. These crimes 
are not always connected to the insurgency, but this is an 
issue that is devastating.
    Of course--we have to recognize that the insurgency is 
concentrated in a region, too--mostly Baghdad and the triangle 
rather than the north and the south.
    I also have some views on the neighbors and Libya. It often 
looks to us as though we should involve the neighbors, but 
inside Iraq, if you talk to Iraqis, particularly these in 
government--with the Kurds and with many of these new Shi'a 
leaders who are oriented in a different direction, it's pretty 
clear, involving the neighbors is not going to be helpful. Some 
of the remarks that I've heard from these people indicate that 
if you start to involve the Arab world, which is mainly Sunni, 
it's going to provide support for the Sunni population. There's 
suspicion of the Ba'thists; they're not in favor. So you've got 
to keep in mind that this is not a friendly environment for 
some of these regional partners. Libya would be a real stretch 
for the Iraqis. It's hard for me to see how the Libyans could 
mediate there.
    But even if we use Egyptians, Jordanians, and others among 
certain elements in Iraq, there's a great deal of suspicion of 
them. So we've got to be careful and sensitive.
    Ms. Van Rest. I'd like to comment on the question about 
direct assistance to political parties as discussed in the 
article.
    I know you all know this, but the National Endowment and 
the party institutes have been on record that we work with 
parties across the board. We don't pick any favorites, giving 
assistance to the parties in terms of training, communications 
training, and the like, and helping them to figure out how to 
develop messages, that kind of thing. And these are the 
techniques that have worked through the years in helping 
parties develop.
    So I think we've been on record with that before, but that 
characterizes our assistance.
    Senator Dodd. Let me just say, by the way, and I'm glad 
Senator Biden intends to offer some additional resource. We've 
had some--I remember some very close votes going back through 
the years, and I think by a margin of one vote, one year, we 
were able to sustain the National Endowment for Democracy. That 
was hotly opposed by many people who saw this as some great--
and I think the record of the NED and the respective two-party 
organizations have been terrific, it was long overdue that we 
weren't more directly involved in building parties--and by the 
way, let me focus on the party aspect of that too. I think one 
of the problems we've been involved in is we've tried to be 
neutral about this to such a degree that our support for civil 
society in a lot of places is very nice, but most of the people 
in civil society don't run for public office. And a great 
spokesman and so forth may show up but they never want to get 
out and knock on the screen door, and I wish we did more with 
the parties. I love civil society in these countries but we 
need to pay more attention to people who are actually willing 
to put their name on a ballot and go out and run for public 
office, and too often we ignore them, fearful we're going to be 
seen as being partisan in some way, and pay attention, the 
civil society groups which are wonderful but rarely want to 
engage in the kind of day-to-day politics you need to do if 
you're going to succeed.
    I didn't mean to digress, but I think it's a point that 
needs to be made.
    Dr. Feldman. A couple of quick points. First, with respect 
to where the debate is going to happen, Senator. Those of us 
who had some--who were involved in the transitional 
administrative law process--have been a bit surprised by the 
way the constitutional committee has operated, because the 
transitional administrative law contemplates that the elected 
national assembly will actually debate the constitution, and 
that would be--and was imagined to be--the natural forum for a 
public televised debate to be visible on Iraqi television and, 
indeed, on regional television where it would also have a 
substantial effect. And that debate would also be open to the 
possibility of changing the constitutional drafted text after 
the process of the debate, because the thing would not have, as 
it were, the text would not have gone out for ratification yet.
    I think it's still not too late to do that. I think that's 
contemplated by the transitional law. It doesn't require any 
changes, and I think it would be plausible to interpret the 
transitional law in the following way: To say that by August 15 
the committee is charged to produce a text, and it can do so. 
And then at that point the national assembly would have an 
opportunity to debate that, and there is, at least, until 
October 15 for ratification referendum. And that date could 
perhaps be extended, perhaps a little bit, at least, insofar as 
this is the Middle East and deadlines are never understood by 
anybody to be absolutely hard and fast.
    So I think there is a possibility for that, and I think it 
would be an ideal context for the debate to occur. It would be 
an opportunity for Iraqis to see the people whom they elected 
actually involved in the constitutional process.
    With respect to the Seymour Hersh article, I did see it. In 
fact, I spoke to Mr. Hersh several times in the process of 
preparing the article, and I think he even quoted a couple of 
things that I said to him there. And I think what is most 
striking to me about the article is that I urged, and I think 
others urged him, to try to see if he could find some sort of 
statistical proof of this suggestion about ballot stuffing, or 
substantial changes in outcomes.
    The one statistic that he pointed to there, which is at 
least worthy of closer attention--I don't think it proves 
anything, but it's worth looking at, is the statistic that says 
that then-Prime Minister Ayad Allawi received a much larger 
number of votes at the national level for his party than the 
same party received at the local level.
    In other words, that there was substantial ticket 
splitting. Now it's entirely possible that there was simply 
ticket splitting, that people were choosing--and this point was 
addressed in the article--that local people were voting for 
parties where they knew the local players, but they wanted a 
strong hand at the national level. That's a perfectly plausible 
explanation, nothing in the article that I've seen disproves 
that.
    It's certainly a statistic worth looking at more closely 
because the truth is that any allegations on this front are 
highly risky. We know this from the situation in Afghanistan 
where a single and ultimately unsubstantiated rumor led to some 
significant violence. Here, too, there could be a real 
process--perhaps not of direct violence, but, at least, of the 
discrediting of some of the people who are, after all, most 
positively inclined toward us. So it may have ended up 
backfiring.
    A last thought on this, and this is something that is much 
closer to the expertise of the members of the committee than to 
mine, but the article at least implied that there may have been 
some disrespect for the legislative input of Members of the 
Houses of Congress in the process of whatever decision was 
made. I, of course, have no way of knowing if any of that is 
accurate or not, but it seems to be of the greatest concern.
    Senator Dodd. And about Libya, do you have any----
    Dr. Feldman. I do. Two thoughts on Libya. I basically agree 
with Dr. Marr.
    The first is that Libya is noted for its--you mentioned 
that they're Sunni, which is true, but the President--or 
President is the wrong word--but Colonel Khadafi is noted for a 
very heterodox form of Sunni Islam, let's just say, going 
alongside his other personal idiosyncracies. I think we can 
probably say that without giving any offense. And I think that 
he would--this is known throughout the region, and I think that 
would make him, to some degree, disqualified from the 
perspective of many local Sunnis.
    The other is simply, and Senator Biden can speak to this 
since he was just there, it may be too soon to place any 
particular trust or extra credibility in someone who's track 
record--I totally agree with the substantial accomplishments 
that have brought him to where he's been brought, but his track 
record is, obviously, not one that inspired confidence, and I 
think there are other stories out there about him that are, 
even if unsubstantiated, the fact that such stories are 
circulating strongly suggests that he might not be the kind of 
person we'd want to strengthen in this way.
    Senator Dodd. Thank you very much. And thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. Well, thank you, Senator Dodd. I appreciate 
very much Senator Biden addressing the appropriation bill 
that's on the floor now, and the need for moneys for the NED 
and the party institutes, and Senator Dodd's strong endorsement 
of that. I would just add a third voice.
    During the 9 years that I was a member of the NED Board, I 
was tasked to get the money every year, and this was sometimes, 
as Senator Dodd knows, a precarious prospect, but I had----
    Senator Biden. You had to overcome some Democratic 
opposition as I recall.
    The Chairman. So I was relieved that when I left the board, 
the place was still there. They've been doing much better since 
I left the board, I might add.
    Senator Dodd. No correlation whatsoever.
    The Chairman. There has been recognition of its value. 
There is an important thing that is occurring on the ground in 
Iraq that is largely unrecognized. Let me compliment those of 
you who have been involved at any level with this.
    And second, I just want to note Dr. Feldman's comments 
about the TAL. How might this evolution of the constitution 
occur? In various of your comments today, you've mentioned when 
we got into this that you wonder how the people of Iraq will 
discover what is in the constitution, or evaluate it, and if 
they do so, is it a document that they can change?
    One of the truths that I perceive with this set of hearings 
is that it really is not too late for things on the ground to 
be influenced by the conversations that we're having here. They 
are